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1. Assessment is based on information drawn from the Korea National Statistical Office and the Bank of Korea.Google Scholar

2. By “democratization,” I mean both the political transition to a democratic regime and that regime's subsequent consolidation. Democratic transition from authoritarian regime is complete when top decisionmakers, who are selected through free and contested popular elections, govern with full authority and according to democratic procedures. And democracy is consolidated when it becomes “the only game in town”—the sole arena for political competition. See Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5–13; and Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 5.Google Scholar

3. Following Stephen Walt, I define alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” Allies can provide military assistance (including force dispatches and military aid for the purpose of deterrence and defense) or offer political benefits (such as access to bases and influence over policy). An asymmetric alliance is a security arrangement between a great power and a weaker state; US alliances with South Korea and the Philippines fall in this category. See Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 12; Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 51–53; and Schroeder, Paul W., “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management.” In Knorr, Klaus, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976).Google Scholar

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6. One scholar observed that democratizing states are less likely to honor alliance commitments in war; however, he did not provide a systematic explanation for that tendency. See Leeds, Brett Ashley, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” International Organization 57, No. 4 (2003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. For example, see Kahler, Miles, ed., Liberalization and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Mansfield, Edward D. and Snyder, Jack, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995); and Walt, Stephen M., Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

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