South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has made strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States a key part of his foreign policy positions. At the same time, South Korea continues to maintain a decent relationship with China, pursuing an ambiguous stance on regional security in the context of the US rivalry with China. How is South Korea responding to the shifting geostrategic regional threats in the Indo-Pacific? Why is South Korea pursuing foreign policies toward China that are different than other US allies, particularly Japan? How do South Korea–Japan bilateral relations affect the ability of the US-led alliance system to effectively deter threats from North Korea and a rising China? Because of its status as half of the divided Korean Peninsula, South Korea has found itself in the difficult position of having to deal with threats from North Korea. As a major US ally, South Korea has coordinated closely with the US to deter North Korea. Working with Japan on North Korea issues, though, has been very complicated, especially given long-standing tensions and territorial and maritime disputes between South Korea and Japan. With China’s increasing military and economic power in the region and beyond, it becomes more challenging for South Korea to navigate between China and the US, which is essential to the effective management of the relationship with North Korea and other crucial issues in the region. As a result, South Korea has played a key role in the US-led alliance in some contexts, but relatively less actively in others.
Most research on South Korea’s foreign policy has focused on the country’s role as a US ally in deterring North Korea in the Korean Peninsula. Given the significant and real threat from conventional and nuclear attacks by North Korea, this is not surprising. Yet, the rise of China has necessarily broadened the scope of the US alliance system beyond the Korean Peninsula, most importantly for Japan and South Korea, since China—as the revisionist state—has more aggressively challenged the regional and international status quo in recent years. South Korea is currently in the precarious position of needing to decide its role in balancing China and how much it can cooperate with Japan and the US in a trilateral sense to deter threats from North Korea. The articles in this special issue address these main challenges that South Korea faces today, focusing on two major interrelated themes: 1) how the US–China rivalry and power competition affect South Korea’s security and economic foreign policies, and 2) how the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security and alliance capabilities in the context of the US–China rivalry.
The collective research presented in this volume, by authors from the US, Australia, Canada, and South Korea contributes to existing research in various ways. First, it adds to the literature that examines South Korea’s security and alliance with the US, and South Korea’s role in regional security (Bong Reference Bong2016; Chung Reference Chung2001; Ferrier Reference Ferrier2019; Heo and Roehrig Reference Heo and Roehrig2014; Kim Reference Kim2019; Lin et al. Reference Lin, Chase, Blank, Cooper, Grossman, Harold, Jennifer, Morris, Ma, Orner, Shih and Kim2020; Moon and Li Reference Moon and Li2010; Nam Reference Nam2010; Rozman and Lee Reference Rozman and Shin-wha-Lee2006; Snyder Reference Snyder2012). Second, the articles add to the literature on foreign policy decision-making and hedging strategies pursued by small and middle power states in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly South Korea (Choi Reference Choi2009; Choi Reference Choi2018; Cooper and Mo Reference Cooper and Mo2013; Easley and Park Reference Easley and Park2018; Karim Reference Karim2018; Kim Reference Kim2014; Lee Reference Lee2009; Lee Reference Lee2012; Lee Reference Lee2017; Lim and Cooper Reference Lim and Cooper2015; Shin Reference Shin2016). Third, the research in this volume speaks to the growing research that has been conducted on the complexity of the relationship between South Korea and China in the context of the US–China rivalry (Cha Reference Cha2020; Chung Reference Chung2001; Huynh Reference Huynh2021; Hwang and Ryou-Ellison Reference Hwang and Ryou-Ellison2021; Meijer Reference Meijer2020; Moon and Li Reference Moon and Li2010; Snyder Reference Snyder2018; Sohn Reference Sohn2019; Son Reference Son2014; Yang Reference Yang2020; Zhou Reference Zhou2019). Fourth, several articles provide deep dives and new analysis of ongoing South Korea–Japan historic tensions, and how this affects South Korean foreign policy (Bae Reference Bae2012; Bong Reference Bong2013; Bukh Reference Bukh2016; Cho, Kim and Choi Reference Cho, Kim and Choi2009; Choi Reference Choi2005; Dudden Reference Dudden2008; Easley Reference Easley2022; Emmers Reference Emmers2010; Huth, Kim and Roehrig Reference Huth, Kim and Roehrig2021; Hwang, Cho, and Wiegand Reference Hwang, Cho and Wiegand2018; Kang, Lehany, and Cha Reference Kang, Leheny and Cha2013; Kim Reference Kim2015; Kwon Reference Kwon2016; Kwon and Benham Reference Kwon and Benham2016; Moon and Li Reference Moon and Li2010; Naito Reference Naito2008; Wiegand Reference Wiegand2015).
