Thanks to Peter Duus, Robert Eskildsen, Stephan Haggard, Eric Helleiner, Yoshiko Herrera, Rieko Kage, Byung-Kook Kim, Paul Kowert, Shigehisa Kuriyama, Yoichi Nemoto, Susan Pharr, Donald Robinson, Frank Schwartz, Franziska Seraphim, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Masako Ema Watanabe, Dennis Yasutorno, and participants at the 2003 Association for Asian Studies New England regional meeting, the 2004 American Political Science Association annual meeting, and a January 2005 seminar at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto, for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. One example of the best of such traditional identity scholarship is Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

2. Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Van Wolferen, Karel, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Knopf, 1989).Google Scholar

3. Katzenstein, Peter J., Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

4. Hymans, Jacques E. C., “The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective Identity,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1 (March 2004): 5–31.Google Scholar

5. Abdelal, Rawi, Herrera, Yoshiko, Johnston, Alastair Iain, and McDermott, Rose, “Identity as a Variable,” manuscript, Harvard University, May 10, 2003, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/images/ID051103.pdf.Google Scholar

6. A pathbreaking effort in this regard is Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995). See also the theoretically and methodologically sophisticated work of Hopf, Ted, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).Google Scholar

7. Duus, Peter, “Presidential Address: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong: The Development of the Japanese Political Cartoon,” Journal of Asian Studies 60, no. 4 (November 2001): 965–997. See also Garon, Sheldon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).Google Scholar

8. Frewer, Douglas, “Japanese Postage Stamps as Social Agents: Some Anthropological Perspectives,” Japan Forum 14, no. 1 (2002): 1–19; Dobson, Hugo, “Japanese Postage Stamps: Propaganda and Decision Making,” Japan Forum 14, no. 1 (2002): 21–39.Google Scholar

9. Helleiner, Eric, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).Google Scholar

10. Cohen, Benjamin J., The Geography of Money (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Helleiner, , The Making of National Money. Google Scholar

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12. On the former, see Brumann, Christoph, “Geld als Geschenk: Aspekte japanischer Beziehnungsartihmetik.” In Ernst, Angelika and Pörtner, Peter, eds., Die Rolle des Geldes in Japans Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1998), pp. 77–91. On the latter, see Hendry, Joy, Wrapping Culture: Politeness, Presentation and Power in Japan and Other Societies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).Google Scholar

13. Hymans, , “The Changing Color of Money.” Google Scholar

14. Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M., and Ramirez, Francisco O., “World Society and the Nation State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (July 1997): 144–181.Google Scholar

15. The focus on human figures stems from the fact that these are typically the most salient iconographic elements on banknotes, and from the fact that these are typically more readily identifiable and classifiable than other elements. Human figures thus generally serve as excellent proxies for the overall philosophical and aesthetic message that the banknotes communicate.Google Scholar

16. Inglehart is ambiguous about whether postmaterialist and postmodern goals are synonyms. I interpret postmodernism as pushing somewhat beyond the quality of life focus of postmaterialism. In my interpretation, postmaterialism still assumes an objective, universal standard of quality of life, whereas postmodernism understands quality of life to be in the eye of the beholder.Google Scholar

17. Pick, Albert, Shafer, Neil, and Bruce, Colin R., Standard Catalog of World Paper Money, vol. 2: General Issues, 7th ed. (Iola, Wis.: Krause Publications, 1994); Bruce, Colin R. and Shafer, Neil, Standard Catalog of World Paper Money, vol. 3: Modern Issues 1961–2001, 7th ed. (Iola, Wis.: Krause Publications, 2001). I also used numerous encyclopedias and other sources for biographical information.Google Scholar

18. Extensively described in Hymans, , “The Changing Color of Money.” Google Scholar

19. Hymans, Jacques E. C., “Money for Mars? The Euro and European Identity.” Forthcoming in Fishman, Robert and Messina, Anthony S., eds., The Year of the Euro: The Social and Political Import of Europe's Common Currency (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 2005).Google Scholar

