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Government versus Bankers: Sovereign Debt Negotiations in Porfirian Mexico, 1888–1910
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2015
Abstract
This article assesses how the government of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1910) negotiated sovereign loans. Mexico was a serial defaulter that established a good reputation and issued bonds abroad at progressively better conditions. Based on new archival material, the article demonstrates that borrowing terms improved not only because of sounder fundamentals, but also due to the efforts of high officials to negotiate with debt underwriters. The Mexicans never accepted a patron bank and used the offers from American banks to bargain with European competitors. They acted according to the government's reputation, the underwriters' status, and the ideology of the Porfirian state.
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- Copyright © The Economic History Association 2015
Footnotes
I benefited from the thoughtful comments given by Colin Lewis, Stephen Haber, Rui Esteves, Carlos Brando, Joe Francis, Coskun Tuncer, the editor and referees of this Journal, and the participants of the 2013 Economic History Society Conference and the 2014 Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia Económica. I also thank Leonor Ludlow, Paolo Riguzzi, and Alma Parra for generously helping me during my field research in Mexico City. This research has been financed by the Council for Higher Education of the Brazilian Government (CAPES).
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