The articles in this special issue treat contemporary South Korean foreign policy and the responses to these foreign policies in a hub and spoke context, examining the relationship of the South Korea–US alliance, South Korea–Japan bilateral relations, and the US–China power competition. Without understanding the influence of these multiple and sometimes overlapping relationships, one sees an incomplete picture of the motivations and limitations that influence decision makers in Seoul and how they pursue the foreign policy strategies they do. Overall, the articles challenge several aspects of conventional wisdom about South Korean foreign policy: 1) despite strong attempts by the US government to persuade South Korea to adopt the US perspective on China, it is unlikely that the South Korean government will do so to the extent that is expected by the US; 2) while South Korean–Chinese bilateral relations are not necessarily warm, they are stable and more enduring than most US analysts recognize; and 3) while much progress has been made between South Korea and Japan in improving bilateral relations, tensions remain enduring, and are not merely reflective of a small portion of Korean society.
How the US–China rivalry and power competition affect South Korea’s security and economic foreign policies
As one of the most prominent allies of the US in the region, South Korea has been facing huge challenges with respect to its foreign policies, both economic and strategic, in the context of the increasing power competition between the United States and China. Kim, Raswant, and Wilkins’ article seeks to answer the question of how South Korea, as a democratic state in the Indo-Pacific region, creates a safe space for liberal and democratic values while maintaining a military alliance with the US and its economic relations with its neighbor China. While providing a thorough review of the debates within South Korean scholarship about the country’s strategic security strategy, this article discusses the geopolitical conditions that facilitate South Korea’s responses to the value dimension of the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy. While existing studies focus heavily on South Korea’s hedging strategy, suggesting that the country either chooses to balance against China or hedges between the US and China, this article argues that South Korea’s strategy has consequentially been dependent on interpreting the offensive intention of its powerful neighbor, China. The article employs a multilingual approach (English and Korean), collecting sources that provide timely interpretation of evolving issues relevant to South Korean security strategy related to the US–China competition. Findings indicate that South Korea’s navigation in the deepening US–China order-building competition prioritizes the following dimensions: first, alliance management, by agenda shaping in ways beneficial to South Korea’s national interests; second, securing safety in numbers by seeking broader support outside of its relations with great power; and third, practicing independent middle power diplomacy as a national policy course.
Continuing the examination of South Korea’s strategy in the context of the US–China competition, Lee and Wiegand’s first contribution to the issue, “South Korea’s Strategy toward the US–China Rivalry,” explores a similar topical area as Kim, Raswant, and Wilkins’ article on South Korea’s delicate balancing act between the US and China. Distinct from Kim, Raswant, and Wilkins’ approach, Lee and Wiegand’s article examines how the lack of territorial and maritime disputes between South Korea, as a US ally, and China affects South Korea’s strategies in the US–China rivalry. When a US ally like Japan is engaged in an ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, Lee and Wiegand expect the ally to clearly side with the US against China. Because bilateral relations between the US ally and China are already harmed by their ongoing dispute, the US ally can afford to side with the US without being more vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. On the other hand, since there are no active territorial and/or maritime disputes between South Korea and China, South Korea is expected to be more cautious in siding with the US against China because doing so can provoke China to retaliate against South Korea in ways more costly than if they already had an ongoing dispute. Lee and Wiegand find that without ongoing and active disputes with China, South Korea is more vulnerable to punishment by China through critical issues like North Korea and trade. As a result, it is more difficult for South Korea to clearly side with the US to actively balance against China.
