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Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

Extract

Between 1870 and 1900 British military organization was extensively revised by act of Parliament. The reforms went further than any previous changes in the history of the British army. They were so enduring that the modem British army has its foundation in these years, particularly in the legislation associated with the name of Edward Cardwell, Gladstone's Secretary of State for War in the Whig-Liberal Ministry of 1868-74. The Cardwell reforms were a vital part of that ministry's legislation to diminish the influence of privilege and acknowledge the place of merit and efficiency in the professions, the civil service, education, and the army. Cardwell's legislation for the army, however, was not so beneficial as historians have implied. Too much of the existent knowledge of British military organization in the late nineteenth century is based on a sympathy with those reforms which glosses over their weaknesses and makes alternative schemes seem reactionary. The Cardwell reforms were neither so new nor so radical in their effects as many reformers intended. A detailed study of army organization between the Crimean and the Boer Wars leads to the conclusion that much of the old continued while many of the changes made under Cardwell failed to take hold. It is time that more emphasis was placed on this conservative aspect of British military history rather than on the liberal and novel features of army reform in the late Victorian period. Why was it, for example, that the country which was the first to experience technological and industrial change on a national scale, and which extended its colonial empire farther than any power in Europe, was also the last among European powers to transform an eighteenth-century army into an instrument of modern warfare?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1963

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Footnotes

*

I am indebted to the Canada Council for a summer grant which enabled me to do some of the research on which this article is based. A. V. T.

References

1. This is not to underestimate the suggestive but all too brief criticisms in Ensor, R. C. K., England 1870-1914 (London, 1952), pp. 290–93.Google Scholar

2. See two articles by Bond, Brian, “Prelude to the Cardwell Reforms,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, CVI (1961), 229–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “The Effect of the Cardwell Reforms,” ibid., CV (1960), 515-24.

3. Failure to emphasize fundamental weaknesses in the Cardwell reforms has been due to reliance on the published work of Cardwell's supporters. Biddulph, Ralph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office (London, 1904)Google Scholar, provided the most comprehensive study on which all subsequent writing has been based, and Biddulph was a private secretary to Cardwell during the period of reform.

4. Capt.Kirchhammer, , “The Military Impotence of Great Britain,” Nineteenth Century, IX (1881), 608 .Google Scholar English military critics were more specific. See SirAlison, Archibald, On Army Organization (London, 1869)Google Scholar, and Brackenbury, C. B., Foreign Armies and Home Reserves (London, 1871).Google Scholar The book by Alison was originally published as two articles in Blackwoods for February and April, 1869. These were both used by Cardwell in preparing his army reforms.

5. Viscount Wolseley as Adjutant-General in October, 1888, wrote a minute to the Admiralty, saying “how very desirable it is that the Army and Navy should be under some one authority.” But he added, “there is little use in remonstrances on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. The Admiralty will not even deign to consider our views, and invariably refuse all concessions.” WO 32/265/7700/6358, quoted in Schurman, Donald's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, “Imperial Defense 1868-87” (Cambridge University, 1955), p. 206 .Google Scholar

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8. The Duke appeared as a witness before almost every parliamentary committee or commission on army matters between 1857 and the 1880's. His evidence gives a better insight into his military views than does his correspondence with Secretaries of State for War like de Grey, Cardwell, Childers, or Campbell-Bannerman. The biography of him by Verner, Willoughby, The Military Life of the Duke of Cambridge (London, 1909)Google Scholar, contains much of his official correspondence and is still valuable for that reason. See also Lyttelton, Neville, Eighty Years (London, 1927), pp. 104–05.Google Scholar

9. Some idea of the deference shown to the Duke is explained by the royal warrant of October 11, 1861, with its ambiguous definition of relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. “Now Our Will and Pleasure is, that the military command and discipline of Our army … as likewise the appointments to and promotion in the same … which … shall have been … vested in … the Commader-in-Chief … shall be excepted from the department of the Secretary of State for War.” But the powers of the Commander-in-Chief shall be “subject always to Our general control over the government of the army, and to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of Our royal prerogative in that behalf.” Parliamentary Papers (1869), XXXVI (75), 591. Google Scholar See Erickson, A. B., Edward Cardwell (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 74 .Google Scholar

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11. Report of commissioners on the system of purchase and sale of commissions in the army, Parliamentary Papers (1857), XVIII (C. 2267), 256–68.Google Scholar The Duke pointed to those social pressures which, without purchase, would weaken any veto he might have over the promotion of incompetent officers.

