1. Sutherland, Lucy, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics (Oxford, 1952), p. 50Google Scholar.

2. Marshall, P. J., Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1813 (London, 1968), pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

3. SirNamier, Lewis and Brooke, John, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1754-1790 (N.Y., 1964), I, 150–51Google Scholar.

It is important to understand how the East India Company was organized. The Court of Directors was the most important administrative organ. It had twenty-four members, and was the major policy making body of the Company. Twelve major committees of nine members each handled different aspects of Company affairs. Most important was the Committee of Correspondence which dealt with political affairs and the administration of various Indian establishments. The General Court of Proprietors was the forum where Company stockholders could express their opinions on various general policy matters. Before 1784, the Proprietors had the right to reverse the decisions of the Court of Directors but with the passage of Pitt's India Act, this power was withdrawn. Unlike the Court of Directors which met frequently, the Proprietors were called together only quarterly and this in itself limited their power even before the passage of the India Act of 1784. While the Proprietors had the power to elect members of the Court of Directors, it is remarkable how stable the membership in the Court of Directors was during the eighteenth century. By judicious use of money and influence, directors managed to get themselves elected and reelected. While the power of the Court of Directors was not absolute, their intimate knowledge of East Indian Affairs left them unchallenged on most Company policy matters. See Phillips, C. H., The East India Company 1784-1834 (Manchester, 1961)Google Scholar; and Misra, B. B., The Central Administration of the East India Company 1773-1834 (Manchester, 1954)Google Scholar.

4. Sutherland, , East India Company, pp. 111–205Google Scholar.

5. Cohen, Stephen, The Indian Army (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), p. 9Google Scholar.

6. For example, on February 1, 1760 before Arcot, 63% of the array was made up of King's troops. PRO, War Office (hereafter, PRO, W.O.), 1/319.

European soldiers were always a small portion of the actual fighting forces available. One return of East India Company troops in the Comorandel in 1767 shows the following:

There were 281 staff officers and others not listed in the European companies and regiments.

Against a grand total of 2,502 Europeans, the Company employed 15,490 sepoys in the Comorandel. If we eliminate the European officers, only 13% of the rank and file at this time were European. BM, Add. MS 34,685, Palk Papers.

In 1778, there were 10,926 European soldiers in India and 70,093 natives serving both armies. Including officers, Europeans made up 15% of these armies. BM, Add. MS 38,401, Liverpool Papers. It was customary for the best men available to be assigned to the artillery.

7. The embarkation lists of the Company give us some idea of the effect of the passage to India on recruits. There are cases where most of the recruits died at sea. In 1760, for example, out of fifty-three officers and men on the ship Osterly, thirty-three died at sea. In the same year, forty-three of the sixty-one men on the Worcester never reached India. Normally, however, and particularly later in the century, the death rate was much lower. In 1792, out of 4,707 recruits, 76 died in passage; in 1793, 54 out of 3,817 were buried at sea; and 33 of 1,877 died in 1794. For this three-year period, 163 men, or only 1.5% of the recruits died in passage. In general, conditions on board the East India Company ships seem to have been better than on the transports used by the regular army in the 1790s. Unfortunately, we do not know the physical condition of those who were alive when their ships docked in India. See India Office Records (hereafter IOR), l/Mil/9/25, Embarkation Lists, and D/126.

Returns for the 1790s show that in 1794, illness kept 17.5% of the men from reporting for duty, while in 1795, an average of 18.3% was incapacitated. The death rate in those two years was 5.8% and 4.8% respectively. It should be noted that the number of men needed to fill the regiments was often as great as the number of men listed as fit for duty. In January of 1794, for example, there were 4,397 men listed for duty, while 4,374 men were needed to fill the ranks and 195 were sick in quarters, 353 were in the hospital, and 123 were listed as invalids and subject to discharge. Conditions in this period were probably better than at any other time in the century. PRO, W.O. 17/1742 and 1743 list total E.I. Army returns for 1794-95. (The total includes those about to be discharged.)