The increasing power competition between the US and China not only influences regional security policies, it also exerts significant influences on the economic strategy of South Korea and on the way the country responds to political-economic challenges caused and intensified by the US–China rivalry. Hwang, Paik, and Lim’s article tackles this issue by seeking to address the question of whether the US, South Korea, and Japan successfully coordinate their efforts to establish secure and resilient global supply chains. Mounting geo-economic competition between the US and China, along with global shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have led to significant attention to the issues of instability and vulnerabilities in global supply chains, which are critical to international trade, production, and economic security. By examining the efforts to reshape global supply chains as part of US–China competition over technological power, this article offers a novel perspective from which to view the pros and cons of South Korea and Japan siding primarily with the US, compared to the current hedging strategy pursued primarily by South Korea, and to a lesser degree by Japan. Moreover, by evaluating the impact of restructuring global supply chains in key industries around the US on economic security of South Korea and Japan in various aspects such as flows of trade and investment, diversification of economic partnerships, and state sovereignty vis-à-vis MNCs, the article presents complex challenges facing South Korea and Japan.
Turning to the effect of domestic politics on South Korean foreign policy in the context of the US–China rivalry, the article by Fang, Lee, and Li investigates the preferences of South Korean citizens regarding the country’s potential joining in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). As highlighted in the articles by both Lee and Wiegand and Hwang, Paik, and Lim, a triangular relationship exists between South Korea, the US, and China given that China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, while South Korea also maintains a strong security alliance with the US. This triangular relationship has posed challenging foreign policy dilemmas for South Korea in recent years under the shadow of the great power competition between the US and China. One such dilemma for South Korea is whether to join the Quad, which is widely perceived as aiming to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-pacific. This decision is likely to be influenced by domestic politics, particularly South Korean public opinion. Public opinion has long been an important factor shaping foreign policy in many countries in Asia, and with the advent of social media and other mass communication technologies, the trend is likely to persist and even intensify. The study of South Korean public opinion in this context is particularly intriguing. The country has extensive and complex historical relationships with both China and the US, which are well-known to its public, and the online activities of its citizens are extremely widespread and vibrant. Fang, Lee, and Li conducted a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample in South Korea to investigate public preferences about joining the Quad and the findings are surprising. Contrary to their expectations, neither the mentioning of security benefits of joining the Quad, nor the mentioning of potential economic costs of joining the Quad changed the level of support. However, they found that threat perceptions and party affiliation are strongly correlated with respondents’ preferences.
How the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security and alliance capabilities in the US–China rivalry
While South Korea considers its own economic and security strategy toward China, it must also think about its role as a major US ally and the US parallel alliance with Japan, as South Korea and Japan are two important pillars of the US-led alliance and regional security system in the Indo-Pacific region. As the US–China rivalry has intensified, there have been growing needs for US allies, especially South Korea and Japan, for further strategic cooperation and closer strategic coordination. Still, South Korea and Japan have longstanding tensions over unresolved historical issues and territorial and maritime disputes, which often disrupt strategic cooperation between the two states and complicate any trilateral alliance relations between the US, South Korea, and Japan. How have such bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan developed and influenced their bilateral relations and South Korean foreign policy strategies? How do these lingering tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security, particularly the role of the US-led alliance system in the US–China rivalry?