12. Verner, , Duke of Cambridge, I, 436, 441 Google Scholar; II, 24-26; and correspondence between the Duke and Cardwell, 3 June 1871 to 2 July 1871, Cardwell Papers, PRO 30/48/4-15.

13. The Duke of Cambridge to Cardwell, 5 Dec. 1869, Cardwell Papers, PRO 30/48/3-12.

14. This correspondence between Cardwell and Gladstone is in the Gladstone Papers, BM, Add. MSS., 44119. See Cardwell to Gladstone, 27 Feb. 1869: “Whatever patronage remains ought not to be transferred from the General Commanding-in-Chief to a political office,” and “it is not consistent with military discipline to appeal from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State.”

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16. Memoranda papers of the Commander-in-Chief, WO 31. For this study only numbers 1469-77, covering the two years 1869-70, were used. After 21 June 1870 the papers come to an end. They then became the papers of the Military Secretary's Division and have never been opened to the public. They would probably throw a good deal of light on what little change was effected after the abolition of purchase. All of the War Office papers cited here have been deposited in the Public Record Office. See also SirWood, Henry Evelyn, From Midshipman to Field-Marshall (London, 1906), I. 207 .Google Scholar

17. The Duke of Cambridge to Cardwell, 29 July 1871, Cardwell Papers, PRO 30/48/5-15. This letter indicates what little change was effected in the office of Military Secretary. The Duke talked the matter over with Sir Richard Airey and selected Col. C. R. Egerton to replace General Forster. “I consider this appointment so essential to my comfort that I urge his appointment to this confidential post … And be just and fair to General Forster to let him leave matters so that his successor will be able to carry on with confidence.” Cf. Wheeler, Owen, The War Office Past and Present (London, 1941), p. 210 Google Scholar; and Verner, , Duke of Cambridge, I, 471–73.Google Scholar

18. First report of the royal commission on the civil establishments, Parliamentary Papers (1887), XIX (C. 5226), 82. Google Scholar

19. On the Duke's resistance to Wblseley's appointment as Adjutant-General in 1881 see SirLee, Sidney, King Edward VII (London, 1925), I, 557–58.Google Scholar

20. Nothing has been written on how influential Thompson and Knox were. Thompson was probably a competent supervisor in a clerical capacity. Knox was more important because of his mastery of financial details and his knowledge of central army administration. Campbell-Bannerman felt closer to him than to anyone else in the War Office. Their letters indicate that they kept in touch with each other through all the years from 1880 to 1906, even when Campbell-Bannerman was out of office. BM, Add. MSS., 41221. Campbell-Bannerman Papers. See also Atlay, J. B., Lord Haliburton: a Memoir of his Public Service (London, 1909).Google Scholar

21. Because of his royal position, the Duke was placed over the Colonial Defense Committee in 1885 to study the improvement of harbor defenses within the Empire. On matters of defense his prestige could be pre-eminent even over the Admiralty. Schurman, , “Imperial Defense,” p. 234 Google Scholar; Tunstall, , “Imperial Defense 1870-97,” Cambridge History of the British Empire, III, 235 .Google Scholar

22. Cardwell to Gladstone, 17 Nov. 1870. BM, Add. MSS., 44119. Gladstone Papers.

23. This was the Hartington Commission, whose report contains the best historical account of these changes of 1887-88. Parliamentary Papers (1890), XIX (C. 5979), 22. Google Scholar It was written by the secretary to the commission, George Sydenham Clarke (Baron Sydenham of Combe). See his My Working Life (London, 1927), pp. 102-03, 147–48.Google Scholar The abolition of the office of Surveyor-General was made easier by the establishment of the Army Service Corps in 1887.

24. There is no adequate biography of Buller. A sketch of him is Butler, Lewis, Sir Redvers Buller (London, 1909)Google Scholar; and a much too favorable account is Melville, W. E., Life of the Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller (London, 1923).Google Scholar

25. Campbell-Bannerman to Buller, 19 June 1895, Buller Papers, PRO/WO 132/5; Spender, J. A., Life of Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923), I, 128–29.Google Scholar

26. Letter from Gen. Gerald Ellison, 2 Feb. 1921, BM, Add. MSS., 41252. Campbell-Bannerman Papers. See also his Our Army System in Theory and Practice,” Army Review, III (1912), 382–97.Google Scholar

27. This view was stated by Campbell-Bannerman in the report of the Hartington Commisscion, of which he was a member. Buller's correspondence with him between 1892 and 1895 is in BM, Add. MSS., 41212. Campbell-Bannerman Papers. See also Lyttelton, , Eighty Years, pp. 167–68.Google Scholar

