1. For an assessment of Taiwan's democratic consolidation after the March 2000 presidential election, see Chu, Yun-han, “Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: The Challenge of Governance,” in Alagappa, Muthiah, ed., Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001); and Chu, Yun-han, Diamond, Larry, and Shin, Doh Chull, “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,” Journal of Democracy 12 (January 2001): 122–136.Google Scholar

2. For changing attitudes of the Taiwanese people on the issue of independence and reunification with China, see the website of the Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/p9007e.htm. A majority of the survey respondents consistently preferred the status quo to both the options of independence and reunification.Google Scholar

3. For an analysis of the 2000 presidential election, see Chu, Yun-han and Diamond, Larry, “Sizing Up Taiwan's Political Earthquake,” Journal of East Asian Studies 1 (February 2001): 211–236.Google Scholar

4. Chinese vice-premier Qian Qichen stated on January 24, 2002, that he allowed the possibility of higher-level cross-strait exchanges and that he recognized the difference between DPP members and the minority of hard-line independence advocates on the issue of independence. Chen Shui-bian also toned down his pro-independence stand since his presidential inauguration, expressing on May 9, 2002, his hope to send a high-level DPP delegation to visit Beijing to resume cross-strait talks. More recently, Qian Qichen stated that the “three links” across the Taiwan Strait were neither international nor domestic affairs, but a “cross-strait” one. Chen Shui-bian responded by saying that he believed in Qian's good intention but still called for a negotiation to settle specific issues. See Taipei Times, January 25, 2002, p. 1, and May 10, 2002, p. 1; and United Daily, October 17, 2002, p. A13.Google Scholar

5. For Taiwan's national statistics, see the website of the Third Bureau of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics of the Executive Yuan, http://www.dgbas.gov.tw.Google Scholar

6. These two views originated from Chen Shui-bian's entrapment in what the press called a “triple minority syndrome.” He was elected with only 39 percent of the total vote, headed a minority party in the Legislative Yuan, and belonged to the minority faction within the DPP Google Scholar

7. Wu, Yu-Shan, “The ROC's Semi-Presidentialism at Work: Unstable Compromise, Not Cohabitation,” Issues & Studies 36 (September/October 2000): 1–40.Google Scholar

8. Lin, Jih-wen, “Democratic Stability Under Taiwan's Semi-presidentialist Constitution,” Issues & Studies 38 (March/April 2002): 47–79.Google Scholar

9. See Hsieh, John Fuh-Sheng and Niou, Emerson M. S., “Salient Issues in Taiwan's Electoral Politics,” Electoral Studies 15 (1996): 219–235. However, this does not explain why the KMT, being the “median” on the Taiwanese ideological spectrum, would choose to align with the PFP rather than the DPP after the regime turnover in 2000. Historically, the KMT under Lee Teng-hui found the DPP a more reliable political partner than the proreunification New Party.Google Scholar

10. Elster, Jon, “Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea,” Public Administration 71 (1993): 169–217.Google Scholar

11. There are many other country cases where political reforms were carried out under the existing constitution. Yet Taiwan still remains a deviant case in that the reforms left the original constitution completely intact. The constitutional changes were introduced only as additional articles that gradually “froze” some of the articles of the original constitution.Google Scholar

12. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, “Institutional Design for the Republic of China on Taiwan,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1998.Google Scholar

13. Some constitutional experts in particular tried to make the president only the symbolic head of the state in the hope of restoring the parliamentary nature of Taiwan's constitution. Many others, however, believed that it was more urgent to prevent President Lee Teng-hui from expanding his power.Google Scholar

14. “Conservative” was a vaguely defined term used by Taiwan's mass media to describe those who were anti-independence critics of Lee Teng-hui's presidential leadership. The term referred to the anti-Lee faction in the KMT, as well as those who split away from the KMT to form new parties. These forces were united in the belief that the original constitution as a symbol of the Republic of China should be restored.Google Scholar

15. For a detailed analysis on Taiwan's constitutional reforms, see Lin, Jih-wen, “Transition Through Transaction: Taiwan's Constitutional Reforms in the Lee Teng-hui Era,” American Asian Review 20 (Summer 2002): 123–155.Google Scholar

