I would like to thank Stephan Haggard and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Of course, I am responsible for any and all errors in this article.Google Scholar

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7. The security threat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the motivation it provided for development were tremendous in 1961. The DPRK had been recording greater economic growth rates after the Korean War and the coup leaders would have been responsible for repelling any DPRK provocation. In addition, the DPRK system provided an alternative to the dismal conditions in the ROK, and subsequently could have been a catalyst for social unrest, which had been increasing during the Second Republic (1960–1961). The first clause in the revolutionary declaration issued by the coup leaders stated that “anti-communism is the number one state policy and this policy would be strengthened.” Nationalism encouraged the junta to promote exports and earn foreign exchange in order to end dependence on US aid. See Hae-gyun, An, Han-gug haengjeongche-je-lon [Korean Administration Systems] (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1988), pp. 140–142.Google Scholar

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12. See Cole, David C. and Lyman, Princeton N., Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 37; or Huer, Jon, Marching Orders: The Role of the Military in South Korea's “Economic Miracle” 1961–1971 (New York: Greenwood, 1989), pp. 59–62. The coup marked a generational change in Korea's political leadership, as 55.2 percent of the junta's leaders were in their forties and 39.6 percent of them were in their thirties. See also Bae-ho, Hahn and Kyu-taik, Kim, “Korean Political Leaders: Their Social Origins and Skills,” Asian Survey 3, no. 7 (July 1969): 305–323.Google Scholar

13. Arguably, the coup leaders had emotional ties to their “roots” and wished to help their families and friends in the countryside. Even today the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF) appeals to urban consumer links to their rural hometowns in advertising domestic food products.Google Scholar

14. Urban areas defined as cities (si) with populations of at least 50,000 based on census reports.Google Scholar

15. Many Korean farmers had to turn to the informal sector for credit with very high interest rates because of Korea's underdeveloped financial sector and the low capitalization of the Agricultural Bank.Google Scholar

16. For a detailed discussion of the liquidation of usurious loans see Hwan, Ban Sung, Yong, Moon Pal, and Perkins, Dwight H., Rural Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 214–216; or NACF, Nonghyeob 30nyeon-sa [NACF: A 30-Year History] (Seoul: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, 1991), pp. 430–431.Google Scholar

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18. See MacDonald, Donald S., U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Period (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 92–103, 280–281, 285–292. The US suspended economic aid for a few months after the coup and then linked future economic aid to its efficient utilization.Google Scholar

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20. In 1963, under pressure from the United States, the SCNR was disbanded and Park ran for president as the candidate of the newly established Democratic Republican Party (DRP). Park had significant advantages in the election held on October 15, 1963. The DRP was superior in organization and funding, the government had strong influence over or control of the media, many political rivals had been legally excluded from political activities, and the date of the election was announced only two months in advance. Park defeated Yun Bo-seon in a close direct election, capturing 4,702,640 votes to Yun's 4,546,614. Park won the election with about 47 percent of the popular vote. See Eckert, Carter J., Ki-baik, Lee, Ick, Lew Young, Robinson, Michael, and Wagner, Edward W., Korea Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), pp. 361–363. For a discussion of Kennedy's relationship with Park and the return to civilian rule, see Se-jin, Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 125–137.Google Scholar

21. Robert Nathan and associates prepared an economic development plan for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency in March 1954. The Nathan Plan assumed that Korea would be able to produce a rice surplus for export. See Cole, David C. and Lyman, Princeton N., Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics , pp. 203–210.Google Scholar

22. KREI, Han-gug nongjeong 40nyeon-sa I, p. 30.Google Scholar

23. Ibid. Google Scholar

24. KREI, Han-gug nongjeong 40nyeon-sa II, pp. 121–122.Google Scholar

25. The dairy industry, which was ransacked in the aftermath of liberation from the Japanese, declined even further under the First Republic. Dairy cattle stocks had dropped to 860 head by 1960, and South Korea had become dependent on foreign aid for imported powdered milk. The Ten-Year Dairy Promotion Plan used aid and loans to import dairy cattle so that the nation could develop a dairy products industry. Other objectives of the plan were to expand idle land into pasture, increase employment in the countryside, increase the amount of manure for use as fertilizer, and increase the dietary protein intake for citizens. See KREI, Han-gug nongjeong 40nyeon-sa I, pp. 874–877.Google Scholar

26. After liberation, Korea exported its first livestock products in 1959 with the shipment of 2,030 hogs and 20 head of cattle to Hong Kong. See KREI, Han-gug nongjeong 40nyeon-sa I, p. 30, and II, p. 122; and NLCF, Chug-hyeob 10nyeon-sa, p. 882.Google Scholar

27. “So 3000du i-sang su-chul” [Exporting More Than 3,000 Head of Cattle], Nonghyeob-sin-mun , March 11, 1965.Google Scholar

28. KREI, Han-gug nongjeong 40nyeon-sa I, p. 30.Google Scholar

29. “Jeungsan su-chul geonseol: sig-lyang dae-lyang hwag-bo dwisbad-chimdo [Increasing Production-Exports-Construction: Countermeasures also Ensured Against Food Shortages-Financial Supports],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , January 14, 1965.Google Scholar

30. For a discussion of agricultural inputs and growth, and government investment during this period see ch. 4, “The Sources of Agricultural Growth,” and ch. 6, “Government Investment Policy and Plans,” in Hwan, Ban Sung et al., Rural Development. Google Scholar

31. Korea's surplus labor and land scarcity indicate a comparative disadvantage in agriculture and livestock, but this did not deter the government from targeting these sectors for exports in the 1960s.Google Scholar

32. “Su-chul jeungdae-e bun-bal” [Exerting Effort to Increase Exports], Nonghyeob-sin-mun , December 6, 1965.Google Scholar

