INCOME, EDUCATION, AND CONFLICTING ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA

Despite being widely criticized by government officials, the media, and other elites, the practice of vote buying persists on a widespread basis in Indonesia. For example, a survey conducted by The Asia Foundation found that 34 percent of Indonesian citizens had been offered money during a recent election (Thornley Reference Thornley2014). The same study found that 38 percent of all citizens said they would accept money if it was offered by campaigns. Moreover, during interviews we conducted in the Spring of 2015, government officials in several large cities across Java expressed pessimism about stopping the practice in upcoming elections. Many of the programs enacted by their agencies in recent years were designed with the goal of long-term impact through socialization of younger voters (especially in Indonesian schools), with the recognition that dissuading citizens from accepting money in upcoming elections was significantly more difficult to accomplish. Thus, empirical evidence indicates that a sizable minority of Indonesians are offered money in exchange for votes, that an even larger minority is willing to accept those payments, and that a broad range of government agencies and media outlets recognize that the practice of vote buying is difficult to prevent.

The extant literature provides some insight as to why vote buying persists despite widespread public education campaigns against the practice. In particular, the literature finds that poor and less educated citizens are more likely to be offered cash or other rewards by candidates in exchange for their votes (Stokes Reference Stokes2005; Nichter Reference Nichter2008). Moreover, Stokes (2005) found that citizens with lower incomes and less education were also more likely to respond that their votes were influenced by the gifts (322). In Stokes’ theoretical framework, poorer voters value the small rewards (cash or commodities) more highly than wealthier voters, which results in parties being able to gather large numbers of votes with relatively small payments per voter. Other research has explained this relationship in terms of policy preference differences across different types of voters. According to this theoretical perspective, poor voters have a strong preference for particularistic and immediate benefits whereas wealthier voters prefer more programmatic benefits that could take longer to be delivered (Scott Reference Scott1972; Desposato Reference Desposato and Shaffer2007; Shin Reference Shin2013). Shin (Reference Shin2015), for example, asked Jakarta citizens to rank their preferences for two patronage benefits (e.g., money and jobs) as well as three more universal programs (e.g., free education). The results demonstrated that poorer and less-educated voters ranked the patronage benefits higher than jobs compared to their wealthier counterparts. Thus, one prominent explanation as to why vote buying continues in Indonesia despite the best efforts of government agencies and anti-corruption activists involves the demand for particularistic, immediate benefits from poorer and less-educated voters. This “demand side” explanation focuses on the economic pressure created by poverty as translating into a demand for money from the candidates by poorer voters.

Much of this literature views the “demand side” explanation as driven by socioeconomic status, and particularly the role of poverty in creating a demand for money or gifts from candidates. Less studied is the interaction between citizens’ economic status and their normative views about vote buying practices in Indonesia. Undoubtedly, poverty forces some voters to demand money and gifts from candidates, but are these demands for money in contradiction to their normative views about the practice of vote buying as compared to wealthier citizens? Put differently, “demand side” explanations suggest that poor voters might otherwise not accept the payment from candidates if they were not impoverished. Many citizens might want to live up to the ideals of democracy but cannot afford to do so because they need the money for themselves and their families. This would induce the conflict discussed above where citizens recognize that vote buying is normatively wrong but are also in financial situations where they feel it necessary to accept the gifts from candidates (e.g., the “conflicted accept money” category in Table 1).

Related to this question about differences in normative attitudes is the potential role of education and income on attitudes about vote buying. Many studies treat education and income as proxy variables for the same underlying concept—poverty and socioeconomic status. For example, Nurdin (Reference Nurdin2014) and Shin (Reference Shin2015) both rely upon education and income as proxy variables for socioeconomic status in their studies. While highly educated citizens are certainly likely to have greater economic opportunities, education and income also can have very difference consequences for citizens’ political attitudes. As Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge, and Nickerson (Reference Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge and Nickerson2013) argue, the negative consequences of vote buying are not always obvious for citizens and can often be “abstract” in the sense that such consequences are not directly and immediately observed by individual citizens. Gonzalez-Ocantos and colleagues thus treat education as a proxy variable for citizens’ level of political sophistication and their awareness of these “distant” and “abstract” negative consequences (201).