16. Chu, Yun-han and Lin, Jih-wen, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity,” China Quarterly 165 (2001): 102–129.Google Scholar

17. Huang, Teh-fu, “Electoral Competition and the Evolution of the Kuomintang,” Issues & Studies 31 (November/December 1995): 104–105.Google Scholar

18. Teng-hui, Lee also needed collaboration from the DPP to liberalize the political regime and free it from the KMT conservatives' dominance. See Lin, Jih-wen, “Democratization Under One-party Dominance: Explaining Taiwan's Paradoxical Transition,” Issues & Studies 35 (November/December 1999): 1–28.Google Scholar

19. The 1947 constitution established the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the Examination Yuan. According to the original design, the National Assembly elected the president, whereas the provincial assemblies chose members of the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan, in turn, approved the president's appointment of members of the Examination Yuan. The 1992 reform deprived the National Assembly of its power to elect the president but gave it the power to approve the president's nomination of members of the Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan. Both powers were transferred to the Legislative Yuan after 2000.Google Scholar

20. On the relationship between state-building and democratization, see Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

21. Stephen Holmes shows that, in the East European postcommunist countries, strong presidencies emerged in societies where elections failed to produce a coherent parliamentary majority that could carry out reform policies. See Holmes, Stephen, “The Postcommunist Presidency,” East European Constitutional Review 2 (Winter 1993): 36–39.Google Scholar

22. Since institution-building is usually path-dependent, the political system in existence constrains the range of institutional options available for would-be reformers in the period of democratic transition. Semipresidentialism appeared a reasonable choice to the reformers in Taiwan partly because its constitution already contained parliamentarist clauses.Google Scholar

23. Duverger, Maurice, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” European Journal of Political Research 8 (June 1980): 165–187.Google Scholar

24. In a one-dimensional game under simple majority rule, the median voter is the winner. In a multiple dimensional game, however, the chance for the winner under simple majority rule is almost none. See Lin, Jih-wen, “Transition Through Transaction.”Google Scholar

25. See Wu, Yu-Shan, “The ROC's Semi-Presidentialism at Work,” and Lin, Jih-wen, “Democratic Stability Under Taiwan's Semi-presidentialist Constitution.” Google Scholar

26. Election campaigns under the SNTV system are expensive, especially when a candidate's party is large. This electoral system usually disfavors incumbents because they cannot focus on constituency service, which is of critical importance to win a seat under the SNTV system. In the Legislative Yuan formed in 2001, 50.6 percent of the legislators were new.Google Scholar

27. The premier in a pure parliamentary system, by contrast, has one's own popular legitimacy to draw power. Moreover, she is usually the head of the majority party or coalition within the parliament.Google Scholar

28. This is best exemplified by a series of scandals involving the National Security Bureau's management of illegal political funds without the knowledge of Chen Shui-bian. The funds originated from the Lee Teng-hui era.Google Scholar

29. For an analysis on the KMT's party structure, see Cheng, Tun-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” World Politics 41 (July 1989): 471–499.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. See Taipei Times, China Times, and United Daily News between April 29, 2000, and February 14, 2001.Google Scholar

31. The gist of the proposal was to build the fourth nuclear power plant while closing down the old nuclear power plants.Google Scholar

32. See Taipei Times, November 22, 2001.Google Scholar

33. Another goal of the Government Reform Committee was to reorganize the Executive Yuan. According to its proposal, the Executive Yuan would be reduced from thirty-six to twenty-two or twenty-three administrative units. The committee also deliberated on the possibility of adjusting the terms of members of the Legislative Yuan, as well as the joint holding of presidential and legislative elections. For details, see the committee's website, http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/innovation.Google Scholar

34. Even with President Chen's reiteration of his determination to carry out the reforms, the Government Reform Committee admitted that its plan to ask the Legislative Yuan to introduce constitutional amendments by the end of 2002 might be very difficult to reach. Obviously, the obstacle was the antagonistic relationship between the ruling and opposition parties. See United Daily News, October 28, 2002.Google Scholar