¹ The most widely known members of the liberal school were V. O. Kliuchevskii and P. Miliukov; of the étatist school, M. N. Pokrovskii.

² “Die russische Manufaktur und Fabrik ist nicht organisch aus der Hausindustrie und nicht unter dem Einfluss des gesteigerten inneren Bedürfnisses der Bevölkerung herausgewachsen.” Miliukow, Paul, Skizzen Russischer Kulturgeschichte (“Essays in Russian Cultural History,” [Leipzig, 1898]), p. 67Google Scholar.

³ “Sie wurde vielmehr ziemlich spät von der Regierung ins Leben Gerufen, die dabei einerseits ihre eigenen praktischen Bedürfnisse (Z. B. Tuchlieferungen für die Armee) im Auge hatte, anderseits aber auch die Unentbehrlichkeit einer nationalen Industrie erkannte.” Ibid.

⁴ “Wie gering die Früchte der ersten Bermühungen waren, auf. dem Wege des Schutzzollsystems eine nationale Industrie zu schaffen, kann man aus den Ergebnissen der amtlichen Fabrikbesichtigungen etwa um 1730 sehen.” Ibid., p. 68.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 68–69.

⁶ V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochinenia, (“Collected Works”), IV (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1958), 335, “Industry after Peter did not make any noticeable progress; foreign trade remained, as it was, in the hands of foreigners.”

The error in Kliuchevskii's judgment becomes obvious as soon as one compares the available data for the two major industries: iron and textiles. From 1725 to 1760, the number of enterprises engaged in wool, linen, and silk manufacturing increased from 39 to 145; the number of machines from 2,070 to 11,666; and the number of workers from about 10,000 to 33,687. The output of pig iron increased from 13,350 tons in 1725 to 60,050 tons in 1760. The number of private iron and copper works increased from 28 to 138 in 1760, of which ironworks rose from 22 to 95. See E. I. Zaozerskaia, Rabochaia Sila i Klassovaia Borʼba na Tekstilnykh Manufakturakh v 20–60 gg. XVIII v. (“Labor Force and Class Struggle in the Textile Manufactories” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1960]), pp. 48, 72, 73. Strumilin, S. G., Istoria Chernoi Metallurgii v SSSR (“The History of Ferrous Metallurgy in the USSR” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1954]), I, 197, 204Google Scholar. We would therefore have to reject Kliuchevskii's thesis as lacking any substantive support from the economic data.

⁷ The number of peasant serfs drafted during the years 1699–1701 for work in the Voronezh wharves was about 20,000 yearly; for 1703–1705, the number is not available. See Miliukov, , Gosudarstevennoe Khoziaistovo Rossii v Pervoi Chetverti XVIII Stoletia (“The State Economy of Russia in the first Quarter of the Eighteenth Century” [St. Petersburg, 1892]), p. 269Google Scholar.

⁸ The number of peasant serfs and skilled workers employed in the construction of the Taganrog harbor was reported as follows: 1701—8,886; 1702—5,449; 1703—2,844; 1704—5,920. Ibid.

⁹ For the employment of forced labor in Azov and Troitsk, we have two estimates—one for the officially drafted, the other for those actually employed. The estimates are the following:

Employment of Forced Labor in Azov and Troitsk

¹⁰ The list would probably be incomplete, even if it included the very inefficient (and ineffective) use of resources in the work on the Ladoga canal prior to Münnich's appointment as construction head.

¹¹ The approximate number of the mobilized serfs employed in the construction of St. Petersburg can be inferred from the following data for the years for which figures are available. The numbers exclude the labor employed in the massive construction works conducted by the Admiralty and in the erection of such objects as the neighboring Kronstadt, Schlüsselburg fortress, etc. The numbers also exclude the employment of prisoners of war and criminals.

Draft Quota and Actual Number of Landlord Serfs Employed in the Construction Works in St. Petersburg, for Selected Years

¹² The yearly expenditures out of taxes for civilian construction in St. Petersburg (excluding the Admiralty) were fixed until 1717 at 242,700 rubles; between 1717 and 1721 at 266,700 rubles; and from 1721, when a tax was substituted for labor services of the peasants, at 300,000 rubles. However the actual expenditures from the budget were usually higher. The total expenditures from the budget in 1720 were 316,484 rubles, and during subsequent years the government was called upon to assign an additional 80,000 to 100,000 rubles over and above the tax receipts earmarked for the St. Petersburg construction work. Ibid., pp. 168, 170, 171.

