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The Origins of British Opposition to Mussolini over Ethiopia*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

James C. Robertson
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Extract

Scholars have not yet provided an authenticated explanation of Britain's support for the League of Nations against Mussolini's scheme to annex Ethiopia in 1935. Writing during the Italo-Ethiopian War and its immediate aftermath, A. J. Toynbee concluded that the Peace Ballot was responsible, a verdict followed by the two principal Italian historians of the war's diplomatic preliminaries, L. Villari and G. Salvemini. Their judgment was echoed by the author of the pioneer work on interwar British history, C. L. Mowat, and no doubt was cast on this version until 1961. Even then no credible alternative was advanced by the dissenter, A. J. P. Taylor, and in the more recent first full-scale diplomatic history of the conflict's origins, the American, G. W. Baer, has drawn substantially the same conclusions as his European predecessors, A. J. P. Taylor apart.

Villari worked from unpublished (still) Italian documents; Salvemini augmented these selections with a vast array of press material and other contemporary printed sources. When Mowat published his book two years later, only Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare of the main British participants had written their memoirs, the former having intentionally restricted himself to material already then made public. The Ethiopian affair figured only as an important second-stream event in Taylor's general study, which did not concern itself in detail with the books of Foreign Office officials, such as that of Sir Robert (later Lord) Vansittart, which had appeared in the meantime.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , November 1969 , pp. 122 - 142
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1969

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Footnotes

*

Reproductions of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. Permission to quote from Cassell and Co. and Houghton Mifflin Co. (The Eden Memoirs), Hutchinson and Co. (The Mist Procession), Macmillan and Co. (The Life of Neville Chamberlain), Hamish Hamilton Ltd. (The Origins of the Second World War), the University of Birmingham (Sir Austen Chamberlain Papers), and John Grigg (Sir Edward Grigg Papers) is gratefully acknowledged. J. C. R.

References

1. The questionnaire conducted by the National Declaration Committee between Nov. 12, 1934, and June 27, 1935. Question 5 read: “Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by (a) economic and non-military measures? (b) if necessary, military measures?” 10,027,608 answered Yes to 5 (a) and 6,784,368 to 5 (b), while 635,074 and 2,351,981 voted No respectively.

2. Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs, 1935 (London, 1936), II, 50–53Google Scholar; Villari, L., Storia diplomatica del conflitto italo-eliopico (Bologna, 1943), p. 10Google Scholar, and Italian Foreign Policy under Mussolini (New York, 1956), p. 129Google Scholar; Salvemini, G., Prelude to World War II (London, 1953), pp. 209–11Google Scholar.

3. Mowat, C. L., Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London, 1955), pp. 542–43Google Scholar.

4. Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), p. 90Google Scholar. “No one knows why the British Government took the line they did; probably they did not know themselves.”

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9. 95 H. L. Deb. 159-60 (Dec. 5, 1934).

10. See Eden, , Memoirs, II, 106Google Scholar, for his retrospective view.

11. BM, Eden to Lord Robert Cecil, Dec. 11, 1934, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Add. MSS, 51083.

12. See above p. 123.

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14. Ibid., p. 200.

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16. Ibid., II, 26.

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20. See below p. 126.

21. Eden was born on June 12, 1897, Simon on Feb. 28, 1873.

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23. Ibid., II, 75.

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27. Ibid., II, 73.

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31. Templewood, , Nine Troubled Years, pp. 107, 109, 116Google Scholar. He resigned as Foreign Secretary in Dec. 1935 following the press revelations of the Hoare-Laval proposals and the subsequent Conservative backbench unrest in the Commons.

32. Vansittart's relations with Simon were poor at this time and deteriorated as the Government put out approaches to Berlin in the early months of 1935. See U. of Birmingham, Sir Austen Chamberlain to his sister, Mar. 31, 1935, Chamberlain Papers, AC 5/1/694.

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34. Selby, , Twilight, p. 34Google Scholar.

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37. Custody of John Grigg, Sir Edward Grigg to Lloyd George, Jan. 11, 1935, Sir Edward Grigg Papers, General Correspondence L 1935.

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40. Vansittart, , Mist Procession, p. 427Google Scholar. “Of many avenues to success he chose the most slippery.”

41. Times, Feb. 22, 1935.

42. For a report on the British political situation, see U.S. National Archives, Ray Atherton (American chargé d'affaires in London) to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Jan. 22, 1935, Dept. of State, MS.74l.00/81.

43. BM, record of conversation between R. A. Leeper and a League of Nations Union official, Sep. 27, 1935, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS, 51171.

