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The Political Economy of Public-Private Compensation Differentials: The Case of Federal Pensions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
Abstract
Numerous empirical studies indicate that, as a result of rent-seeking behavior, public-sector workers are overcompensated relative to their private-sector counterparts, with pensions representing part of the difference. I present a history of the Federal Employees Retirement Act of 1920 and show that rent seeking by federal workers cannot explain several features of the act. Instead, I argue that the act represented an optimal incentive contract between Congress and civil service employees in which civil servants accepted mandatory retirement and a compensating wage differential in exchange for the federal pension plan.
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- Papers Presented at the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association
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- Copyright © The Economic History Association 1995
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