¹³ Yearly Number of Draftees in the Army and Navy

¹⁴ The available data on manufactories in Prussia and Saxony support the general impression that the “life expectancy” of industrial firms during the eighteenth century was short. See Krüger, Horst, Zur Geschichte der Manufakturen und det Manufakturarbeiter in Preussen (“On the History of Manufactories and the Manufactory Labor in Prussia” [Berlin: Rütten and Loening, 1958]), pp. 306–57Google Scholar. Forberger, Rudolf, Die Manufaktur in Sachsen vom Ende des 16. bis zum Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts (“The Manufactories in Saxony from the End of the Sixteenth until the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century” [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958]), pp. 306–57Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The inventory of one of the largest private enterprises in Russia, that of the ironworks of Akinfii Demidov (1747), reveals that, while the value of plant and equipment was about 400,000 rubles, the value of the serf peasants employed in his iron and copper works was between 400,000 and 420,000 rubles. Among the various manufactories existing in the eighteenth century, ironworks were the most capital intensive. See Kafengauz, B. B., Istoria Khoziaistva Demidovykh v. XVIII. v. v., (“The History of the Demidovs' Enterprise in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries”), I (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1949), 224–30Google Scholar.

¹⁶ In some branches of manufacturing in the eighteenth century, the nature of the technological processes and the type of equipment made it easier to subdivide enterprises than is the case in modem industry, and each part of a divided enterprise could still exist as an economically viable unit. The state-owned linen factory in Moscow (Polotniany Zavod) was divided among five enterpreneurs in the 1720's. The large silk manufactory (of Apraksin, Tolstoi, and Shafirov) was soon taken over and divided into three parts by groups of merchant entrepreneurs. Zaozerskaia, Razvitie Legkoi Promyshlennosti v Moskve v pervoi Chetverti XVIII v. (“The Development of Light Industry in Moscow in the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1953]), pp. 213–42, 308–11Google Scholar.

¹⁷ This was generally the case in the early silk manufactories and leather factories. The expenditures to import foreign specialists and to train the indigenous labor force exceeded the costs of even imported equipment. Ibid., pp. 297–300.

¹⁸ An examination of the activities of 41 merchants engaged in industrial entrepreneurship during 1710–70 indicates that 36 continued their activities in domestic or foreign trade, in tax farming, in alcohol supply contracts, etc. Thus their involvement in manufacturing depended upon the various alternative opportunities to earn a return on their capital. Under such circumstances, their participation in manufactories depended upon the state of their total business activity. This would explain many transfers of their holdings in manufacturing to relatives and partners and the sales to other entrepreneurs. For sources describing the behavior of various entre-preneurial groups, see Ibid.; also, Zaozerskaia, “Labor Force and Class Struggle” cited in n. 6); Pavlenko, N. I., Istoria Metallurgii v Rossii XVIII veka (“The History of Metallurgy in Russia in the Eighteenth Century” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1962]); I. VGoogle Scholar. Meshalin, , Tekstilnaia Promyshlennost Krestian Moskovskoi Gubernii (“The Textile Industry of the Peasants in Moscow Gubernia” [Moscow, Leningrad: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1950])Google Scholar; and Kahan, Arcadius, “Entrepreneurship in the Early Development of Iron Manufacturing in Russia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, X, No. 4 (July 1962)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The major relocation was connected with the government's conservation policies of 1754, when most of the ironworks, glass factories, and distilleries within about a 130-mile radius of Moscow were closed. Miliukov's calculation included in the total the enterprises liquidated by the government decree of 1754.

²⁰ Pavlenko, p. 462. The survival rate and life span of ironworks in Russia were remarkably great in comparison with other countries whose ironworks were also based upon charcoal fuel. This phenomenon of the Russian ironworks can be explained principally by the greater supply of timber in the proximity of the ironworks.

²¹ Available data for the textile industry (linen, wool, and silk) indicate that out of 39 manufactories existing in 1725 (the year of Peter's death), 28 enterprises were still functioning in 1745. The number of basic machines in those enterprises had increased from about 2,070 to 3,073. The number of workers had increased in the “old” woolcloth manufactories by about 8 per cent and the value of output by about 50 per cent. In the silk manufactories, the output had increased by about 40 per cent. Zaozerskaia, “Labor Force and Class Struggle,” pp. 34, 46, 48, 50, 52, 53.

²² In 1745, the “old” textile manufactories (established during the Petrine period) constituted 39 per cent of the total number of textile manufactories and represented 66 per cent of the basic equipment, 68 per cent of the labor force, and 70 per cent of the output. Ibid., pp. 48, 50–51.

²³ For the disappearance of manufactories established during the 1740's and 1750's, see Baburin, Dmitrii, Ocherki po Istorii Manufaktur-Kollegii (“Essays on the History of the Manufaktur Collegium” [Moscow: Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie NKVD SSSR, 1939]), pp. 189, 296–98Google Scholar. For the later periods, see Pavlenko, pp. 458–68, and Pazhitnov, K. A., Ocherki Tekstilnoi Promyshlennosti (“Essays on the Textile Industry of Prerevolutionary Russia” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1958]), pp. 168–73, 308–13Google Scholar.