33. Ibid. Google Scholar

34. NLCF, Chug-hyeob 10nyeon-sa , p. 884.Google Scholar

35. In 1965 the Korean government completed negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan. Opposition to the treaty was widespread, but Korean leaders insisted it was necessary for economic development. “Bag-dae-tonglyeong yeon-du-gyo-seo: jeungsan-su-chul geonseol jeon-lyeog, 10nyeon-nae geun-dae-hwa-i-lug” [President Park's Annual Address: Complete Devotion to Increasing Production-Exporting-Construction; Achieving Modernization Within 10 Years], Nonghyeob-sin-mun , January 24, 1966.Google Scholar

36. “Nonglimjanggwan-ebag-tong-yeongssi: su-chul nong-eob-deung-ui ji-jeong [Minister of Agriculture to Mr. Pak Tong-myo: Emphasizing Agriculture as an Export Sector],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , February 28, 1966.Google Scholar

37. Special cooperatives included things such as livestock, beekeeping, and silk. NACF, Nonghyeob 30nyeon-sa , p. 665.Google Scholar

38. The First Five-Year Economic Plan expired at the end of 1966, and the second plan began in January 1967.Google Scholar

39. “Bag-dae-tonglyeong ji-sa yo-ji: chug-nongjeongchaeg gye-sog gyeon-ji sae-nongmin-eun in-gan-gug-bo [A Summary of President Park's Commendation: Continual Adherence to Principle Agricultural Policies: New Farmers as a Human National Treasure],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , October 3, 1966.Google Scholar

40. “Chug-san yug-seongchaeg-deung ganggu: bag-dae-tonglyeong ji-si pil-yo-su-geub-bun yeo-yu-issge [Livestock Promotion Policies Considered: President Park's Instructions; Marginal Adaptability in the Supply and Demand of Fertilizer],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , October 24, 1966. Park's directives also included a plan for the supply and demand of fertilizer, a proposal to increase sweet potato consumption, and the establishment of special production zones in rural areas. Park had to be seriously concerned about economic performance and income in the rural sector, as the presidential election was approaching. And since economic growth in the countryside had been lagging in 1966, Park was in danger of losing the rural vote, which was crucial for his reelection in 1967.Google Scholar

41. “Chug-san jin-heung-ui sae-jeon-gi: chug-san-in-dae-hoe, geonuimundo chae-taeg [A New Turning Point in Livestock Promotion: Livestock Producers Conference, Proposal, and Adoption],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , December 12, 1966.Google Scholar

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43. ROK National Assembly, Dae-han-min-gug-gug-hoe 50nyeon-sa , p. 374. (Emphasis added.) Google Scholar

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53. “Bun-yu-su-ib gye-sog gyu-je: nonglimbu, nag-nongjin-heung-wi-hae bangchim bal-hyo [The Prohibition of Powdered Milk Imports Will Continue: The MAF Reveals the Intention to Develop the Dairy Industry],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , June 26, 1967.Google Scholar

54. The meeting included cabinet ministers, provincial governors, and the chairmen of the NACF, the National Fisheries Cooperatives Federation, the Office of National Fisheries Administration, the Office of Rural Development, and the Office of Forestry. See “Nongmin-so-deug-jeungdae-e jeon-lyeog [All-Out Effort to Increase Farm and Fishery Income],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun , July 24, 1967; and “Bag-dae-tonglyeong yu-sin [President Park's Instructions],” Nonghyeob-sin-mun, July 24, 1967.Google Scholar

55. The Agricultural and Fishery Development Corporation was founded in December 1967. The public corporation at one time had twenty-three subsidiaries including Korea Cold Storage, which would later become a distributor of imported beef during liberalization in the 1990s. See KREI, Han-gug-nongjeong 40nyeon-sa I, p. 36.Google Scholar

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57. See Hwan, Ban Sung, et al., Rural Development , pp. 24–31.Google Scholar

58. Kim Chung-yum served as vice minister of finance, vice minister of commerce and industry, minister of finance, and minister of commerce and industry between 1962 and 1969. He was President Park's chief of staff from 1969 to 1978. See Chung-yum, Kim, Han-gug-gyeongje-jeongchaeg 30nyeon-sa [Korean Economic Policy: A 30-Year History] (Seoul: JoongAng Daily, 1995), pp. 184–187.Google Scholar

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68. The Livestock Bureau then included four sections: feed, policy, production, and sanitation. See KREI, Han-gug-nongjeongjeongchaeg 40nyeon-sa II, p. 878.Google Scholar

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73. In 1963 the DRP captured 110 of 175 seats (62.9 percent), and in 1967 the ruling party increased its share to 130 of 175 (74.3 percent). But in 1971 the DRP only won 113 of 204 seats (55.4 percent). See Kim, C. I. Eugene, “The 1971 Elections and the Transformation of the DRP,” ch. 3 in Kim, C. I. Eugene and Whan, Kihl Young, eds., Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring, MD: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), pp. 35–45.Google Scholar

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88. Ibid., p. 197.Google Scholar

89. On March 9, 1978, the EPB selected thirty agricultural and livestock items that would be subject to price controls, and the MAF announced it would establish the LPA to “manage production, supply and demand, and price stability.” See KREI, Han-gug-nongjeong-il-ji , p. 406.Google Scholar

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99. The referendum was held on October 22, 1980, and 95.5 percent of the voters turned out. The new constitution was approved by 91.6 percent of those who voted. See Hae-gyun, An, Han-gug haengjeongche-je-lon , p. 372.Google Scholar

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103. Ibid. pp. 202–206.Google Scholar

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109. EPB, Gae-bal-yeon-dae-ui gyeongje-jeongchaeg , p. 365.Google Scholar