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The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2014
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When a powerful state seeks to impose its will on a weaker one, it expects to be subject to condemnation, which must be weighed against its assessment of national interest. Failure does not eliminate the condemnation; indeed it may intensify it. In most books and articles on the Jameson Raid and its antecedents, the fact that it was a fiasco foredoomed to disaster seems to add to the gravity of the indictment against those who planned it. In recent years scholars have devoted considerable attention to the question of the complicity of Joseph Chamberlain. Most of them have concluded that he was aware of an impending rising but that he was not acquainted with the details, principally because he did not choose to know. Most investigators have also averred that the High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Hercules Robinson, knew far more about the preparations for a coup than he was willing to admit.
The overthrow of the Transvaal Government, of course, had been the subject of discussions among Imperial officials long before the Raid. Robinson's predecessor, Sir Henry Loch, had plans as early as 1893 to intervene in the Transvaal in the event of an insurrection and the Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Ripon, knew of these plans and did not prohibit such action, even though he did not encourage it, and at the time of Robinson's appointment in 1895 he discussed with Ripon intervention to support a Johannesburg rising. Edmund Garrett, who talked to Ripon at this time, stated that if the raid had occurred while Ripon was in office, he could have telegraphed, “Ripon is in it up to his neck.”
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References
1. For a discussion of the literature on this subject, see Holli, Melvin G., “Joseph Chamberlain and the Jameson Raid: a Bibliographical Survey,” Journal of British Studies, III, no. 2, May, 1964, pp. 152–166CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Baylen, Joseph A., “W. T. Stead's History of the Mystery and the Jameson Raid,” Journal of British Studies, IV, no. 1, November, 1964, pp. 104–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. van der Poel, Jean, The Jameson Raid (London, 1951), p. 37Google Scholar. This conclusion leans heavily on the testimony of the Imperial Secretary, Sir Graham Bower. In a narrative written in 1901, Bower states that Rhodes informed him that he had told Robinson “everything.” Rhodes House MS, Africa s. 63. The Bower papers in Cape Town also record Bower's belief that Robinson was aware of preparations for the rising.
3. See Loch's speech in the House of Lords, May 1, 1896, Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, XI. cols. 313-317.
4. Ripon thought Loch overly eager and declined to send him reinforcements to prepare for intervention, but he assumed that in one way or another the Transvaal would come under the control of its British inhabitants. See, for example, British Museum, Ripon to Rosebery, Sept. 5, 1894, Ripon Papers, Addtl. MSS 43516.
5. Garrett, Edmund and Edwards, E. J., The Story of An African Crisis (Westminster, 1897), pp. xxvi–xxviiGoogle Scholar.
6. The Memorandum of Agreement is contained in PRO, B. T. 31/4451/28988. The Central Search Association allotted 92,400 shares. Rothschild received 3000 shares for his services.
7. This correspondence is contained in Rhodes House, British South Africa Papers, Misc. V. On March 28, 1895, Abercorn acknowledged Cawston's sale of 4500 shares and authorized him to sell another 2000 at 65 shillings. In November, 1894, he had sold 150 shares at between 45 and 50 shillings.
8. University of Durham, draft, Grey to Chamberlain, Dec. 10, 1896, Grey Papers. I acknowledge the kind assistance of Mr. J. E. Fagg and Dr. J. M. Fewster in making these papers available to me.
9. National Archives, Salisbury, Rhodesia, Grey to Chamberlain, Nov. 17, 1895, Grey Papers, GR 2/1/1, cited in Butler, Jeffrey, The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid (Oxford, 1968), pp. 295–296Google Scholar.
10. Univ. of Durham, Rhodes to Grey, July (?), 1896, Grey Papers.
11. Univ. of Durham, Rhodes to Hawksley, June 12, [1896], Grey Papers.
12. For an account of Rhodes's interview with Chamberlain, see Lockhart, J. G. and Woodhouse, C. M., Rhodes (London, 1963), pp. 336–338Google Scholar. The authors suggest that Reginald Brett, a friend of Rhodes, Grey, and Chamberlain, was an important intermediary.
