Portions of this research were funded by the National Science Foundation and the UCLA International Studies and Overseas Program. I wish to thank the following individuals for their valuable comments and suggestions: Baum, Matthew, Baum, Richard, Bawn, Kathleen, Cox, Gary, DeShazo, J. R., Haggard, Stephan, Londregan, John, McCubbins, Mathew, Thies, Michael, and two anonymous referees. I am particularly grateful to Nathan Batto for his valuable insights into Taiwanese politics. I also wish to thank Tsai-wei Sun for research assistance and Chang, Carl Chiaohao, Lin, Jih-wen, Lin, Michael T. W., Tang, Dennis T. C., and Wu, Roy Hsiang-jung for facilitating my fieldwork.Google Scholar

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