Education is also likely to measure socialization into broader democratic values that recognizes vote buying as undermining democratic governance. Public opinion literature has long demonstrated that higher levels of education are associated with fundamental differences in political attitudes, including levels of political participation, acceptance of democracy, tolerance towards minority groups, and other important political beliefs (for an example, see Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi Reference Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi2011). Beyond acceptance of democracy, education is also strongly related to more qualitative understandings about the nature of democratic governance. These different meanings of democracy are often discussed in terms of “substantive” and “procedural” democratic values (see, for example, Rose Mishler, and Haerpfer Reference Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer1998; Bratton and Mattes Reference Bratton and Mattes2001; Dalton Shin, and Jou Reference Dalton, Shin and Jou2007; Canache Reference Canache2012). “Substantive” values refer to the outputs of government and include things such as social equity, effective government, and other economic or material benefits produced by government. In contrast, “procedural” democracy involves valuing the norms and procedures of free elections as well as various freedoms and liberties for citizens in a democratic society. Citizens who conceptualize democracy in the more instrumental “substantive” terms are more likely to demand economic benefits from government, and to adjust their support for democracy in light of economic downturns, than are those who adopt the less instrumental “procedural” conceptualization of democracy.

The East Asia Barometer asked citizens about the essential characteristic of democracy and categorized responses into four categories. Two of these categories measured “substantive” characteristics such as narrowing the gap between rich and poor and providing basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, and clothing, while the other two categories measured “procedural” characteristics such as holding government accountable and the freedom to express opposition to government. Citizens with higher levels of education were more likely to choose responses indicating that democracy involved freedom to express opposition to government or citizens holding government accountable than more economic characteristics such as reducing inequality or providing basic necessities of life (data not shown).Footnote ² The East Asia Barometer dataset also showed that citizens with higher levels of education were also more interested in politics and were more likely to follow the news (data not shown). Chu, Huang, and Lu (Reference Chu, Huang and Lu2015) likewise demonstrated that citizens across 13 East Asian countries were more likely to conceptualize democracy in “procedural” terms if they had a college degree or higher while citizens with lower levels of education were more likely to conceptualize democracy in “substantive” terms.

Finally, beyond socioeconomic status and qualitative conceptualizations of democracy, education is also likely to increase the reception of anti-corruption messages from the government, media, and other actors that are often targeted to students. During author interviews with several government agencies and political party leaders across Central Java, East Java, and Kalimantan Island, many of the efforts at dissuading citizens from participating in vote buying in Indonesia were targeted at students in both secondary schools and college. Media commentary about the negative effects of vote buying was also prominent on major television stations and the largest newspapers in Java. Highly educated citizens are more likely to be exposed to these messages and to develop more negative views about the practice than those with less education.

Thus, consistent with past studies, we expect that both income and education will have an effect on attitudes about vote buying in Indonesia. However, these different demographic characteristics are expected to have differential effects across the normative and practical dimensions. In particular, income should have the biggest effect on reducing conflicted attitudes, shifting citizens from the “conflicted accept money” category to the “consistent reject money” category. Education, however, is expected to have a broader effect by creating more opposition to the practice of vote buying as a normative proposition as well as increasing the likelihood that a citizen rejects money when offered. This should manifest as a shift from both the “consistent accept money” and the “conflicted accept money” categories to the “consistent reject money” category.

Moreover, it is possible that there are community-based or social mechanisms that could influence citizens’ attitudes about vote buying. First, there are likely to be collective action problems where an individual citizen might believe that the practice is normatively wrong, but recognizes that most of the other people in the area are accepting the money. The voter may believe that, without coordinated action with other citizens in the area, it is impossible to stop or even reduce the practice of vote buying (Lyne Reference Lyne2008). Recognizing that vote buying is occurring in the area regardless of her personal views, this voter might accept the money despite her personal objection to the practice. This would certainly be more likely to occur among poorer voters, but it could also occur among wealthier voters as well. The incentive to take the money in this situation is not based on personal financial need. Rather, it is based on the idea that the money will be given (and everyone else is accepting it), therefore the person might as well get the benefit of the practice. Related to this collective action problem is the possibility that social pressure could also induce people who might otherwise view the practice as corrupt to accept the money. This would especially occur in areas where community leaders negotiated informal “contracts” with candidates and the voters in the area need to demonstrate that they fulfilled their part of the agreement. By refusing the money, the individual would signal to the community that she was not participating in the collective agreement they had made with a candidate. In fact, rejecting the money could make the person feel isolated or marginalized within society, especially if others viewed it as violating an agreement with the candidate that was made on behalf of the community.

