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Measuring and Explaining Party Change in Taiwan: 1991–2004

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Dafydd Fell
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Abstract

This article examines party platform change in a third wave democratic country, Taiwan, during its first fourteen years of full multiparty elections. A variety of datasets show that Taiwan's parties have moved from polarized positions toward a moderate center on all core electoral issues. However, the parties have not converged into indistinguishable catchall parties; instead they have instituted a state of moderate differentiation. The degree to which Taiwan's parties have moderated and been electorally successful has been intimately tied to the internal balance of power between election-oriented and ideologically conservative factions or leaders. In response to public opinion and electoral competition, Taiwan's election-oriented leaders attempted to drag their parties toward centrist positions. The key variable constraining convergent party movement and maintaining differentiation has been the strength of ideologically conservative party factions. When these ideologically oriented factions have held the upper hand in parties, they have promoted ideologically orthodox but often unpopular policies. Even when the election-oriented faction is in control at the party center, secondary factions have been able to constrain movement away from party ideals.

Keywords

Taiwanpolitical partieselectionsparty change
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , April 2005 , pp. 105 - 133
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

The fieldwork in 2001 for this project was made possible by a research grant from the Center for Chinese Studies, National Central Library of Taiwan. I would also like to thank the Taiwan Studies Programme of the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Asia Research Centre of the London School of Economics for supporting a research trip in March 2004.Google Scholar

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61. Author interview with Yao Chia-wen, Taipei, October 2, 2001.Google Scholar

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63. I am indebted to the Taiwanese political scientist Wu Chung-li for pointing this out.Google Scholar

64. In my 2001 interviews numerous KMT politicians accepted that the party's corrupt image had contributed to its fall from office.Google Scholar

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71. Author interview with Chang Chun-hong, Taipei, September 26, 2001.Google Scholar

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