Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
Population pressure has been identified as a major force behind the transition from traditional property rights in land to exclusive, transferable property rights. This article examines the case of Hawaii where the transition to private property in land occurred while its population was rapidly declining. That transition was driven by new market opportunities and considerations of public finance.The shift in comparative advantage to sugar production increased the rents associated with private land rights, while declining tax revenues prompted the king and his government to pursue property rights reform to gain additional revenues.
1 See Kuykendall, R. S., The Hawaiian Kingdom (Honolulu. 1938), vol. 1, pp. 269–98;Google ScholarDaws, Gavan, Shoal of Time (Honolulu, 1968). pp. 124–28;Google ScholarBeechert, Edward D., Working in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1985). pp. 29–36;Google Scholar and Morgan, Theodore, Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change: 1778–1876 (Cambridge, MA, 1948), pp. 123–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 We define efficient actions as those which maximize the society’s wealth, without regard to the actual distribution of the gains and losses.Google Scholar
3 North, Douglass C. and Thomas, Robert Paul, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge. 1973);CrossRefGoogle ScholarNorth, Douglass C.. Structure and Change in Economic History (New York, 1981);Google Scholar and Chambers, J. D., “Enclosure and Labour Supply in the Industrial Revolution” Economic History Review, 2nd series. 5 (1953). pp. 319–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Feeny, David. “The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study”, in Bates, Robert H., ed.. Toward a Political Economy of Development (Berkeley, 1988).Google Scholar
5 Ibid., pp. 273–82.
6 There was also a third very small class of slaves (kauwa).Google Scholar
7 See Davenport, William, “The ‘Hawaiian Cultural Revolution’: Some Political and Economic Considerations”, American Anthropologist, 71 (02 1969). p. 5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 Some controversy exists as to whether the ’ohana represents a single extended family or a group of extended families. See Beechert. Working in Hawaii. p. 7.Google Scholar
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10 A more complete discussion of the role of the ali’i in the Hawaiian economy can be found in Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics (Chicago, 1972).Google Scholar
11 See Morgan, Hawaii, p. 51. An evaluation of the nutritional merits of the ancient Hawaiian diet reveals that it meets modern (1927) standards.Google Scholar See Miller, C. D.. Food Values of Poi, Taro, and Limu. Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin (Honolulu, 1927).Google Scholar
12 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 1, p. 9.Google Scholar
13 See Sahlins and Barrere, “William Richards”, p. 23. They qualified Richards’s statement with the observation that testimony “before the land commission (1848–1854) will not support the contention that people commonly held land in different ahupua’a. What sometimes occurs is that siblings and first cousins from locally important families are dispersed among several ahupua’a of a district (such as ’Ewa). On the other hand. ordinary maka’ainana did often have claims in different [parts] of the same ahupua’a, a distribution which …. might place them under two or more chiefs at once” (p. 38).Google Scholar
14 Malo, David, Hawaiian Antiquities (Mooelo Hawaii) (Honolulu, reprinted 1971), p. 195.Google Scholar
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17 Croix, Sumner J. La and Roumasset, James, “An Economic Theory of Political Change in Premissionary Hawaii”, Explorations in Economic History, 21 (04 1984), pp. 151–68. The island of Kauai remained independent until 1810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 SeeJohnsen, D. Bruce, “The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians”, Journal of Legal Studies, 15 (01 1986), pp. 41–67, for an analysis of a similar response to western contact. He argued that the opportunities presented by trade and the threat presented by the new settlers in Canada would increase expenditures to enforce property rights in fishing and hunting territories. Johnsen observed that the use of violence to settle disputes about property rights fell as a result of the decline in the Kwakiutl population. His explanation for the change was that violence is “a relatively labor-intensive input in protecting exclusive property rights” (p. 65). The Canadian government’s sanctions on violence between tribes also contributed to a shift away from its use.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
19 The system of separated strips also facilitated the king’s monitoring of each chiefs managerial efforts.Google Scholar