28. The reasons for this change have not been clearly established. Campbell-Bannerman wrote to Lady Wolseley, 15 Nov. 1893, that Lord Wolseley was “the foremost man for any new arrangement that may be necessary when an Illustrious Person retires.” Wolseley Correspondence, Hove Public Library. Campbell-Bannerman's plans for an Army Board must have made him change his mind, and there were doubts about Wolseley among Liberal cabinet ministers, while the Queen disliked Wolseley's tendency to be outspoken in the press. Campbell-Bannerman wrote to Buller, 19 June 1895, that the Duke's successor would “in all probability” be the present Adjutant-General. WO 132/5. The haste of the new Conservative government to refuse this appointment arose from hostility to Buller (nursed by Balfour in particular) for his apparent sympathy with Home Rule when he had served as an under secretary in Ireland for a few months in 1887. Butler, , Redvers Buller, p. 55 Google Scholar, and a letter from Butler to Henrietta Buller, 15 Nov. 1918, in the Regimental Museum, King's Royal Rifle Corps, Winchester. On Wolseley's appointment see Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), pp. 130–33.Google Scholar

29. The members of the Army Board were the Adjutant-General, the Quarter-master-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-General of the Ordnance. The supervision of the Commander-in-Chief over this Board was defined by an Order-in-Council of November, 1895. Parliamentary Papers (1896), LI (59), 483, 487. Google Scholar

30. Wolseley to Maj. Gen. Sir John Ardagh, 10 Oct. 1895, Ardagh Papers, PRO 30/40/2. Wolseley to Buller, 3 Oct. 1895, Buller Papers, WO 132/5. Wolseley in the House of Lords, 4 Mar. 1901, 4 Hansard, XC, 327-45.

31. The documents revealing this dispute between the Queen and Lansdowne are in two memoranda (Lansdowne 8 May 1899; the Queen 3 June 1899) in WO 32/282/7968/8046; and Parliamentary Papers (1901), XXXIX (C. 512), 243. Google Scholar Wolseley's power over the military staff is indicated in Wood, , Midshipman to Field-Marshal (London, 1907), p. 571 .Google Scholar

32. Purchase Commission, Parliamentary Papers (1857), XVIII (C. 2267)Google Scholar, evidence of G. O. Trevelyan, pp. 269-316.

33. Hart, Jennifer, “Sir Charles Trevelyan at the Treasury,” E.H.R., LXXV (1960), 92110 .CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. Report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into over-regulation payments on promotion in the army. Parliamentary Papers (1870), XII (C. 201), 199 Google Scholar; evidence of Charles Hammersley, a member of Cox & Co., ibid., (1870), XII, 11-12.

35. Ibid., (1857), XVIII (C. 2267), 293.

36. The figure accepted as most realistic was £8,529,297, deferred over 25 years. Parliamentary Papers (1871), XXXIX (243), 75. Google Scholar This sum included over-regulation prices. Cf. Biddulph, H., “The Era of Army Purchase,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XII (1933), 230–33.Google Scholar

37. Cardwell to Gladstone, 28 May 1871, BM, Add. MSS., 44119. Gladstone Papers.

38. About one million pounds a year was saved by withdrawing from Canada. Stacey, C. P., “Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-71,” C.H.R., XXXVI (1955), 185–98.Google Scholar

39. Cardwell to Gladstone, 28 May 1871, BM, Add. MSS., 44119. Gladstone Papers.

40. Cardwell to Gladstone, 3 Jan. 1874; and Cardwell to Granville, 15 Jan. 1874, ibid., 44120. Gladstone Papers.

41. 3 Hansard, CCXVI, 1218, 20 June 1873.

42. Lyttelton, , Eighty Years, pp. 145, 173 .Google Scholar This observation of practice should be compared with War Office Regulations for Appointments and Examinations for Promotion, May 1872. Parliamentary Papers (1872), XXXVII (C. 575), 509. Google Scholar Cf. Erickson, , Edward Cardwell, pp. 84, 93 Google Scholar, who places perhaps too much emphasis on Cardwell's speeches in the House.

