This is an abbreviated version of a lecture delivered in May 1942, at the Economics Department of the League of Nations (Economic Discussion Club, Professor A. Loveday, chairman), where I was accredited for a certain time by the French National Committee of London. Amongst those who have since referred to this lecture are: Kindleberger, Charles P., “Foreign Trade and Economic Growth, Lessons from Britain and France, 1913 to 1950,” Economic History Review, sec. ser., XIV, 2 (1961), 302Google Scholar; Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851–1950 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964)Google Scholar; Barre, R., Economie Politique, II, Thémis, P. U. F. (1956)Google Scholar, and revised 4th ed. (1964), p. 566; André Marchal, La Pensée Economique en France dupuis 1945, chapter iii, § 3, B, J. Weiller, “Le déséquilibre structurel mondial et la politique internationale,” from p. 127; Moret, Michel, L'Exchange International (Paris: M. Rivière et Cie., 1957), from p. 233Google Scholar; Perroux, François, “The Quest for Stability: The Real Factors,” in Hague, D. C., editor, Stability and Progress in the World Economy (New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 120Google Scholar. See also the controversial article by J. T. Desanti on why the bourgeoisie refuse to acknowledge the objectivity of laws, published in the April-May edition of “La Nouvelle Critique,” 1953, and several of my more recent articles: Weiller, Jean, “Anti-Cyclical Policies in Relation to Foreign Trade Patterns and Tariffs,” Economia Internazionale, XXII, 2 (Geneva, 1969)Google Scholar; “Préférences de structures et politiques du commerce extérieur,” Economie appliquée, archives de l'I. S. E. A., XXII, 1, 2 (Geneva: Droz, 1969)Google Scholar; “Exchanges extérieurs et politique commerciale de la France depuis 1870,” (premiere partie) in “Du protectionisme traditionnel aux nouvelles politiques industrielles,” Economies et Sociétés, III, 10 and 11 (Oct. and Nov., 1969)Google Scholar. See also IV, 5 (May 1970).

¹ The latest articles published on the subject are to be found in “Du protectionisme traditionnel aux nouvelles politiques industrielles,” Cahiers de l'I. S. E. A., Economies et Sociétés, I (Oct., 1969)Google Scholar.

² Cf. Rist, Charles, “Les Cours de Droit,” Lectures on International Trade Relations (Paris, 1925–26), p. 12Google Scholar ff.

³ Comparison of average exports in the period 1896–1900 with the average exports during the period 1911–13, for two groups of countries: (1) Capitalist countries (United States, England, Germany, France, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Japan). (2) Regions “essentially not capitalistic” (Balkans, Latin America, Turkey, China, Persia, Africa, Oceana, Indies, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Canada). The increase of exports towards “Capitalistic countries’ only amounts to 24 percent; towards non-capitalistic regions it attains 147 percent. Cf. Laurat, L., Bilans, ed. Carrefour, (Paris 1951)Google Scholar.

⁴ French imports increased until 1880 and, compared with the depressed level of 1873, the 1895 level seems somewhat higher (+ 6 percent). From 1880 to 1895, the decrease in imports attains 28 percent, a little less than the decrease of prices in the same period. The “index of quantities” calculated by Professor White for French imports since 1880 starts from 96 in 1880, falls to 92 in 1881, reaches 114 in 1891, then fluctuates between 97 in 1893, 108 in 1896 and 99 in 1895. Cf. H. D. White, p. 232. For exports, the quantity index calculated from 1880 (74) rises to 77 in 1893–1894. During the subsequent period of long-term expansion, the index reaches 142 in 1911 and 141 in 1913 for imports, and 142 in 1910 and 131 in 1913 for exports.

⁶ Part of this tendency can be ascribed to a diminution of the transit of re-export trade of European centers, or even to an improvement in the very bad trade statistics we had as far as “final destination” is concerned. However, the real decline is a long-run tendency.

