Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face a greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a new dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.

It is unfortunately an established fact that both men and womenfolk have, in utterly irresponsible manner, driven extravagance in dress and new styles to such shameful and wanton extremes that the different classes are barely to be known apart.

This paper assesses the causal relationship between POW assignments and labor productivity for a vital sector of the German World War I economy, namely coal mining. Prisoners of war (POWs) provided significant labor. Combining data on all Ruhr mines with a treatment-effects approach, I find that POW employment alone accounted for 36 percent of the average POW-employing mine’s annual productivity decline over wartime. Estimates also suggest that the representative POW’s productivity averaged 32 percent of the representative regular miner’s productivity and that POWs’ contribution to wartime coal output amounted to 3.9 percent. Violence did not serve as a powerful work incentive.

Since writing “Cotton Competition,“ I have many times wished that I had never included the paragraph joining pages 632 and 633, since figures that were intended as no more than back-of-the-envelope confirmation of the econometric results have been cited as the central conclusions of the study. To make matters worse, the demand-shift formula was incorrectly applied, most seriously in the exaggerated decline in demand for American cotton between 1860 and 1870. For these reasons I am grateful to John Hanson for making these corrections and for giving me an opportunity to disown this particular halfdozen numbers.

This paper analyzes 1850 cost data for a sample of 36 steamboats operating on five routes. The results indicate no economies or diseconomies of scale. Substantial differences in the cost per ton-mile are found between routes. These differences are largely explained by differences in capacity utilization.

From 1841 throught 1845 and again in 1847 and 1848 ofiicials of the United States patent Office estimated the output of the principal agricultural crops of each state and territory. These estimates have been generally disregarded by economic historians, presumably because their acuracy has been considered questionable. But I have bee unable to find any published, comprehensive evaluation of them. In this note I will briefly examine the methods used to make the crop estimates and apply a few checks againsts the results, with the object of evaluating them, in a preliminary way, as historical data.

The period between 1860 and the death of Queen Victoria in 1901 saw the pound sterling moving into even the most isolated corners of the world, seeking, amoeba-like, to reproduce itself with a minimum of effort. Among other areas to feel its impact and to reap its benefits was the American West, particularly the mineral frontier. Records of the Board of Trade indicate that during these forty-one years at least 518 British joint-stock companies were incorporated, with a total nominal capitalization of not less than £77,705,751, to engage in mining and milling activities in the intermountain West, exclusive of the Pacific Coast.

It is widely accepted that improvements in transportation were an important feature of Western development. However, in contrast to the research undertaken on transportation after 1775, very little study has been undertaken on the development of transportation before the Revolution. The main theme of this study is productivity change in ocean shipping on colonial routes, 1675-1775. The primary objectives are twofold: to estimate the change of productivity and to determine the sources of that change.

The aim of this discussion is to elucidate the evolution of the management concepts, organizational patterns, and policies of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). In point of fact, these topics are discussed primarily with reference to the origin and development of the Standard Oil combination under its various legal titles prior to 1911. The policies and practices, both sound and unsound, of the men who administered the Jersey Company in its early years were largely those of the men who created the combination.

Financially, the Federal Government was more poorly prepared for war in the early months of 1861 than it had been since its establishment. The financial policies of the government in the period preceding the war weakened its credit; and this, along with the urgency of the conflict, was to make short-term borrowing and the printing of paper money attractive but costly wartime expedients. Although the failure to finance the war on a sound basis cannot be ascribed merely to prewar financial conditions and policies, the stage was set by them. The regression to earlier methods of war finance began even before the war.