²⁴ The following series, recorded in English sources, represent the pattern of Russian-English trade.

Trade of Russia With Great Britain

(in £)

²⁵ Semenov, A., Izuchenie Istoricheskikh Svednii o Rossiiskoi Vneshniei Torgovle i Promyshlennosti (“Study of Historical Information on Russian Foreign Trade and Industry” [St. Petersburg, 1859]), Part 3, pp. 23–25Google Scholar.

²⁶ Pokrovskii, S. A., Vneshniai Torgovlia i Vneshniaia Torgovaia Politika Rossii (“Foreign Trade and Foreign Trade Policy of Russia” [Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga, 1947]), p. 89Google Scholar.

²⁷ Semenov, Part 3, pp. 23–25.

²⁸ The break in Russian-English diplomatic relations, coupled with the deterioration of the quality of Yorkshire coarse wool cloth, made the Prussian woolens competitive in the Russian market. As a result, the following quantities of Prussian cloth were ordered by the Russian government.

Between 1725 and 1727, cloth for 485,000 thalers was delivered, for which one third was paid in specie. Henderson, W. O., “The Rise of the Metal and Armament Industries in Berlin and Brandenburg, 1712–1795,” Business History, III (June 1961), pp. 65–66Google Scholar. Reading, Douglas K., The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 380Google Scholar.

²⁹ Internal Taxes and Custom Duty Payments Collected on the Makarievska Trade Fair, 1718–28

(in Rubles)

³⁰ Output of Pig Iron, 1718–35

(in Metric Tons)

³¹ During 1726, the furnaces of the large Kamenskii and Alapaievskii and, in 1726–1727, of the Uktuskii, ironworks were out of order. Serious unrest was reported among the peasant serfs employed in the state ironworks during 1726 and 1727. Ibid., p. 194.

³² The increase in the number of forge hammers, in view of an unchanged number of furnaces, indicates the shift toward harder types of iron products. The number of forge hammers increased from 110 in 1725 to 139 in 1727, while the number of active furnaces remained the same. The shift toward a different product mix of ironworks is substantiated by the data on the output of flat bar-iron, which show an uninterrupted rise.

Output of Flat Bar-Iron, 1725–1730

(in Metric Tons)

³³ During 1726 and 1727, four new ironworks were completed (Sivinskii, Nizhe-Siniachynskii, Verkhne-Isetskii, and Shaitanskii). Since another three ironworks were completed during 1728–29, this shows that the investment flow into iron manufacturing did not cease.

³⁴ Copper Output, 1725–35

(in Tons)

³⁵ The two main uses of copper were the military and the monetary. The expansion of copper output might have been a result of the increase in demand for money, which would contradict the notion of a general slump.

³⁶ While Peter the Great imported most of the wool cloth needed for army uniforms, the lining (karazeia) was almost entirely produced domestically. Government prices also made it more profitable to manufacture the lining than the cloth.

³⁷ We have records about one wool cloth plant (later divided into four enterprises) and two silk factories that were established during those years. See Zaozerskaia, “Labor Force and Class Struggle,” pp. 50–51.

³⁸ Incomplete data on yearly government expenditures in the area of manufacturing are available for a number of years, but they include operating expenditures and those connected with the importation of foreign specialists, an item that was declining over time. Hence capital expenditures are difficult to extract from those data.

³⁹ Strumilin, pp. 459–61. Rubtsov, N. N., Istoria Liteinogo Proizvodstva v Rossii (“The History of Castings Production in Russia” [Moscow-Leningrad: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1947]), pp. 69–70Google Scholar, gives the following figures for the establishment of ironworks in the Ural:

Peter (1699–1725): 14 (.5 yearly)

Catherine I (1726–27): 4 (2 yearly)

Peter II (1729–30): 4 (2 yearly)

Anna (1731–41): 25 (2.5 yearly)

Elizabeth (1742–61): 57 (3 yearly)

⁴⁰ The data on internal factory consumption of iron (which constituted a sizable share of the gross investment outlays for replacement of equipment and construction of new capacity) by the state-owned Ural ironworks point to the following quantities used (in tons):

If we assume the costs of production at 14.64 rubles per ton (24 kopecks per pud), the average yearly investment outlays from this source alone would amount to:

The above data do not indicate a slackening in this area of investment outlays for the state ironworks during the immediate post-Petrine period. See Pavlenko, “Development of Metallurgy,” Table 16, p. 272.

⁴¹ Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (PSZ) (“Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire” [St. Petersburg, 1830]), Vol. VIII, No. 5,821Google Scholar.