20. It will eventually be important to disentangle the relative causal weight of the “push” factors of economic development–driven values change highlighted by Inglehart, or the “pull” factors of international normative evolution highlighted by Meyer. The process-tracing portion of this study provides some evidence on the matter. But the most direct way to confront it would be to extend the research to the banknote iconographies of developing countries, whose societies may not be ready to embrace developed-country norms, yet whose states are still subject to strong international pressures to conform to those norms.Google Scholar

21. The first yen banknotes were printed in 1872, a clear consequence of Japan's adoption of world norms of territorial currency; on this, see Helleiner, , The Making of National Money. However, the Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko) was not founded as a central bank and sole legitimate issuer until 1882, and it issued its first notes in 1885. I choose to focus only on the Bank of Japan banknotes in order to maintain comparability with the central bank banknotes used as the data in the European cases.Google Scholar

22. Between 1885 and 2004, Japan on average has issued 0.6 new banknote per year. This rate of turnover is slightly lower than the EU nations' average of 0.7 new banknote per year.Google Scholar

23. Sixty-four of the seventy-one banknotes featured at least one human figure. One of the notes featured three human figures; these are counted as separate observations in the data set. Of the seven notes without human figures, two are from the 1920s and five are from the unsettled period 1944–1948.Google Scholar

24. As in the European cases, for the sake of clear coding I coded any depicted human figure who served in an important position in the state as a “state representative,” even if he or she was arguably more famous for some nonpolitical pursuit. I also coded representations of gods as representing the “state,” since gods are the rulers of the universe.Google Scholar

25. For a careful analysis of one instance of this phenomenon, see Eskildsen, Robert, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan's 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” American Historical Review 107, no. 2 (April 2002): 388–418.Google Scholar

26. Ninomiya Sontoku is most renowned as the “ideal schoolboy,” but in this rendering he is an old man. Since in his later years he served as a government minister, the depiction of him as an old man reinforces my coding decision to count him in the “state” category.Google Scholar

27. Daikoku-ten is a god and thus coded as representing the state. However, his appeal was largely to Japanese commoners rather than to elites. In that regard, a case could be made for coding those images in the “society” category. Thanks to Rob Eskildsen for raising this point.Google Scholar

28. The coding rules impose these interpretations, but for those deeply schooled in Japanese history, they are open to question. It is a stretch to code Genji, Murasaki Shikibu's hedonistic protagonist, as representing the “state,” even if he was the son of an emperor. Meanwhile, as will be suggested in the process tracing of the selection of these individuals, Nitobe was not merely a diplomat. But although this or that coding choice can be questioned, the overall direction of yen iconography is clear.Google Scholar

29. In addition to this simple application of the coding rules (modern politician = “materialist”), it seems legitimate to describe these actors as “materialist” in the specific Japanese context, because of the extreme focus in the Meiji restoration period on pursuing Japan's material progress.Google Scholar

30. It is certainly the case that Fukuzawa and Natsume had political agendas—and in some respects quite militaristic ones. But these men were public intellectuals, not politicians who dabbled in the arts.Google Scholar

31. Of course, Lady Murasaki was far from traditional for her own time, but her association with Japanese courtly life clearly makes her a traditionalist symbol in the contemporary period. The reader will recall the coding decision mentioned above to code any figures from ancient or feudal Japan as “traditionalist.” Google Scholar

32. Bank of Japan, “The Introduction of New Series Bank of Japan Notes,” August 2, 2002, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/money/money_f.htm.Google Scholar

33. See Takashi, Uemura, Banknote Engravers of Japan: E. Chiossone, S. Oyama, K. Kato (Tokyo: Banknote and Postage Stamp Museum of the Ministry of Finance, 2001).Google Scholar