Here are some returns for 1795:

8. BM, Add. MS 42,071. Humberston-Greville letters on the rising of the Seaforth Highlanders, September, 1778. Copy of conditions entered into by the General Officers in Scotland with the mutineers of the Earl of Seaforth's Regiment.

9. IOR, Home Series, Misc., Vol. 24, 113 and IOR, B 92, Committee of Shipping Report, 3 Dec. 1776. In the 1750s, the instructions to the recruiting agents were very general. The agent was empowered to raise recruits and to “act and govern … in the execution of the said trust according to such orders and directions as you shall from time to time receive from us ….” By the 1770s,recruiting instructions also listed the precise sum the Company would pay for each man—a rate which rose sharply in wartime. In 1776, for example, perennial recruiters Blomfield and Hart received only one guinea per man raised within a thirty mile radius of London (IOR, B/92), but by January 1777, Hart was receiving six guineas per man found in Yorkshire (IOR B/92, Jan. 1777), and in the same year, the price of recruits raised in the London area rose to five guineas per man (IOR, B/92, Sept. 1777).

10. The Public Advertiser, 12 March 1771. Letter of “A.B.”

11. IOR, L/Mil/9/85. These figures were compiled by A. J. Farrington, Assistant Director of the India Office Library. I am indebted to him for this material and for others he allowed me to examine from his own collection.

12. IOR, Dispatches to Bengal, 25 March 1757.

13. Ibid., 1759.

14. IOR, E/4/617, Dispatches to Bengal.

15. Statutes at Large, Anno Vicesimo Septimo, Georgii II, c.9, 1754.

16. IOR, H/100, Note from Weymouth to Barrington, 12 March 1769.

17. IOR, D/26, Committee of Correspondence, 19 Oct. 1769.

18. IOR, H/101, 12 Nov. 1769.

19. It was common practice for the army to resort to drafting — filling the regiments abroad with men belonging to home-based regiments. This was often done without the consent of the recruits involved and, needless to say, was a source of great bitterness in the ranks.

20. IOR, H/101. Both plans were given to Lieutenant Colonel Stewart for a professional opinion, and he recommended plan two. It was understood that Stewart would be the commander of the new corps.

21. IOR, H/84, 786.

22. IOR, D/26, Committee of Correspondence, 4 April 1770.

23. IOR, H/84, 787-93, “A Bill with the amendments for the more effectually raising of a Military Force, for the protection of the Settlements and possessions of the East India Company.”

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. IOR, B/86, 8, 12 and 22 Feb. 1771.

27. See Sutherland, , East Indict Company, p. 157Google Scholar, for an assessment of the parliamentary intervention of 1766-67. The coalition formed during the period of dispute between Sullivan and Clive seems to have broken down by the early 1770s. It was comparatively easy for the minority of directors and proprietors in the Company who opposed reform to find allies among the opposition to the North administration.

28. Namier, and Brooke, , History of Parliament, II, 313-17, 683–85Google Scholar; III, 449-50.

29. The London Evening Post, 26-28 Feb. 1771. (Hereafter, LEP.)

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid. See comments of Sullivan and Cornwall.

34. The Public Advertiser, 12 March 1771. Letter of “Solon.”

35. Ibid., 13 March 1771.

36. Ibid., 12 March 1771.

37. LEP, 21-23 March 1771.

38. Parliamentary History, Vol. XVII, col. 169-73, and LEP, 16-18 April 1771Google Scholar.

39. For an interesting example of the results of parliamentary xenophobia during this period, see BM, Add. MS 23,680, The Case of Colonel F. Frederick with the East India Company, 1773. Frederick was hired to employ German troops for the Company service. Unfortunately, his mission ended in disaster, at least in part because of Company and parliamentary sensitivity about foreign troops on English soil.

