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The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2011
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In The concept view of many economists the just price is a nebulous concept invented by pious monks who knew nothing of business or economics and were blissfully unaware of market mechanisms. It is true that certain writers, Catholics and non-Catholics alike, have done their best to accredit this fairy tale and to propagate the notion that the just price, instead of being set by the allegedly blind and unconscionable forces of the market, was determined by criteria of fairness without regard to the elements of supply and demand or at least with the purpose of eliminating the evils of unrestrained competition.
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References
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48 Social Control of Business, p. 23.
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77 The text of the indictment is published by Rodolico, Niccolò, Il popolo minuto (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1899), pp. 157–60, No. 14Google Scholar.
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82 After this paper had been read, Fritz Redlich kindly called my attention to a little-known enactment of Emperor Frederic I (1158) according to which sutlers who sold their wares to the soldiery at a price higher than the one prevailing in the neighboring markets exposed themselves to severe punishment, including confiscation of their merchandise, whipping, and branding with a hot iron on both cheeks. This is a rather drastic way of enforcing competition and preventing price discrimination! MGH, Legum, Sectio IV, I, 241, No. 173, art. 17.
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