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3. Yet Katzenstein's work fails to systematically code regional institutions on these or other dimensions as the “dependent” variables to be explained, making it difficult to assess his causal arguments and predictions.Google Scholar

4. The US-centered bilateral alliances include US-Japan (1951), US-South Korea (1953), and US-Taiwan (1979 Taiwan Act). In the communist camp, China and North Korea signed a friendship treaty in 1961; Russia and North Korea renewed a treaty on friendship in 2000; and China and Russia signed a new friendship treaty in 2001. As Stephan Haggard pointed out in his comments on the earlier version of this article, the number of Asia's formal bilateral alliances outside the United States has been extremely limited. For instance, neither Japan nor South Korea has formal alliances with its Asian neighbors, while China has only one formal alliance, with North Korea, which has been significantly undermined in the post-Cold War period.Google Scholar

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