20 See accounts of the commoners’ burden in Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom. vol. 1, pp. 89–90. The decline in population probably had mixed effects on living standards. In a simple Maithusian general equilibrium model, population decline should lead to increased wages and higher standards of living. The decline in population may, however, also generate a host of effects that would reduce living standards. Incentives to accumulate human capital and to work intensively on the job may be impaired and individual specialization may decrease as market size declines. Long-term sequelae of the diseases (or their treatments) can adversely affect health status and labor productivity and therefore living standards.Google Scholar
21 Schmitt, Robert C., “New Estimates of the Pre-Censal Population of Hawaii,” Journal of the Polynesian Society, 80 (06 1971), pp. 237–43:Google Scholar and Stannard, David E., Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai’i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu. 1989).Google Scholar
22 The 150,000 figure is the “official” missionary estimate. Other estimates are as low as 130,000. James Jackson Jarves’s estimate of 142,050 has been widely cited. See Schmitt, Robert C., Demographic Statistics of Hawaii: 1778–1965 (Honolulu, 1968), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar
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27 As quoted in Schmitt, Demographic Statistics, p. 39.Google Scholar
28 As quoted in Beechert, Working in Hawaii, pp. 9–10.Google Scholar
29 Fornander, Abraham, An Account of the Polynesian Race: us Origins and Migrations, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1969), vol. 2, p. 300. Fornander, a newspaper editor and judge, was a dedicated student of Hawaiian history in the middle to late nineteenth century. In his 1878 work he compiled genealogies and recorded oral traditions for many pre- and post-contact events. His accounts are only as reliable as the oral traditions.Google Scholar
30 See Kamakau, Samuel M., Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii (Honolulu. 1961), p. 175;Google Scholar and li, John Papa, Fragments of Hawaiian History, edited by Barrere, Dorothy B. (Honolulu, 1959), pp. 13–14, 20, 26, 69–70.Google Scholar
31 See Alexander, W. D., “A Brief History of Land Titles in the Hawaiian Kingdom,” in Thrum, Thomas G., ed., Hawaiian Annual for 1891 (Honolulu. 1890). p. 108.Google Scholar
32 Croix, La and Roumasset, “An Economic Theory of Political Change,” p. 164.Google Scholar
33 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. I. p. 278.Google Scholar After the Declaration of Rights of 1839 and the constitution of 1840 transformed Hawaii’s government, several missionaries entered the king’s government service including Judd. Lorrin Andrews. Richard Armstrong, and Edwin Hall. Daws observed that each man. “as a condition of his employment, had signed an oath of allegiance to the king. Among the noisy expatriates of the foreign community this was enough to ruin any man’s reputation.” See Daws. Shoal of Time. p. 108.Google Scholar and pp. 106–12 for a full discussion of the role of the missionaries in Kamehameha III’s government. Wyllie, R. C.. the minister of foreign affairs, also argued in a report dated December I. 1847 (in Reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1852–62, p. 67) that land reform would have salutary effects on Hawaians. “Thus even the poorest of Your Majesty’s subjects would stand on a footing of independent right–he would know that the land which he cultivated was his own, and could not be taken from him: and he would have the powerful stimulus of self interest to improve it. and to put a good dwelling on it: every child would be of value to him as he grew up. to help him in cultivating the ground: laborers would be induced to marry. in order to have children to help them: those children would be better taken care of. and would become more moral by being removed from the haunts of vice in the seaports.’Google Scholar
34 Chinen, Jon J.. The Great Mahele (Honolulu. 1958), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar Other important renditions of the Mahele, Great are Kuykendall, . The Hawaiian Kingdom. vol. I. chap. 15:Google ScholarMorgan. Hawaii, chap. 8: and Daws. Shoal of Time. pp. 124–27.Google Scholar
35 Kuykendall, . The Hawaiian Kingdom. vol. I. p. 288.Google Scholar
36 Ibid.. p. 289.
37 Ibid.. p. 291.
38 Ibid.. p. 294. This allocation is consistent with John Umbeck’s prediction about property rights allocation. See Umbeck, John. “Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Foundation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights.” Economic Inquiry. 19 (01 1981). pp. 38–59. On p. 46 he showed that when property is being allocated among a group of individuals, those people receiving “more productive land will get less land than others whose holdings are not so productive.”CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Roumasset, James and James, William. “Explaining Variations in Share Contracts: Land Quality, Population Pressure and Technological Change.’ Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics. 23 (08 1979). pp. 116–27.Google Scholar
39 Penal Code of the Hawaiian lslands. Passed by the House of Nobles and Representatives on the 21st of June. A.D. 1850: to which are appended the Other Acts Passed hi the House of Nobles and Representatives during their general Session for 1850 (Honolulu. 1850). pp. 146–47.Google Scholar See the discussion in Kuykendall. The Haiwaiian Kingdom. vol. I. pp. 294–98.Google Scholar