Kwon’s article investigates South Korea–Japan relations through in-depth case studies and historical analysis of the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima. Employing a content analysis, Kwon reviews all remarks about the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial and maritime dispute made by the Japanese cabinet members and representatives from the Japanese Diet from December 2012 to September 2020 under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Kwon finds that the Japanese were very frustrated with South Korea’s effective control of Dokdo/Takeshima, as well as the Korean government’s bold stance on comfort women and forced laborers. Along with these frustrations, the article also demonstrates that Japanese remarks on Dokdo/Takeshima were intensified by Japanese domestic political and economic conditions, which eventually make any progress between Japan and South Korea over their territorial dispute even more difficult. The findings of the article inform policy makers and ultimately lead to an increased understanding of disputes between Korea and Japan. The various quantitative analyses provide interesting comparative perspectives on the degree of speech and perceived relevance of issues in the Dokdo/Takeshima discussion from each Japanese political party, the different terms of Prime Minister Abe and Korean presidents. While there are several studies examining the Korean perspective on the South Korea–Japan tensions, this article addresses a much less studied topic, the domestic politics of Japan, and the self-expressed viewpoints of decision-makers in Japan.
Wiegand and Lee’s second article in the issue, “Walking a Fine Line: US Involvement in Bilateral Tensions between South Korea and Japan,” highlights another side of the South Korea–Japan tensions in the contemporary era—how it has been perceived by the US and how the South Korea–Japan tensions affect the US and allies’ ability to deter North Korea and balance against China. Despite being the most important allies of the US in East Asia, South Korea and Japan maintain tense bilateral relations over their unresolved historical issues and territorial and maritime dispute. The US has emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation between the US, South Korea, and Japan, but mostly through political rhetoric, rarely intervening directly in South Korea–Japan relations. Under what conditions and to what extent would the US intervene and use its leverage as a stronger power to persuade South Korea and/or Japan to set aside their disputes and shift their foreign policies? Wiegand and Lee argue that US involvement depends on the degree to which the US perceives the tensions as costly and risky for the US and allies’ regional security capabilities. As long as tensions between South Korea and Japan remain in the bilateral context with little direct impact on the US and allies’ regional security capabilities, the US is less willing to involve itself in South Korea–Japan bilateral relations. On the other hand, the US is more likely and willing to use its leverage toward South Korea and/or Japan when their bilateral tensions are perceived as incurring potential and significant risks to the allies’ joint security capabilities. By examining US government rhetoric, trilateral meetings between the US, South Korea, and Japan, specific issues discussed bilaterally and trilaterally between South Korea, Japan, and the US, and insights from interviews with former US government and military officials, Wiegand and Lee find general support for the theory.
This special issue on South Korea’s foreign policy strategies in the contemporary era makes several important contributions to the discipline and policy world. First, the theoretical frameworks and analyses provided by the articles in this special issue examine South Korea’s foreign policies and strategic responses on political, economic, and security issues in a coherently inter-connected manner, in which distinct but crucial factors such as the US alliance system, bilateral interstate relations, territorial/maritime and historic disputes in the region, and the US–China rivalry interact with each other, thus affecting South Korea’s foreign policy strategies. By looking at these multiple and overlapped dynamics, this special issue provides a comprehensive picture of what drives South Korea’s foreign policy decisions.
Second, this special issue explores South Korea’s roles and strategies not just in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia but also extending to broader regional and global contexts in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Given intensifying power competition between the US and China, South Korea is in greater need of developing its strategies on regional and global issues such as US-led Indo-Pacific frameworks and global supply chains. By exploring different scopes and levels of challenges that South Korea has faced, one can better understand how South Korea’s foreign policies and strategies have developed at local, regional, and global contexts.
Third, this special issue provides policy implications and insights on South Korea’s foreign policies and strategies. In the context of the further intensifying and complicated US–China rivalry, South Korea should envision its own winning strategies to successfully navigate between the US—its long-standing military ally—and China—one of its closest neighboring countries. By exploring different issues and aspects of the US–China power competition and relevant factors that influence South Korea’s foreign policy, the articles in this special issue volume suggest what the best strategy South Korea can and should consider for dealing with certain challenges, and thus maximizing its national interests while minimizing potential costs and harm.
Funding statement
This research was supported by a Korea Foundation grant.
Competing interests
The authors declare none.