1. For more recent works that take culture seriously as a variable, see Hofstede, Geert H., Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2001); and Gannon, Martin J., ed., Cultural Metaphors: Readings, Research, Translations, and Commentary (London: Sage, 2001).Google Scholar

2. See Chaibong, Hahm, “Family Versus the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Laws in Korea,” in Bell, Daniel A. and Chaibong, Hahm, eds., Confucianism for the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 334–360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Schwartz, Benjamin, “The Primacy of the Political Order in East Asian Societies,” China and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 114–125.Google Scholar

4. Confucius, , The Analects of Confucius, trans. Ames, Roger T. and Rosemont, Henry Jr. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 2:3, p. 76.Google Scholar

5. Ibid., 2:21, pp. 80–81.Google Scholar

6. Ibid., 2:1, p. 76.Google Scholar

7. Mencius, , Mencius, trans. Lau, D. C. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984), 1A:3, p. 7.Google Scholar

8. Ibid., 7A: 14, p. 269.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., 7A:1, p. 265.Google Scholar

10. Xunzi, trans. Knoblock, John (Hounan: Foreign Languages Press, 1999), 17.13, pp. 550–551.Google Scholar

11. Ibid., 22:1, p. 707.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., 23:4, p. 745.Google Scholar

13. “A man in the street can become a Yu. What does his saying mean? I say that in general what made Yu a Yu was his use of humaneness, morality, the model of law, and rectitude. Since this is so, then in each of these four there are rational principles that we can know and which we are capable of putting into practice. That being so, it is clear that the man in the street can become a Yu, since it is possible for every man to understand the substance of humaneness, morality, the model of law, and rectitude and the ability to master their instruments.” Ibid., 23:14, pp. 764–765.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., 23:15, p. 767.Google Scholar

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16. Ibid., 23:12, pp. 760–761.Google Scholar

17. Ibid., 9:2, p. 211.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., 9:1, p. 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. Ibid., 9:2, p. 211.Google Scholar

20. The Analects of Confucius, 14:17, pp. 175–176.Google Scholar

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22. Ibid., 11:4, pp. 320–321.Google Scholar

23. Mencius, 4:B:1, emphasis added.Google Scholar

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25. Quote in Yu-lan, Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 317.Google Scholar

26. Xunzi, as a matter of fact, visited Qin during his lifetime and was impressed by its strong and efficient politics. However, he also condemned the Legalistic politics. He assessed Qin's politics thus: “Undertaken with ease, yet well ordered; restricted to essentials, yet carried out in full detail; not involving trouble, yet resulting in real achievement—these are the perfection of government. Qin belongs to this category. Yet even though all this is so, Qin is filled with trepidation. … It is that it is dangerously lacking in Ru scholars” (Xunzi, 16:6, p. 525). And he denounced his pupil Li Si when Li Si asked whether the reasons for Qin's strength “stems from taking advantage of opportunities rather than heeding the values of humanity and justice” (Ibid., 15:7, 481).Google Scholar

27. Zhongshu, Dong, Chun chiu fan lu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuguo, 1991), chap. 36, pp. 169–171.Google Scholar

28. The term “despot” originates from the Greek term for the male head of the household who wielded absolute, that is, “despotic” power over other members of the family. This was in contrast to the relationship of equality or “isomorphism” that was said to obtain between these men once they entered the “polis.” Google Scholar

29. Feizi, Han, Shinbian Han Feizi, edited by Suzhen, Jiang (Taibei: Guoli Bianyiguan, minguo 90) Zhongxiao , p. 1407.Google Scholar

30. Anshi, Wang, quoted in Keunhyo, Lee and Youngpyo, Yu, “Wanganseok Kyungje Sasang Yeongu” [A study of Wang Anshi's economic theory], Chungkukhakbo [Journal of Chinese Study] 30 (1990): 128.Google Scholar

31. Zhenfeng, Ma, Zhengzhi Gaigejia Wanganshi de Zheshe Sixiang [Philosophy of a reformer, Wang Anshi] (Hubei: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), p. 193.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., p. 190.Google Scholar

33. Ibid., pp. 190–194.Google Scholar

34. See Pom-hak, Yi, “Wang An-shih's Reform Policies: With Emphasis on the Ideological and Theoretical Basis of Hsin-fa,” Dongyangsahakyeongu 18: 48–53, 61–63.Google Scholar

35. Ferguson, John C., “Wang An-shih,” in Meskill, John, ed., Wang An-Shih: Practical Reformer? (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1963), pp. 35–39.Google Scholar