44. The “other government departments” Leeper indirectly mentioned were the Dominions Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Air Ministry.

45. For this account of the Foreign Office's administrative organization, see esp. Ashton-Gwatkin, F. T., The British Foreign Service (Syracuse, 1951), pp. 13–23Google Scholar. See also SirKelly, David, The Ruling Few (London, 1953), pp. 205–07, 210, 221Google Scholar.

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48. Selby, , Twilight, p. 15Google Scholar.

49. U. of Birmingham, Sir Austen Chamberlain to his wife, Mar. 4, 1933, Chamberlain Papers, AC 6/1/971.

50. Foreign Relations of the United States 1934, II (Washington, 1951), 759–60Google Scholar (hereafter cited as F.R.U.S.).

51. For the text and translation of, and a commentary on, the four secret agreements, only one of which related to Ethiopia, see Watt, D. C., “The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 1935 on Ethiopia,” Middle East Journal, XV (1961), 69–78Google Scholar.

52. Pierre Laval, however, had notified Simon at Geneva on Jan. 12, 1935. France regarded the protocol as a statement of her lack of economic interests in Ethiopia, except for a zone one hundred kilometres wide on either side of the Djibuti-Addis Ababa railway. Britain was also assured that the secret agreement in no way threatened her rights under the treaty of 1906, by which Britain, France, and Italy undertook to maintain the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia. This early French economic interpretation of the secret protocol, and its communication to Britain, go some way towards exonerating Laval of foreknowledge concerning Italian military intentions and of a consequent implicit bargain with Mussolini in Jan. 1935. See PRO, conversation between Simon and Laval, Jan. 12, 1935, FO 371/19496, R.318/1/67; FO minute, Jan. 22, 1935, FO 371/19497, R.516/1/67.

53. PRO, Cabinet Papers 24/256 161 (35) Annex (hereafter cited as CP),

54. Eden, , Memoirs, II, 197–99Google Scholar.

55. Ibid., II, 200.

56. BM, Sir Eric Drummond to Cecil, Dec. 29, 1931, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS, 51112.

57. Times, Mar. 9, 1935.

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59. Vansittart, , Mist Procession, pp. 479, 491, 522Google Scholar.

60. BM, record of conversation between Simon and Cecil, June 14, 1934, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS, 51082.

61. H. G. (later Sir Harold) Nicolson, , King George the Fifth (London, 1952), p. 528Google Scholar.

62. 98 H. L. Deb. 1139 (Oct. 23, 1935).

63. On Jan. 29 Thompson avoided detailed enquiries of Leonardo Vitetti, lest the Italian counsellor “commit his government … to proposals which H.M. Government may in the long run be obliged to resist.” By Mar. 6 British policy was “to decide on the nature of British interests and to keep the initiative as much as possible … so that they may from the beginning be in a position to guide Italian requests away from points which H.M. Government will be unable to concede.” PRO, CP 24/256 161 (35) Annex.

64. French ministers visited London for talks from Feb. 1-3, 1935, to formulate a common Anglo-French policy in Europe. The resulting communiqué was a mixture of conciliation and firmness towards Germany, whose reply on Feb. 14 contained an invitation to British representatives only to come to Berlin. The cabinet agreed on Feb. 25 to accept in principle, and this was the situation when Simon approved Eden's memorandum on Ethiopia. After Simon met Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the French Prime Minister, in Paris on Feb. 28, it was announced that Simon would see Hitler in Berlin on Mar. 8.

65. PRO, CP 24/256 161 (35), Aug. 16, 1935.

66. After the publication of a British White Paper on defence on Mar. 4, 1935, Hitler caught a diplomatic cold and postponed Simon's visit, only taking it up again when London enquired whether he still wanted it to take place after his action in renouncing the peace treaty of 1919.

67. Robertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933-39 (London, 1963), p. 56Google Scholar.

68. Lord Lothian sent Simon a written record of the conversation on Jan. 30. It is not entirely clear from this transcript whether Hitler was offering a separate arrangement with Britain or whether he meant the proposed agreement to form part of an international naval treaty, but he made it perfectly plain to Lothian when discussing air forces that he approved the principle of bilateralism with Britain.

69. Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, III (Washington, 1959), 681Google Scholar, No. 358 (hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.); Butler, J. R. M., Lord Lothian (London, 1960), pp. 203, 334, 369Google Scholar; PRO, Cabinet Conclusions 23/81 12 (35) 3, 16 (35), 16 (35) 1 (hereafter cited as CC); CP 24/254 69 (35); F.R.U.S. 1955, I (Washington, 1953), 66-67.