40. LEP, 16-18 April 1771.

41. Parliamentary History, XVII, col. 173.

42. In 1772, the Company raised height requirements to 5′4″ and required that no men over 35 be listed. The men were to be mustered, examined before leaving Gravesend, and issued clothes, sugar and soap. If a man lost his clothes in a storm, he was to receive new ones, and there were to be monthly inspections for cleanliness. Further, it was ordered that records of death and desertion be kept during the passage to India. IOR, B/88, Report of Committee of Regulations governing recruits, 31 Dec. 1772.

43. IOR, L/Mil/9/85, Farrington Recruiting figures.

44. IOR, L/Mil/103, Vol. 7, 1778-84.

45. IOR, H/84, 22 Dec. 1776.

46. In 1777, for example, the Court sent a memorial to Lord Weymouth requesting the assistance of the government in strengthening their forces in India. They noted the Company needed 2,695 men last year, “but altho they used the most effectual means, they could think of, by employing several agents and contractors and by offering very high prices for their procurring men, in different parts of the kingdom and also in Germany, they have hitherto been able to obtain no more than 728 men ….” IOR, H/84, 28 April 1777.

47. In 1778, out of 1,684 men sent to India, well over 500, or roughly 30%, were born in Ireland. In 1779, 275, or 35 % were Irish, and in 1780, the percentage of Irish-born recruits rose to 44, before declining to 28 % in the following year. When we consider that there were probably a good many Irishmen born in England who embarked as well, it seems reasonable to estimate that nearly 50% of army recruits during this period were of Irish extraction. IOR, L/Mil/9/103, Vol. 7, 1778-84.

48. Statutes at Large, Anno Vicesimo Primo, Georgii II, c.65, 1780, 1781, p. 431.

49. Ross, Charles (ed.), Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis (London, 1859), I, 225Google Scholar.

50. Ibid., p. 230, and IOR, Misc. Mil/127, Appendix 7, 16 Nov. 1786.

51. IOR, Home Misc. Series, Vol. 85, Cornwallis to Dundas, 16 Nov. 1787.

52. Ibid., 8 March 1789.

53. IOR, Mil/Misc/127, Extract of Court's letter to Bengal, 15 Dec. 1790, and Cornwallis to Court of Directors, 15 Dec. 1790. Cornwallis also objected to the Company practice of taking sailors, as he felt these men would desert at the IOR, Mil/Misc/127, 14 Oct. 1786. In 1792, when Colonel Brownrigg was inspecting officer for the Company in London, he accepted sailors since recruits were needed badly, but he marked an “X” by their names as a sign that they were “objectionable in great degree.” PRO, W.O., 133/15, Brownrigg's Inspection Book, 8 March 1792.

54. IOR, Mil/Misc/127, Appendix 26, Extract from General Letter to Bengal, 25 Oct. 1785. Presumably, these men wanted to seek their fortunes in India.

55. Ibid., Appendix 7, Cornwallis to Court of Directors, 16 Nov. 1786.

56. In spite of this threat, the practice continued and the following year Cornwallis complained about it once again. IOR, Mil/Misc/127, Appendix 8, Cornwallis to Court of Directors, 19 Dec. 1787.

57. Ibid., Appendix 26, Cornwallis to Court of Directors, 18 Aug. 1787.

Callahan, Raymond, in The East India Company and Army Reform, 1783-1798, (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 76–77Google Scholar, argues that the Company had tried to set up a depot in 1781, but “had received little cooperation” — presumably from the government. He berates Cornwallis for attacking the Company's directors for failure to carry out this reform. Callahan fails to note that in 1786-87, opposition to the depot plan came from the Court of Directors. Further, he is very hard on Cornwallis for attacking the quality of the Company's European regiments. He writes, “a dispassionate analysis would have revealed that, while far from perfect, they were as good as they could be made in the circumstances — probably as good as any of the British reigments in India.” His argument is not convincing, and while it may be true that Cornwallis was more interested in how the men looked on parade than in their fighting qualities, we cannot make any meaningful judgment about the relative quality of crown and Company troops in India.