34. Interview with former Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

35. This structure is just now changing. The Printing Bureau, formerly part of the Ministry of Finance, is now to become an independent agency responsible for paying for itself. It is unclear how this change will affect the magnitude and direction of its political influence.Google Scholar

36. Encarnation, Dennis J. and Mason, Mark, “Neither MITI nor America: The Political Economy of Capital Liberalization in Japan,” International Organization 44, no. 1 (Winter, 1990): especially pp. 50–51.Google Scholar

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38. The potential importance of the top leadership as an agent of change in Japan is underscored in Samuels, Richard J., Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).Google Scholar

39. Indeed, when the new project was unveiled a year later, some of them expressed anger at not having been consulted. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

40. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

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42. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

43. Interview with former Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

44. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

45. For instance, even to this day the Printing Bureau actually engraves its banknote designs rather than using a computer. Interview with current Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

46. Interview with former Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

47. Interview with former Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003. These arguments mirror those of the more “conservative” side of the European jury that reviewed the draft euro designs. See Hymans, , “Money for Mars? The Euro and European Identity.” Google Scholar

48. Indeed, in the slang of the day, rich people were said to have a lot of “Shotoku-Taishis.” Thanks to Kage Yuji for this example.Google Scholar

49. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

50. Japan Economic Newswire, July 7, 1981 (accessed on Lexis-Nexis).Google Scholar

51. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

52. On this point, one small incident speaks volumes. I asked one former Treasury Division official what foreign country's banknotes he personally preferred, and he answered, “I pay mostly by credit card.” Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

53. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts , “Prime Minister Makes Post-cabinet Change Statement,” October 7, 1999 (accessed on Lexis-Nexis).Google Scholar

54. Interview with former Printing Bureau official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

55. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts , “Prime Minister Makes Post-cabinet Change Statement.” Google Scholar

56. Bank of Japan Currency Museum, “The Numeral Two in Currency: A Special Exhibition of Notes and Coins of Denominations Starting with the Numeral Two,” available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/cm/pdffiles/02kikakul.pdf.Google Scholar

57. However, some foreigners did notice the meaning of both Murasaki and the numeral two. “Japan's Other Currency Woes,” The Economist, October 30, 1999 (accessed on Lexis-Nexis).Google Scholar

58. “Higuchi 1st Woman on Postwar Bill,” The Daily Yomiuri, August 3, 2002 (accessed on Lexis-Nexis).Google Scholar

59. “Jottings” (Henshu Techo), The Daily Yomiuri, October 9, 1999 (accessed on Lexis-Nexis).Google Scholar

60. The rising influence of Japanese civil society has been a major theme in recent political science research. See Pekkanen, Robert, “After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan,” Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 3 (September–December 2004): 363–388.Google Scholar

61. The one exception was in the 1996 survey, in which only 44.5 percent declared themselves satisfied and 18.1 percent wanted major change.Google Scholar

62. See Hymans, , “Money for Mars?” Google Scholar

63. Interview with former MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

64. CBS News, “Japanese Feminist to Adorn Yen,” August 2, 2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/02/world/printable5187343.shtml.Google Scholar

65. Interview with current MOF official, Tokyo, May 2003.Google Scholar

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67. As Sheldon Garon has pointed out, the Japanese state does not merely penetrate but is also deeply penetrated by the broader society and its values—and, indeed, often by the more progressive elements in it. Garon, , Molding Japanese Minds, especially pp. 18–21.Google Scholar

68. Of course, as previously emphasized, drawing overly broad conclusions from one indicator would be a mistake, but refusing to put forth any tentative lessons at this stage would be equally mistaken.Google Scholar

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74. Also important to mention in this context is the Japanese state tendency toward banishing the thought of regional, ethnic, class, or other differences within the Japanese body politic. Thanks to Rob Eskildsen for suggesting this point.Google Scholar

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76. In my interviews it was apparent that the effects of the iconographic choices on Japan's OECD brethren were considered much more fully than their effects on Japan's East Asian neighbors.Google Scholar

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