Another mechanism that could create the perception of conflicted attitudes concerns the nature of elite discourse across Indonesia regarding vote buying. A long-standing finding in public opinion studies is that citizen opinions often follow elite discourse (see, for example, Zaller Reference Zaller1992; Zaller and Feldman Reference Zaller and Feldman1992). Government agencies and candidates in some kota (cities) and kabupaten might be more unified in denouncing the practice. Indeed, government leaders in Banjarmasin and Banjarbaru (located in Kalimantan Island) were adamant about encouraging citizens both to reject money and to reject the candidates who offered it.Footnote ³ Yet other government offices, including several in Central and East Java, communicated messages that could increase the number of “conflicted” responses among citizens. Numerous government officials across Central and East Java repeated variations on the same common slogan, “take their money, but do not vote for them.” It should be noted that these messages were not intended to support vote-buying practices. Just the opposite, their goal was to reduce or eliminate vote buying by rendering it ineffective as a tactic for winning elections. Yet such messages could result in citizens who view vote buying as unethical responding that they would take the money from the candidates. This type of response is not the same kind of economic dilemma described above, but rather is a strategic consideration designed to undermine the practice of vote buying. Yet the survey responses of citizens following this strategic tactic would appear to be the same as those who are actually conflicted in their beliefs.

It should be noted that these alternative mechanisms are unlikely to be isolated to voters with lower incomes or lower levels of education. In fact, the effect of social pressure might be more common among citizens with higher levels of income who do not need the money and would otherwise reject it. These alternative mechanisms have two main potential consequences for the hypotheses described above related to income and education. First, if these collective action problems are more common among citizens with higher incomes or higher levels of education, it could attenuate the estimate of the effect of these variables in a regression model. Income, for example, might measure both the effect of the economic dilemma facing poor voters who recognize that vote buying is corrupt as well as the social pressure on those with higher levels of income who might otherwise reject the money. This would reduce the size of the income coefficient in a regression model and suggest that income has a smaller effect than it might otherwise have. Second, the effect of social pressure that is not correlated with income and education would be picked up in the error term of a regression model and also possibly be reflected in a higher constant term. In other words, even after controlling for income and education, there might still be high levels of conflicted attitudes (“conflicted accept money”) because the variables in the regression model do not adequately measure the effect of social pressure and other collective action problems. This could be the case, for example, if a sizable number of citizens (regardless of education or income) engaged in the strategic accepting of money proposed by government officials and party leaders in Central Java.

In sum, attitudes about vote buying can be multidimensional, encompassing both a normative and a practical component. People can view vote buying as corrupt or acceptable, and this viewpoint can be distinguishable from their openness to accept money from candidates. For some citizens, beliefs across these two components will be consistent. These voters will view vote buying as acceptable and will accept the money from candidates or they will view vote buying as unjustified or corrupt, and they will reject the money offered by candidates. Yet, conflicted attitudes are also a possibility with voters recognizing the corrupt nature of vote buying while still being open to accepting gifts from candidates in exchange for their votes. The analysis below examines the factors related to each component separately, estimates the prevalence of conflicted versus consistent attitudes across the two components, and finally examines the effect of income and education on conflicted/consistent attitudes about vote buying.

DATA AND METHODS

The data are drawn from a sample of households in the Banyumas and Cilacap Regencies in Central Java. The survey was administered in February 2014, prior to the national legislative and presidential elections, and uses stratified random sampling to survey approximately 20 respondents in each kecamatan in the Banyumas and Cilacap Regencies. In addition to basic demographics (income, education, gender, etc.), the survey asked citizens about preferences in both national and local elections as well as job performance among the various political parties. One obvious limitation of this study is that the two kabupatan in Central Java that were sampled in this survey obviously do not represent an archipelago of 240 million people. However, the survey was designed to capture variation on the variables of interest to this study, not necessarily to be representative of the entire country of Indonesia. In that regard, the sample does provide significant variation in attitudes about the normative and practical dimensions of vote buying in Indonesia as well as variation across levels of education and income. It is possible that mean levels of conflicted and consistent attitudes about vote buying could vary across Indonesia and future research could focus on examining and explaining this variation.

