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Why Employer-based Pension Plans? The Case of Britain
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
Abstract
Private savings–often through employer-based pension plans–account for a larger proportion of retirement incomes in Britain than elsewhere. The strength of employer–based pension plans in Britain can be traced to a variety of factors; their early development and security are emphasized. The pattern of spread, with heavy concentration initially in bureaucratic firms, suggests that old-age saving entered the employment relationship around 1900 because large-scale bureaucracies needed conditional, lifetime payment systems. By the 1930s, the other main intermediaries for old-age saving, specializing in private provision on an individual basis, had moved into the market for collective, employer-based pension plans.
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- Papers Presented at the Forty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
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- Copyright © The Economic History Association 1985
References
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