43. WO 32/1014/107 Gen/1609. A similar statement was made by Kitchener before the royal commission on the war in South Africa. Parliamentary Papers (1904) XL (C. 1789), 54. Google Scholar

44. Royal commission on the present state of military education, Minutes of Evidence, Parliamentary Papers (1870), XXIV (C. 25), 209, 229. Google Scholar The Duke of Cambridge said that young men from the public schools could not have passed a professional military examination. In order to attract them to Sandhurst he suggested that the entrance examination there should be lowered. See also Mack, E. C., Public Schools and British Opinion since 1860 (New York, 1941), pp. 35, 122–25.Google Scholar

45. Parliamentary Papers (1870), XXIV. Sidney Herbert's minute of 1 Sep. 1859 is on p. 445, the Duke's opinion on p. 208.

46. Report … on … military education. Ibid., (1869), XXII (C. 4221), 23. The commissioners concluded that an exclusive military college “would not harmonize with the general feeling of the country or with the views of parliament.”

47. Ibid., (1869), XXII, 15. More than 90% of the candidates for commission went to these crammers before 1870, and the number was afterwards only gradually diminished. See also Stocqueler, , Personal History of the Horse Guards, p. 182 Google Scholar; and Grenfell, Lord, Memoirs (London, 1925), p. 14 .Google Scholar

48. Parliamentary Papers (1870), XXIV (C. 25), 209. Google Scholar “Officers abroad have no other pursuits or occupations or feeling but military feeling. Now here the general mode of life is so distinct from that of an officer abroad … I do not think you can force the officers of the British army to go into classes, or to be instructed, by order from the authorities.”

49. Wolseley, Viscount, “The Army,” in Ward, T. H. (ed.), Reign of Queen Victoria (London, 1887), I, 218 .Google Scholar

50. Henderson, G. F. R., The Science of War (London, 1905), pp. 398402 Google Scholar; Maude, Frederick N., War and the World's Life (London, 1907), ch. ixGoogle Scholar; Esher, Viscount, Journals and Letters (London, 1934), I, 353 .Google Scholar

51. Parliamentary Papers (1903), X (C. 1421), 11. Google Scholar

52. WO minute by Buller, Jan. 1894, and by the Inspector-General of Cavalry in WO 32/1006/103/834.

53. WO 32/1089/101/432. The memorandum is dated 6 June 1893. See Wilkinson, Spenser, Volunteers and the National Defense (London, 1896), p. 133 .Google Scholar From 1870-90 the number of commissions from the ranks, exclusive of Quartermasters and Ridingmasters, averaged 3% a year of the total number of commissions granted. Parliamentary Papers (1894), LII (189), 289. Google Scholar

54. Parliamentary Papers (1903), X (C. 1421), 24. Google Scholar

55. The difficulties of building a reserve from a foreign-service army were discussed in Adye, John, “The British Army,” Nineteenth Century, VI (1879), 344–60.Google Scholar Cardwell wrote to Gladstone, 6 Nov. 1879: “I hope you will read Adye's article …. It was a joint composition of his and mine, a litlte modified by him because of cautions he had received from His Royal Highness.” BM, Add. MSS., 44120.

56. Adye, John, Recollections of a Military Life (London, 1895), p. 255 .Google Scholar

57. Cardwell to Gladstone, 9 Jan. 1869, BM, Add. MSS., 44119; and Cardwell's speech outlining his scheme in the Commons. 3 Hansard, CCIV, 338, 16 Feb. 1871.

58. There is a more complete description of the plan in Biddulph, Lord Cardwell, passim, and in Erickson, , Edward Cardwell, pp. 8590 .Google Scholar On the Prussian and French armies in 1870 see Howard, Michael, The Franco-Prussian War (London, 1961), ch. i.Google Scholar

59. The difficulties of recruiting and maintaining a fluctuating establishment were analysed in MacDougall, Patrick L., “Have We an Army?Nineteenth Century, XV (1883), 508 .Google Scholar MacDougall was a general much admired by Wolseley, a supporter of Cardwell, yet also respected and listened to by the Duke of Cambridge. Like Sir Richard Airey, he was one of the key military figures in the War Office during the 1870's. His knowledge and experience strongly influenced the localization of the militia with the regular army.

60. War Office committee on recruiting, 1875, in WO 33/27/0585.

61. Cardwell to Gladstone, 9 Nov. 1879, BM, Add. MSS., 44120. Gladstone Papers.

62. Ibid. Cardwell memorandum, 3 Jan. 1874. “But the number obtained in 1873 has been only half.” Report of committee on army reorganization. Parliamentary Papers, (1881), XXI (C. 2791), 209. Google Scholar

63. Simmons, John Lintorn, “The Critical Condition of the Army,” Nineteenth Century, XIV (1883), 170 .Google Scholar Like John Miller Adye and George Sydenham Clarke, Simmons was a senior officer of the Royal Engineers and another example of how the most intelligent criticism of the army came from men trained in the scientific corps.