⁷ As far as French imports are concerned, the United States kept a certain advance on the French market. Germany, immediately after the trade agreement of 1927, competed with Great Britain for the first rank, etc., but these disturbances are relatively unimportant. More important, both with regard to imports and exports, are the much decreased share of the U. S. S. R., the development of transactions with the Netherlands, and the new dynamism of the relations with the French Empire. In 1913, these only accounted for 12.4 percent of French foreign trade, which rose from 11.5 percent in 1924 to 15.2 percent in 1928.

⁸ A slight difference must be noted in the statistics concerning Belgium for 1913, taking into account the trade with Luxembourg in order to compare with the situation after 1919.

⁹ The main question would be whether or not such a readjustment was as “normal” as generally considered; another solution would have been an increase in French capital exports on the scale that occurred a little later.

¹⁰ This accounts for the fact that a great agricultural depression, due to the intensification of international competition in the domain of agricultural products, was very often neglected in too hurried an investigation of data concerning foreign trade in the years 1873 to 1896. The studies, which exclude from their investigation the years 1875 to 1880, under the assumption that they were immediately following the payment of war indemnity, completely distorted the real movement.

¹¹ It must be emphasized that from 1895 to 1913, whereas Japanese export trade expanded at the rate of 10.6 a year, against 4.6 for Great Britain and 4.3 for France, its absolute value increased by less than half the augmentation of French exports during the same time.

¹² The expression “vertical” is used here in the sense given to it by Professor Haberler, G., in his book, Prosperity and Depression (Geneva: League of Nations, 1941)Google Scholar, 2nd. ed.

¹³ The study of the immediate post-war years has been badly neglected; this period has generally been dismissed as one of chaos. All Government intervention was directed towards re-establishing the pre-war economic structure in each country. The case of France, endeavouring to reconstruct her devastated industrial regions as quickly as possible, in order to reach the 1913 production of 40 million tons of coal within the pre-war frontiers, to rebuild the 1.4 millions of spindles which had been destroyed during the hostilities, etc., although a very impressive one, is not exceptional.

Belgium, which in general followed a very liberal policy, insured her reconstruction within the frame of a rigorous system of import and export licenses and, what is more remarkable, kept to the pre-war supply of domestic coal: about 22 million tons. This question of the redistribution of basic raw materials, especially of fuel, was a very important one from such a point of view. Even Great Britain thought it necessary to restrict the export of coal, in order to facilitate the return of its national industry to a normal level of activity and the Government-owned stocks of wool were distributed with priority to British spinners. Germany abandoned her war economy to introduce a system for the distribution of raw materials, which enabled her, in spite of general poverty, to assure the rapid re-establishment of her major exporting industries. Even in the new states emerging from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Government tried for a long time, in spite of the new boundaries, to preserve as far as possible, conditions similar to those of the pre-war period. These attempts were successful in differing degrees, but we cannot neglect their importance as far as the partial reversion to pre-war tendencies is considered.

We must emphasize once more that the shifting of labor from one specific industry to another is not taken into account in the description of the long-run tendencies. France's export trade of manufactured articles, for instance, was 62.8 percent of her total exports, on average, during the years 1928–32, as against 60.8 in 1913, but chemicals rose from 5.1 percent to 6.9 percent whereas cotton fabrics fell from 5.6 to 5.3 percent etc.

¹⁴ The introduction of the imports quota system in France during the thirties, for instance, was emphasized as a break in the status quo of commercial policy. But, as we have seen, these measures tried to maintain the French import structure which prevailed during more than half a century and this reaction took place quasi mechanically as soon as these proportions tended to be disrupted, in exactly the same manner as during the depression of 1873–96. This was “protectionism” in its truly original meaning, intent on conserving a certain economic structure whereas, in fact, neither the state of the balance of payments nor the influence of the major vested interests could give a satisfactory explanation for this policy. On the other hand, it should be recalled that no adequate industrial readjustment took place whereas export industries such as textiles, were not replaced.

With respect to the English experience; did the sudden shift from almost complete free trade to protectionism favor a real shift?