58. IOR, D/2, 18 July 1786. See also IOR, D/32, Committee of Correspondence, Aug. 1787, discussion of Stevenson plan.

59. IOR, B/105, Court of Directors, 7 Sept. and 10 Oct. 1787, and IOR, D/32, Committee of Correspondence Report, Aug. 1787. It should be noted that the recruiting debate took place against a backdrop of new pressures to reform the Company army, and a dispute over sending regular army troops to India at Company expense. Dundas and the Board of Control instigated the latter plan, and when the Court declined to pay for these regiments, the Board appealed to Parliament, and in 1788, the Declaratory Act was passed, giving the Board of Control power to demand that the Company support such forces out of territorial revenues. See Misra, , Central Administration, p. 34Google Scholar. Dundas's general view of the Company army is summed up in this statement:

I cannot conceive of anything more preposterous than that the East India Company should be holding in their hands a large European army exclusive of the Crown to be recruited from … this country, acting either jointly or separately with the King's troops as occasion may suggest.

Quoted in Phillips, , East India Company, p. 34Google Scholar. See also, Callahan, East India Company and Army Reform.

60. IOR, D/2, 29 March 1796, and BM, Add. MS, 13/854, Wellesley Papers, Court to President and Members of the Committee of Officers.

61. IOR, E/l/95, Cosby to Scott, 20 Aug. 1796.

62. PRO, W.O. 1/892, Scott to Dundas, 25 Aug. and 10 Nov. 1796.

63. IOR, B/124, 1 and 15 Nov. 1796, and D/37, Reports of the Committee of Correspondence, 11 and 15 Nov. 1796.

64. IOR, Mil/Misc/127, COC, Nov. 1796.

65. IOR, B/124, COD, 15 Nov. 1796.

66. Ibid., 24 Nov. 1796 and D/2, 15 Nov. 1796.

67. Phillips, C. H. (ed.), The Correspondence of David Scott: Director and Chairman of the East India Company Relating to Indian Affairs, 1787-1805 [Camden Society 3rd Series, Vol. LXXV] (1951), 104Google Scholar.

68. Ibid. Dundas wrote to Scott, “I have had it [the revocation] in my possession these last three days, but waited in hopes that the Court … would be induced to reconsider their conduct. The business must now be brought to an issue in a different mode.”

69. IOR, Home Misc. Series, Vol. 85, Dundas to Court, 5, 10 and 13 Dec. 1796. In the December 5 letter, Dundas wrote, “Not only my private letters from your most respectable servants, civil and military, but your own public letters are full of representations upon the enfeebled and inefficient state of your European army to the wretched system by which it is recruited.” He continued:

I have refrained from taking any measure upon it, during the last two years of your charter. I publicly stated that I purposely omitted saying anything on your military establishment because I waited for the opinion of Lord Cornwallis, to whose abilities and experience on the spot I had applied for a report on the subject. He at last came home and a long and intricate discussion which followed is fresh in all your memories. Can it have escaped your recollection that the correction of the recruiting system was an idea interwoven with every discussion which took place respecting your European army. I appeal to your own records for the truth of what I state and I can with confidence assert, on my own part, that every advice I submitted either to His Majesty or to His Royal Highness the Duke of York proceeded on my taking it for granted that this was a point understood between the Court of Directors and me ….”

70. IOR, Mil. Misc/127, Appendix 17, Brownrigg letter, 7 Dec. 1796.

71. Ibid., Appendix 18.

72. Ibid., Appendix 17, Ackermann letter.

73. IOR, Mil/Misc/127, Court, 16 Dec. 1796. The Court argued that short men were preferable to tall ones in hot climates, and that it was wise to send boys to India because they “better seasoned to the climate.”

74. IOR, B/124, 17 Dec. 1796, and IOR, E/2/29, Dundas to Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 27 Dec. 1796, and Mil/Misc/127, Appendix 24.

75. The Morning Chronicle, 19 Jan. 1797. The recruiting issue was also brought to the attention of the House of Commons, but no action was taken. Commons Journal, LII, 31 Dec. 1796Google Scholar.

