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The Rise of Effective States in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 August 2015

Mark Dincecco
Mark Dincecco*
Affiliation:
Mark Dincecco is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 6567 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109–1045. E-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

This review article examines the development of state capacity—the extractive and productive power of states— in European history. To explain the historical evolution of state capacity, I focus on the role of political innovations. I relate state capacity improvements to long-run economic growth and the establishment of twentieth-century welfare states. The article concludes with historical lessons for developing nations today.

“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

James Madison (1788, p. 257)

Type
Reviews and Reflections
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 75 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 901 - 918
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2015 

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Footnotes

I thank Ann Carlos, Paul Rhode, and participants at the May 2014 conference at the Center for Historical Enquiry and the Social Sciences at Yale University for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-1227237).

References

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