40 Kuykendall. The Hawaiian Kingdom. vol. I. pp. 153–69.Google Scholar
41 See the discussion in Ibid.. pp. 153–59.
42 Earlier disputes between the Hawaiian government and foreign governments had resulted in foreign warships visiting the Islands to “influence’ the course of negotiations. Two American warships arrived in 1826 to press for the repayment of debts incurred by the chiefs in the course of sandalwood trading. Ships returned later in the year and in 1829 to remind the chiefs of their unpaid obligations. Questions about the treatment of native Catholics. French priests, and foreign consuls produced a succession of visits by American. French. and British ships during the 1830s.Google Scholar
43 Wyllie, R. C.. Answers to Questions Proposed by R. C. Wyllie (Honolulu, 1848), pp. 7–13.Google Scholar
44 See Feeny, David. The Political Economy of Productivity: Thai Agricultural Development, 1880–1975 (Vancouver. 1982). chap. 3. appendix 2. for a more complete discussion concerning the inference of factor prices from sparse data.Google Scholar
45 Croix, La and Roumasset. “An Economic Theory of Political Change.” pp. 161–64.Google Scholar
46 Morgan, Hawaii. p. 76. In addition, he noted: “By 1838. with diminishing returns from the Japan and Yellow Seas, the rich Kodiak or Northwest Coast ground off the Russian possessions had been discovered. 30 days sail from Hawaii.” With the exhaustion of the Northwest Coast grounds in the late 1840s. ship visits declined until news of the 1848 opening of the Arctic Ocean north of the Bering Strait brought forth a renewed round of visits in 1852. Whaling ship visits began to permanently decline in 1859 and, with the exception of a brief revival in the late 1860s, continuously declined thereafter.Google Scholar
47 Growth in whaling ship visits varied (see Table 2). From 1824 to 1833 ship visits increased from 104 to 189. but then declined steadily over the next seven years. bottoming out at 86 in 1840. From 1843 to 1854 an average of 419 ships visited Honolulu and Lahaina annually. While the decline during the 1830s is substantial, it is important to remember that whaling ships did not visit the Islands prior to 1820. The period 1820–1842 might be characterized as the “establishment” period of the industry in the Islands. while the decade after 1843 might be identified as the industry’s “mature” period.Google Scholar
48 Demand by visiting ships for food supplies offset some of the decline in demand from other sources.Google Scholar
49 SeeLind, Andrew. An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii (Chicago. 1936), pp. 61–62.Google Scholar
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52 Morgan. Hawaii. pp. 154–58.Google Scholar presented data on exports of important agricultural products which indicate that the increased “[d]emand was bunched into a three-year interval, from the fall of 1848 through part of 1851. though it continued at a higher level after 1851 than it had before 1849.” An additional effect of the gold rush was to stimulate migration of Hawaiians to California and southern Oregon. See Blue, G. V.. “Early Relations Between Hawaii and the Northwest Coast.” Hawaiian Historical Society Report No. 33 (Honolulu. 1924). p. 20.Google Scholar
53 See the letters sent to Turrill, Joel by his friends in Hawaii in “The Turrill Collection, 1845–1860.” Hawaiian Historical Society Report No. 66 (Honolulu. 1957).Google Scholar
54 Reliable population estimates do not exist for any of the three villages.Google Scholar
55 The term “wage rate” refers to the shadow price of a commoner’s time, not to the actual method of compensation for agricultural work. Since a worker on the land owed labor dues (which are not fixed in value) to the chief and to the king. workers could be characterized as sharecroppers. “Rents” refer to a combination of taxes and rents prior to the constitution of 1840, as the finances of the chiefs, king. and the government were not separated until 1842. After 1842 rents refer to the shadow price of the land’s services.
56 North and Thomas. The Rise of the Western World. Pp. 39–40.Google Scholar argued that part of the shift from in-kind to other forms of taxation is explained by the growth of commodity and factor markets. Rulers could more efficiently collect money taxes and then use the proceeds to purchase the goods and services they needed as markets became better developed relative to the earlier period in which taxes in kind may have been used to minimize the transaction costs of revenue collection. While North has recently acknowledged (Structure and Change, pp. 129–31) timing problems with the application of his analysis to Europe. the criticisms do not apply to the Hawaiian case.Google Scholar
57 Thurston, Lorrin A.. ed.. Constitution and Laws of 1842. in The Fundamental Law of Hawaii (Honolulu. 1904). chap. 3. sec. 3.Google Scholar
58 Ibid.. chap. 3, sec. I.
59 Ibid.. chap. 3. secs. 5 and 6.
60 See, for example, the Statutes of Labourers considered by virtually every English Parliament between 1350 and 1380.Google Scholar
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65 A small amount of acreage was sold prior to the institutional reforms in 1847. but we have been unable to discover how such sales were executed.Google Scholar
66 The figures from 1853–1857 should be interpreted cautiously. In 1856 the government halted the sale of large tracts of land. It adopted a policy of leasing the remaining lands in response to the lower land prices prevailing during this period. The land sales reported for 1855 and 1857 were actually made in 1854 and 1855 but were reported in later years due to a delay in the issuance of royal patent grants.Google Scholar
67 North’s theory was presented in detail in Structure and Change. chap. 3.
68 Ibid., p. 28.
69 Ibid., p. 139.
70 Ibid., pp. 138–42.
71 The “new political economy” is an umbrella term for public choice, economics of property rights, law and economics, political economy of regulation. the new institutional economics. and the new economic history. See Buchanan, James M.. Explorations into Constitutional Economics (College Station. 1989). p. 61:Google Scholar and Inman, Robert P.. “Markets. Governments, and the ‘New’ Political Economy.” in Auerbach, Alan J. and Feldstein, Martin. eds., Handbook of Public Economics (New York. 1987). vol. 2.Google Scholar
72 This perspective suggests due caution in generalizing about the minimal efficient degree of central control independent of an economy’s state of development. See Roumasset, James and La Croix, Sumner J.. “The Coevolution of Property Rights and Political Order: An Illustration from Nineteenth-Century Hawaii,” in Ostrom, Vincent, Feeny, David, and Picht, Hartmut, eds., Rethinking Instiiuonal, Analysis and Development (San Francisco, 1988), pp. 315–36.Google Scholar