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The Patterns of Party Polarization in East Asia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2016
Abstract
The alignment of parties within a party system shapes the nature of electoral competition, the process of representation, and potentially the legitimacy of the system. This article describes the distribution of parties and the levels of party polarization in the party systems of East Asian democracies. We examine the public's perceptions of party positions on a left-right scale to map the pattern of party competition. The evidence is based on two waves of surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. We describe considerable variation in the polarization of Asian party systems, which has direct implications for the clarity of party choice and the behavior of voters. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
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- Information
- Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Party Choice and Partisanship in East Asia , August 2007 , pp. 203 - 223
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- Copyright © East Asia Institute
References
Notes
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35. We thank Rein Taagepera for his assistance in developing these statistics. The polarization index is measured as P = Σ (party vote share i )* (party L-R score i – party system average L-R score/5)2 (where i represents individual parties). This P index has a value of 0 when all parties occupy the same position on the left-right scale, and 10 when all the parties are located at either 0 or 10 on the scale. The representation index is measured as R = Σ (governing party L-R score – voter L-R score i )/n (where i represents individual voters). The representation gap is measured as the absolute difference between the average voter and the perceived position of the governing party. The governing party is defined as the party of the prime minister.Google Scholar
36. These cross-national comparisons are based on a different set of nations in both timepoints, and thus changes over time may reflect a different mix of nations. There were fourteen Western democracies (Western Europe and North America) in module I and seventeen in module II. There were seven Eastern European nations in module I and four in module II. For additional analyses, see Dalton, , “The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems.” Google Scholar
37. Ibid. Google Scholar
38. Ibid. Google Scholar
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