⁴² There are two ways of supporting the assertion about a decrease in the volume of smuggling. One is to cite the diminishing number of official reports, complaints, etc. The other is to investigate the volume of imports to the ports of the Baltic provinces (excepting St. Petersburg) and the volume of overland trade through the customs from the provinces into Russia, making an allowance for the volume of goods consumed in the Baltic provinces. On both accounts the data for the 1740's and early 1750's, when compared with the 1720's, appear to support the above assertion. For the trade to the Baltic ports, see Bang, N. E., Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Oresund 1661–1783 (“Tables on Shipping and Merchandise Transportation Passing through the Sund, 1661–1783), Vol. II (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1930)Google Scholar.

⁴³ An interesting case in point was the duty differential established between the ports of St. Petersburg and Archangel, which resulted in almost completely diverting trade toward St. Petersburg. The 1731 tariff equalized the tariffs for both ports and revived Archangel and its vast hinterland. The decrease of some tariff rates led to the abolishment of a number of trade monopolies, thus enabling other producers and merchants to enter the field on a more competitive basis. See Pokrovskii (cited in n.26), pp. 94–97.

⁴⁴ The relative profitability of the private manufactories as compared with those owned by the state was pointed out in the report of the Monetary Committee (Monetamaia Komissia) to the Senate in 1732, in the “Senate Reports” of 1733–34, etc.

⁴⁵ The above policy directives are spelled ont in detail in the “Berg-Reglament” of 1739. PSZ, Vol. X, No. 7,766, and in the analysis of the conditions of transfer of state enterprises to private individuals. See Pavlenko, pp. 131–33.

⁴⁶ The last case of summary expropriation of private property (not involving punishment of any particular individual) is the decree of January 6, 1704. The Berg Collegium Privilege of December 10, 1719, was a major attempt to provide assurance of property rights in the area of mining and iron-producing. During the post-Petrine period, the property rights of industrial entrepreneurs were widened, safeguarding for them not only physical property (plant and equipment) but also serfs. PSZ, Vol. VII, No. 6,255; Vol. IX, No. 6,858, Vol. X, No. 7,766.

⁴⁷ See Baburin, Dmitrii, Ocherki Po Istorii Manufaktur-Kollegii (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, 1939), pp. 194–99Google Scholar. Baburin presents the basic features of government economic policy prior to the decree of 1775.

⁴⁸ As an illustration, the following data pertaining to the iron and copper works could be cited.

Entrance of New Entrepeneurs in Iron and Copper Works, 1701–1760

⁴⁹ The conclusions about the relative positions of the manufacturers and the government officials are based upon an analysis of documents published in the following sources: N. I. Pavlenko, “Nakaz Shikhtmeisteru V. N. Tatishcheva” (“V. N. Tatishchev's Instructions to the Charge Master”), in Akademia Nauk SSSR, Istoricheskii Arkhiv, Vol. VI (Moscow-Leningrad: author, 1951)Google Scholar. M. A. Gorlovskii and N. I. Pavlenko, “Materialy Soveshchania Uralskikh Promyshlennikov, 1734–1736 gg.” (“The Proceedings of the Meetings of Ural Industrialists, 1734–36”), in Ibid., Vol. IX (1953).

⁵⁰ V. N. Tatishchev in 1734 got an instruction from Anna that regulated for the private iron masters the number of peasant serf families per ironwork, depending upon the volume and type of equipment. Anna's decree or 1736, which permitted the enserfment of free skilled workers, nonetheless forbade the non-gentry from purchasing whole villages (“only few households at a time”), although one wonders whether this particular clause was operative or followed in practice.

The Elizabethan decree of July 27, 1744, permitted non-gentry to purchase whole villages and cited the 1742 precedent of the merchant Grebenshchikov's purchase of 50 households. A decree of the Senate of January 17, 1752, established norms of serf purchases for textile manufactures and was implemented by an instruction of October 5, 1753, which permitted the purchase of serfs without land.

⁵¹ For 1743–62, we have 38,480 “souls” (males of all ages) and 2,440 households with land, and 3,034 “souls” and 50 households without land.

For ironworks and mining, the figures are 36,860 prior to 1752 and 8,683 afterwards—together, 45,543 souls.

The Manufacture Collegium reported purchases of serfs by manufacture owners of 10,328 prior to 1752 and 6,532 after 1752—together, actual purchases of 16,860 serfs (males).

The Soviet historian Zaozerskaia estimated the total number of serfs acquired by all types of private-manufacture owners as being about 22,000 during 1720–43 and about 85,000 during 1743–50, while Semevskii gives the total for 1700–60 as about 60,000. See E. Zaozerskaia, “Begstvo i Otkhod Krestian v Pervoi Polovine XVIII v” (“Flight and Seasonal Leave of Peasants during the First Half of the Eighteenth Century”) in O Pervonachl'nom Nakoplenni v Rossii XVII-XVIII v. (“About the Primary Accumulation in Russia of the Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries” [Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1958]), pp. 156–57Google Scholar.