¹ See David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 11–15.

² Ibid., pp. 11–12.

³ These works include Stone, Katherine, “The Origin of Job Structures in the Steel Industry,” Review of Radical Political Economics (Summer 1974);Google Scholar and Lazonick, William, “Production Relations, Labor Productivity and the Choice of Technique: British and U.S. Cotton Spinning,” this JOURNAL, 41 (09 1981), “Technological Change and the Control of Work,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 821 (April 1981), and “Production Productivity and Development: Theoretical Implications of Some Historical Research,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 876 (Jan. 1982).Google Scholar

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⁷ Ibid., p. 224.

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¹⁰ I assume throughout that employers do not combine to depress wages. Most modern studies find monopsony to be unimportant as a feature of labor markets. See for example Bunting, R., Employer Concentration in Local Labor Markers (Chapel Hill, NC., 1962);Google ScholarLandon, J. and Baird, R., “Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers,” American Economic Review, 61 (12 1971).Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Matthewson, Stanley B., Restriction of Output Among Unorganized Workers (New York, 1931), p. 61.Google Scholar

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¹⁷ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁸ Scitovsky, Tibor, The Joyless Economy (Oxford, 1976), p. 95.Google Scholar

¹⁹ As Mancur Olson shows, the conditions for rational agents being able to achieve a collective benefit are quite strict. See Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965).Google Scholar

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³¹ Heim, Carol, “Structural Transformation and the Demand for New Labor in Advanced Economies: Interwar Britain,” this JOURNAL, 44 (06 1984), points out this phenomenon in Britain in the 1930s. It is also true in recent years. Researchers at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, investigating recruiting of labor by a large multinational in Britain, found that the firm hired only workers with no previous industrial experience for production-line tasks.Google Scholar

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³⁶ See Marglin, Stephen A., “Knowledge and Power,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper 901 (1982), for the complete argument.Google Scholar

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⁴⁹ See Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies (New York, 1975), for the most complete presentation of this approach.Google Scholar

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⁵⁸ The lack of social distinctions between managers and employers may explain why cooperatives of professionals can be very successful. The London Symphony Orchestra has been a successful workers' cooperative since 1904. The members elect the conductor and the directors, and participate in a production process which is complex and requires a high degree of cooperation between participants. The possibilities for opportunistic behavior and for collective restrictions by workers are as great as in any enterprise.Google Scholar