13. Univ. of Durham, Jameson to Grey, July 2, [1896], Grey Papers.
14. Univ. of Durham, Chamberlain to Grey, Oct. 13, 1896, Grey Papers.
15. Ibid.
16. Univ. of Durham, Chamberlain to Grey, August 21, 1896, Grey Papers.
17. Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa …. Ordered by H. of C. to be Printed, July 13, 1897.
18. Stead, W. T., Blastus, the King's Chamberlain (London, 1898), p. 3Google Scholar. See also his Joseph Chamberlain. Conspirator or Statesman (London, 1900)Google Scholar.
19. British Museum, Ripon to Fairfield, July 1, 1896, Ripon Papers, Addtl. MSS 43558.
20. British Museum, Ripon to Chamberlain, Oct. 19, 1899, Ripon Papers, Addtl. MSS 43637. In this letter Ripon complained of Chamberlain's allusion to a confidential memorandum of his dated September, 1894, on the question of suzerainty over the Transvaal and misrepresentation of its nature.
21. PRO, telegram, confidential, Chamberlain to Robinson, January 4, 1896, F.O. 83/1340.
22. PRO, telegram secret and personal, Chamberlain to Robinson, March 31, 1896; telegram, Robinson to Chamberlain, April 1, 1896, both in CO. 537/130.
23. Rhodes House, Kirk to Cawston, Private, Jan. 9, 1896, British South Africa Papers, vol. V, Miscellaneous.
24. PRO, Rhodes to BSAC, Jan. 3, 1896, confidential, F.O. 83/1340.
25. PRO, BSAC to Colonial Office, Jan. 9, 1896, CO. 417/197. Printed in C. 7933, Feb., 1896.
26. Times, Jan. 4, 1897.
27. In an undated letter in 1896, Grey referred to Rhodes's testimony to the Board. He also gave Rhodes advice as to what his version of events should be if he were required to testify before the Select Committee. It was essential, Grey counselled, to maintain that Jameson acted without authority in initiating rather than assisting a rising. Univ. of Durham, Grey to Rhodes, 1896, Grey Papers.
28. PRO, cable, Hawksley to Rhodes, May 4, 1896, C.O. 517/197.
29. PRO, Cabinet meeting, May 5, 1896, CAB 41/23/54.
30. Gifford's, testimony on this is in the Report of the Select Committee, May 11, 1897, pp. 404 ff.Google Scholar
31. Rhodes House, précis by Cawston of special Board meetings, May, 1896, BSAC V, Misc.
32. Univ. of Durham, telegram, confidential, Hawksley to Rhodes, June 3, 1896, Grey Papers.
33. Rhodes House, Fairfield communicated this information to Cawston on May 2, 1896, précis by Cawston of special Board meetings, May, 1896, BSAC V, Misc.
34. Univ. of Durham, telegram, confidential, Hawksley to Rhodes, June 3, 1896, Grey Papers.
35. Rhodes House, Kirk to Cawston, Private, June 27, 1896, BSAC V, Misc.
36. Univ. of Durham, Maguire to Grey, June 27, 1896, Grey Papers.
37. Univ. of Durham, decypher of telegram, Grey to (?), n.d. (approx. July, 1896), Grey Papers.
38. Univ. of Durham, Rhodes to Grey, 1897; Grey to Rhodes, May 3, 1897, Grey Papers.
39. Sir Horace Farquhar became a baron in January, 1898.
40. South Africa, April 2, 1898.
41. Times, March 31, 1898. See also Glasgow Evening Times, March 31, 1898, and Newcastle Leader, April 1, 1898.
42. Financial News, April 4, 1898.
43. Financial News, Feb. 4, 1898.
44. Financial News, April 14, 1898; Times, April 14, 1898.
45. Rhodes House, [Gifford?] to Cawston, Feb. 14, 1897, BSAC V, Misc.
46. Rhodes House, Cawston to Abercorn, June 27, 1898, BSAC V, Misc.
47. Rhodes House, Hawksley to Cawston, July 1, 1898, BSAC V, Misc.
48. Rhodes House, draft, July 4, 1898, BSAC V, Misc.
49. The published letter, dated June 27, 1898, was the first letter he sent to the Board announcing his resignation. Rhodes House, BSAC V, Misc.
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