36. Liu, James T. C., “Reappraisal of Wang An-Shih.” In Meskill, , ed., Wang An-Shih, p. 93.Google Scholar

37. Meskill, , ed., Wang An-Shih, pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

38. Ibid., p. 14.Google Scholar

39. Ibid.Google Scholar

40. Keunhyo, Lee and Youngpyo, Yu, “Wangansok kyungjesasang yongu,” Chungkuk hakbo 30 (1990): 8.Google Scholar

41. For example, Shi, Su, Wang's contemporary and political opponent says, “If its moral virtue is truly deep and its social customs are truly stout, even though the country is poor and weak, its poverty and weakness will not affect its duration and existence. If its virtue is shallow and its social customs flimsy, even though the nation is rich and strong, this will not save it from coming to an early end. When a ruler knows this, he knows what is important and what is not important. Therefore the wise rulers of ancient times did not abandon virtue because the country was weak, nor did they permit social customs to suffer because the country was poor.” Su Shi, “Memorial to Emperor Shen-tsung to the New Laws of Wang An-shih,” in Meskill, , ed., Wang An-Shih, 24.Google Scholar

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43. For a general discussion of the Song legal system, see Miyazaki, Ichisada, “The Administration of Justice During the Sung Dynasty,” in Cohen, Jerome Alan, ed., Essays on Chinas Legal Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 56–75.Google Scholar

44. Of course, another reason for their opposition to Wang was that the latter's policies threatened their privileged economic status. Liu, James T. C. says: “In response to the suggestions that funds were diverted to the military or to landowners' luxuries, one may turn to the variety within Confucianism. Under the New Policies of Wang An-shih, the Northern Sung had seen drastic attempts to introduce administrative reforms, to seek the development of economic resources, to curb the abuses and defects in the tax system, and to introduce significant changes in various institutions. To discontinue such efforts was not merely an economic matter. It was a political decision that concerned the whole ruling class with land property, as Marxist and other economic interpretations of history generally claim. The policy decision, however, also depended upon the prevailing intellectual orientation or what kind of bureaucratic leadership was in power.” Liu, James T. C., China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 13.Google Scholar

45. Shi, Su, “Memorial to Emperor Shen-tsung to the New Laws of Wang An-shih,” in Meskill, , ed., Wang An-Shih, p. 24.Google Scholar

46. A wushi was a military retainer, the equivalent of medieval Europe's knight, who served a royal or an aristocratic family. This particular warrior class survived well into early modern Japan in the form of the Japanese samurai.Google Scholar

47. Elman, Benjamin, “Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China,” Journal of Asian Studies 50, No. 1 February 1991): 7–28.Google Scholar

48. An important institutional innovation designed to strengthen their politico-economic base was the reintroduction of the zhong system. For a detailed analysis of the historical and political context of the development of zhong as an important part of Neo-Confucianism, see Chaibong, Hahm, “Family Versus the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Laws in Korea,” in Bell, Daniel A. and Chaibong, Hahm, eds., Confucianism for the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 334–360.Google Scholar

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50. Communist China under Mao and more recently Jiang Zemin is another example of a Legalistic regime whose Legalistic elements are combined with Confucian ones.Google Scholar

51. See Yamashita, Samuel Hideo, “Confucianism and the Japanese State: 1905–1945,” in Weiming, Tu, ed., Confucian Tradition in East Asian Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 132–154.Google Scholar

52. See Wei-ming, Tu, Confucian Ethics Today: The Singapore Challenge (Singapore: Federal Publication, 1984).Google Scholar

53. One of the upshots of our argument is that the “Asian values” debate has been misbegotten insofar as it has been an argument between those who defend human rights against the authoritarian tendencies of Confucianism, on the one hand, and those who defend Confucianism for its humanistic and human rights potentials, on the other. What it should be is a debate on how the tradition contributed to the efficient and productive allocation of resources and manpower that led to the rapid industrialization of East Asia. This is an argument concerning economic efficiency and political realism, not about human rights and democracy, no matter how much one believes that the latter are the ultimate goals of all political societies. In this regard, East Asia has been fabulously successful, and Legalistic Confucianism played a crucial role in this success. Confucianism, as reflected in political and economic institutions of modem East Asia, is not the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy that either its detractors or defenders refer to. In addition, the argument here shows how similar the experience of modernization is for everyone, regardless of tradition. It shows the importance of a powerful centralizing government that succeeds in overcoming feudalistic tendencies and pushes through often harsh and painful “reform” policies. It also shows how the rise of such powerful states with centralized bureaucratic policy apparatuses lead to the fall of “traditional values” that elicit a “reaction” from those bearers of tradition virtues. “Dehumanization” that seems to accompany all efforts at centralization, ancient or modern, inevitably gives rise to a call for the restoration of ancient virtues.Google Scholar