76. IOR, B/262, General Court, 17 Jan. 1797. It is difficult to evaluate the arguments on the quality of recruits sent to India, and whether deficiencies were due to the passage or the poor condition of the men before they embarked. On the surface at least, the statements of inspecting officers show some concern for standards. Colonel Brownrigg's inspection books also suggest that examination of men and boys for Company service was not just a formality in the 1790s. His records for 1792-93 showed that some men, at least, were rejected because they did not meet Company standards. On March 8, 1792, he passed 135 men and rejected 22. Most were rejected because they were sailors, but some because they were too old. On March 9, 28 out of 134 men were rejected, some because of the surgeon's report, but more because they were undersize or seamen. For the 1792 recruiting season, eighty men were rejected and 653 passed — a rejection rate of more than 10%. This was not, even by eighteenth-century standards, a high rejection rate. For example, a larger proportion of men was rejected when the army press was in operation in wartime. Clearly, the low rate of rejection was a product of low Company standards, as Brownrigg himself maintained. A large percentage of the recruits were both small and young. On December 10, 1792, of 86 men approved, 54% were under twenty, while on December 11, 50 of 78, or nearly 67%, approved men were under twenty, and on April 22, out of 41 potential recruits, 36 were under twenty and 21 were under sixteen. IOR,l/Mil/9/25, Embarkation lists, and PRO, W.O. 113/15, Brownrigg's Inspection Records.

77. PRO, W.O. 1/893, Committee Report, January, 1799. Most of these men were recruited in England and Ireland prior to the withdrawal of the license. PRO, W.O. 1/893, 15 March 1797, Scott to Dundas, PRO, W.O. 6/67, 22 March 1797, Dundas to Chairman of Court.

This report contains an examination of the state of the Company army during the period 1794-99- It includes the following information:

The report shows how the Company tried to compensate for the cutting off of the home recruit supply by reducing the Company garrison at St. Helena and enlisting foreign troops stationed in Africa for service in India.

78. IOR, B/126, Court, 29 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1797.

79. Ibid., 4 April 1798.

80. IOR, B/127, 13 April 1798. The vote was 381 for and 203 against the measure.

81. Ibid., and PRO W.O. 1/894, Bosanquet to Dundas, 18 April 1798.

82. IOR, B/127, 2 May 1798.

83. IOR, Home Misc. Ser., Vol. 86, Dundas to Bosanquet, 18 Aug. 1798.

84. IOR, D/2, 3 Jan. 1799.

85. PRO, W.O. 1/620, Duke of York to Dundas, 30 Jan. 1799.

86. PRO, W.O. 1/893, Bosanquet to Dundas, 25 Jan. 1799.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., 13 Feb., and PRO, W.O. 1/620, Duke of York to Dundas, 31 Jan. 1799.

89. IOR, D/2, 15 March 1799, and Commons Journal, LIV, 25 April 1799Google Scholar. The bill also gave the Company permission to train its own men and to carry out the role, the Court could appoint officers from within the Company or from the regular army. Further, deserters could be apprehended and confined in the same manner as in the regular army, and “all such officers and soldiers as shall be raised and enlisted … at all times and until their embarkation,“ should be “subject to all the provisions and regulations of said Act … entitled an Act for Punishing mutiny and desertion….” Statutes … 39 George III, An Act for Better Recruiting of the Forces of the East India Company.

90. PRO, W.O. 1/894, Inglis and Scott to Dundas, 5 Dec. 1800.

91. IOR, Home Misc. Ser., H/87, 407-12. There is a list of King and Company troops sent to India between 1798 and 1802 in PRO, W.O. 1/894. The following chart shows how the Company army suffered vis-a-vis the regular army during this period.

Only twenty percent of the new recruits went to the Company during this period. According to an agreement worked out between the two armies, 2,638 men should have been delivered to the Company forces.

92. See Callahan, East India Company and Army Reform, Chapters 6-8.