64. On the Egyptian campaign of 1882 see John L. Simmons, “The Weakness of the Army,” ibid., XIII (1883), 529. The article was based on the general annual return of the British army for 1881. The army at home numbered 92,784 men, yet it contributed only 16,400 to the Egyptian expedition, and 10,840 of them were reserves. The balance of 15,000 came from Malta and regiments returning from India. See also Chronology of Events Connected with Army Administration, 1858-1907 (London, 1907), p. 39 .Google Scholar

65. SirRoberts, Frederick, “Free Trade in the Army,” Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 1056 .Google Scholar

66. Maude, War and the World's Life, diagram #2.

67. The annual replacements for India increased from 5,600 in 1871 to 8,600 in 1878. At the same time, the rate of desertion at home increased from an average of 3,000 in 1872 to 5,000 in 1880. Parliamentary Papers, (1881), XXI (C. 2791), 197209. Google Scholar

68. Ibid., (1881)) XXI, 194. Cardwell to Gladstone, 9 Nov. 1879, BM, Add. MSS., 44120. Bond, Brian, “Recruiting the Victorian Army,” Victorian Studies, V (1962), 336 .Google Scholar

69. Buller to Campbell-Bannerman, 1 Jan. 1893, BM, Add. MSS., 41212.

70. On the size of the home battalions 1872-83 see MacDougall, , “Have We an Army?Nineteenth Century, XV (1883), 509 .Google Scholar

71. Ibid., p. 507.

72. Cardwell reduced food stoppages in 1873 so that the soldier received a daily ration of 1 lb. of bread and ¾ lb. of meat, in addition to 1s a day. Verner, , Duke of Cambridge, I, p. x Google Scholar; Fortescue, , History of the British Army, XIII, 536–37.Google Scholar

73. Roberts, , “Free Trade in the Army,” Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 1061 Google Scholar; Cairnes, W. E., The Army from Within (London, 1901), pp. 7, 61, 111 .Google Scholar But low pay was not the only factor, since there were not many occupations in which a young man without skill could save three to four shillings a week after paying all living expenses.

74. Blatchford, Robert, My Life in the Army (London, n.d.), p. 143 .Google Scholar

75. Roberts, , “Free Trade in the Army,” Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 1060 .Google Scholar SirButler, William, An Autobiography (London 1911), p. 84 .Google Scholar

76. Report of the army medical department. Parliamentary Papers, (1886), LXVII (C. 5447), 481. Google Scholar The number examined in 1886 was 74,991. Of these 32,853 were rejected. The figures were almost repeated on the eve of the Boer War. Ibid., (1901), XXXIX (C. 521), 303.

77. Report from the select committee on how far it is practicable that soldiers be employed in civil departments. Ibid., (1877), XV (383), 517.

78. Ibid., (1888), LXVII (245), 807. The figures cover the years 1881-87, ranging from 245 to 275 per thousand.

79. Roberts, , “Free Trade in the Army,” Nineteenth Century, XV (1884), 1065–73Google Scholar; MacDougall, “Have We an Army?” ibid., XV (1883), 514.

80. Report on terms and conditions of service in the army. Parliamentary Papers, (1892), XIX (C. 6582), 4. Google Scholar Bond, , “Recruiting the Victorian Army,” Victorian Studies, V (1962), 337–38.Google Scholar

81. WO 33/52/A. 236, pp. 5-6.

82. Ibid. Atlay, , Haliburton, pp. 108–12.Google Scholar The same suggestion had been made ten years before by the committee on army reorganization, which recommended that the Crown be empowered “to call out an expedient number of reserves for a certain time without proclamation or formal communication to parliament.” Parliamentary Papers, (1881), XXI, 223. Google Scholar

83. Report of the royal commission on the war in South Africa. Parliamentary Papers, (1904), XL (C. 1790), 213. Google Scholar

84. Tunstall, W. C. B., “Imperial Defense 1897-1905,” Cambridge History of the British Empire, III, 563–65Google Scholar; Esher, , Journals and Letters, I. 394–96Google Scholar; Amery, L. S., My Political Life (London, 1953), I, 187–90.Google Scholar

85. Buller's evidence, Parliamentary Papers, (1904), XLI (C. 1790), 188–90.Google Scholar See also his memorandum on War Office reform written sometime between 1900 and 1904, after his return from South Africa. WO 132/26.