Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2016
How important have Thai parties and intraparty factions been in Thailand's fast-evolving democracy? What role do they play today, especially since the enactment of the latest constitution? What has accounted for the fragmentation in Thailand's party systems and coalitions? How did Thai democracy allow for the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra? This article analyzes these questions, presents a theory of Thai coalition behavior, and offers some predictions for Thailand's democratic future.
I want to thank Daniel Unger and Stephan Haggard for their assistance and advice.Google Scholar
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29. Thaksin increased Somsak's duties, giving him control of Thailand's Board of Investment and Public Relations department. Moreover, Thaksin reportedly threatened Wang Nam Yen at a party meeting: “If any of you do not want to remain with the party, just tell me so that I don't have to file you in the next election.” This threat speaks to the 1997 constitutional requirement that MPs must remain members of their parties for at least ninety days prior to an election. Otherwise they forfeit their MP status. “Talking Point: The Twilight of the Wang Nam Yen Faction,” The Nation, March 16, 2002, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com.Google Scholar
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33. In August 2002, both Wang Nam Yen and Wang Bua Ban accused Thailand's Highways Department director-general of contract bid-rigging. The official was appointed by then Transport and Communications minister Wan Muhamad Noor Natha, a member of Thai Rak Thai's Wadah faction. Wang Nam Yen and Wang Bua Ban were particularly piqued at the bureaucrat because he apparently refused to promote these factions' supporters in a reshuffle of highway officials. Ultimately, Thaksin removed Wan Noor himself from his portfolio in the 2002 cabinet reshuffle. “Party Power Play: Snoh and Wan Noor in Battle,” The Nation, August 17, 2002, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com.Google Scholar
On September 5, 2003, intraparty conflict openly erupted in the lower house's Budget Committee when members of the Wang Nam Yen faction alleged that Wang Bua Ban faction members were illegally channeling budget allocations to their own constituencies (and, more seriously, hoarding funds at the expense of members of Wang Nam Yen). However, the public airing of the allegations and threats to have 120 senators (minimum necessary) refer the matter to the Constitutional Court forced Wang Bua Ban members to agree to a more even distribution of budgetary resources. See “Budget Debate: Ruling Party Faction Promised More Funds,” The Nation, September 6, 2003, p. 1 A.Google Scholar
34. “Chart Thai to Meet Amid Defection Talk,” Bangkok Post, June 14, 2003, p. 3.Google Scholar
35. Election Commission of Thailand, “Thailand's 500 Members of Parliament,” available at http://www.ect.go.th.Google Scholar