70. British, French, and Italian leaders met at Stresa on April 11-14, 1935, to concert policy in reply to the German repudiation of Versailles. Britain and Italy formally reaffirmed their position as guarantors of the Franco-German frontier under the Locarno Treaty of 1925, a joint declaration formally communicated to Germany. In addition, the need for a common policy at the League in considering Hitler's unilateral breach of Versailles and in maintaining Austrian independence was proclaimed, as well as the principle of close Anglo-French-Italian collaboration for upholding the peace of Europe. No allusion to Africa appeared in the declarations.

71. Baer, , Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 122–23Google Scholar; PRO, CC 23/81 20 (35), 21 (35) 1; CP 24/254 79 (35); minute by Ramsay MacDonald, Mar. 12, 1935, FO 371/19105, J.973/1/1.

72. PRO, Drummond to Simon, Mar. 19, 1935, FO 371/19106, J.1139/1/1; memo. by Thompson, Apr. 5, 1935, minute by Vansittart, Apr. 8, 1935, FO 371/19107, J.1396/1/1; memo. by Thompson, Apr. 12, 1935, ibid., J.1490/1/1; memo. by Vansittart, Apr. 30, 1935, FO 371/19108, J.1700/1/1; Simon to Drummond, May 3, 1935, ibid., J.1711/1/1. See also Eden, , Memoirs, II, 202–04Google Scholar.

73. Ibid., II, 205.

74. This memorandum, drafted by Thompson, Vansittart, and Simon, was intended to foster the impression that Foreign Office knowledge of Mussolini's Ethiopian ambitions was relatively recent. It made no allusion to the existence of the Franco-Italian secret protocol on Ethiopia, still less to Italy's communication to London on Jan. 29. The subsequent establishment of the Maffey Commission was not reported, and no explanation was advanced for the failure to clarify British policy at Stresa. None of the February contacts with the Italians was specifically singled out for mention, and the general references to them occurred in the context of the Wal-Wal clash and the consequent boundary dispute. To conceal the traces of his fruitless diplomacy, Simon was less than frank with his colleagues. Although it was strictly correct that he made no proposals for future policy, the memorandum's tone was strongly suggestive of sacrificing Ethiopia. It was pointed out that an Italian conquest of the Ethiopian lowlands would commence in September or October and encounter only limited military difficulties. Italy would not accept an adverse decision from the League Council, and British support for the League would greatly compromise Anglo-Italian relations, affecting the European situation to German advantage. The memorandum assumed that British backing would not be sufficiently resolute to prevent Italy from flouting the League, and considerations arising from the Covenant if Italy were held to be an aggressor were left out of account. Paris and London should recommend jointly to the Ethiopian Emperor recognition of Italy's claims to participate more fully in increasing trade between Ethiopia and the outside world and to assist in the development of Ethiopia's economic resources. All that was missing for Simon to jettison Ethiopia and the League altogether was the accomplishment of the naval détente with Germany. PRO, CC 23/81 27 (35) 5; CP 24/255 98 (35).

75. D.G.F.P., C, IV (Washington, 1962), 144Google Scholar, No. 82.

76. PRO, CC 23/81 25 (35) 3.

77. Eden, , Memoirs, II, 216Google Scholar. Eden eventually had to be content with cabinet membership and the title of Minister for League of Nations Affairs.

78. Times, May 27, 1935.

79. D.G.F.P., C, IV, 209, No. 109.

80. Eden, , Memoirs, II, 205Google Scholar.

81. See, for example, 299 H. C. Deb. 80 (Mar. 11, 1935).

82. PRO, CC 23/81 27 (35) 5.

83. See above p. 123. By the end of November only sixty thousand votes had been received. Livingstone, Dame A., The Peace Ballot (London, 1935), p. 15Google Scholar.

84. PRO, CC 23/82 33 (35) 4.

85. PRO, CC 23/82 35 (35) 2, 39 (35) 1, 40 (35) 1, 41 (35) 1.

86. PRO, Meeting of Ministers, Aug. 6, 1935, ibid.

87. PRO, Meeting of Ministers, Aug. 21, 1935, CC 23/82 42 (35) 1, 3.

88. Whether the answers to the Peace Ballot's question 5 accurately reflected public opinion is doubtful, but the question is not relevant to this particular essay.

89. PRO, CC 23/81 27 (35) 5.

90. Eden, , Memoirs, II, 216–17Google Scholar.