There are several approaches to measuring conflicted attitudes through survey data. First, open-ended questions allow a more direct measure of respondents’ considerations and the opportunity to assess which respondents offer conflicting considerations (see Zaller Reference Zaller1992, 60–62 for an example). Yet many large-scale surveys do not include these types of open-ended questions. A second approach attempts to measure conflicted attitudes by separately asking respondents about their likes and dislikes toward an issue or object (see Stoeckel Reference Stoeckel2013, for example). Respondents who simultaneously give high numbers of likes and dislikes about the issue or object are said to be more conflicted or “ambivalent.” Third, surveys often do not include either of these direct measures of conflicted attitudes, and research must rely on inferential techniques to measure ambivalence in public opinion. Statistical techniques such as heteroskedastic regression are used to measure the degree of response instability, which is used as a measure of the degree of conflicted attitudes among respondents (for an explanation of this technique, see Alvarez Reference Alvarez and Brehm1997).

Our measurement strategy uses the more direct method by asking respondents separately about the normative aspect of vote buying and the practical side of accepting the money. Embedded in the survey were two questions that asked about citizens’ attitudes about their normative view of vote buying and another that asked about their willingness to accept money from candidates. The first question approximately translates as, “according to [respondent], can giving a sum of money in order to vote for a candidate be justified?” The second question approximately translates as, “according to [respondent], if there was an offer of money to vote for the candidate, would you [Accept/Reject] the offer?”Footnote ⁴ The first question is intended to measure the respondent's normative judgment about the practice of vote buying in elections while the second measures the respondent's willingness to accept money that is offered by the candidates.

Control variables include four demographic characteristics—age, gender, income, and level of education.Footnote ⁵ Age is measured using a five-point scale while income is measuring using an eight-point scale.Footnote ⁶ Gender is a dummy variable coded 1 for male and 0 for female. Finally, education is measured as an eight-point scale ranging from no education to college or above.

Finally, the models include two dummy variables intended to measure information sources. The first dummy variable is coded 1 for respondents who received most of their political information from television and the second dummy variable is coded 0 for respondents who received most of their political information from face-to-face interactions with the campaigns. Other sources of political information were left as the baseline in the models.Footnote ⁷ Government officials in both the KPU and the Kesbang Polinmas frequently run television advertisements seeking to change citizens’ attitudes about corruption, including practices such as vote buying. Moreover, candidate debates often end with a message from the debate moderators telling citizens not to vote for candidates who offer money. For example, during the 2013 Central Java Governor election, all three of the televised candidate debates ended with the moderator telling viewers, “And remember, do not vote for candidates who offer you gifts.”

In order to examine these questions about conflicted versus consistent attitudes about vote buying, we created a typology of voters from the responses to the two questions related to vote buying (see Table 1). Respondents could provide consistent responses by saying that vote buying is both unjustified and that they would reject the money (what we term “Consistent Reject Money”) or by saying that vote buying is justified and that they would accept the money (what we term “Consistent Accept Money”). Alternatively, respondents could indicate conflicted responses by saying that vote buying is unjustified but that they would accept money (“Conflicted Accept Money”) or that vote buying is justified yet they would reject gifts from candidates (“Conflicted Reject Money”).

First, only one of the 800 respondents fell into the “Conflicted Reject Money” category.Footnote ⁸ A small majority (53.4 percent) fell into one of the two consistent categories, with a larger number being consistent in viewing vote buying as unjustified and saying they would reject the money (38.9 percent) with a smaller number saying that vote buying is justified and they would accept money (14.5 percent). The size of the “Conflicted Accept Money” category, however, was also quite large (46.5 percent) and actually represents the largest category of responses. Thus, a large number of respondents exhibited conflicted attitudes about vote buying, expressing conflict between the normative perspective that vote buying is unjustified while simultaneously admitting that they would accept money from candidates if it were offered.

To analyse which factors influence consistent and conflicted attitudes about vote buying, we created a dependent variable, coded -1 for “Consistent Accept Money” responses, 0 for “Conflicted Accept Money” responses, and 1 for “Consistent Reject Money” responses. This categorical variable was then regressed against the six independent variables described above using multinomial logistic regression.Footnote ⁹ The “Consistent Reject Money” category was left as the base outcome in the multinomial logit model. Finally, the respondents are clustered by kecamatan, which makes it likely that the errors in the multinomial regression models are not “independently and identically distributed.” Failing to account for this clustering of responses could artificially increase the statistical significance of the standard errors in the model (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo Reference Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo2007).Footnote ¹⁰ We therefore estimate the multinomial logistic regression model using clustered standard errors to account for the potential problems created by the clustered nature of the data.