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British War Crimes Trial Policy in Germany, 1945–1957: Implementation and Collapse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2012

Abstract

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Research Article
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Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 2003

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References

1 See the somewhat sensational Bower, Tom, Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany—a Pledge Betrayed (London, 1997)Google Scholar; and on the general problems of occupation justice, see Niethammer, Lutz, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanische Besatzung (Frankfurt am Main, 1972)Google Scholar.

2 Tusa, John and Tusa, Ann, The Nuremberg Trial (London, 1995), p. 21Google Scholar.

3 Cited in ibid, pp. 23–24.

4 See United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London, 1948)Google Scholar; and Kochavi, Arieh, Prelude to Nuremberg (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998)Google Scholar.

5 Jones, Priscilla Dale, “British Policy towards German Crimes against German Jews, 1939–1945,” Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 36 (1991): 339–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Phillips, Raymond, ed., The Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others (London, 1949)Google Scholar.

7 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 25–28, 61–64; Smith, Bradley F., The Road to Nuremberg (London, 1982), pp. 4546Google Scholar.

8 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 50–51; Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp. 25–29. Such an approach also had British advocates.

9 For extensive details of these interdepartmental rivalries, see chap. 1 of Smith, The Road to Nuremberg; and Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 51–54.

10 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 61–67; and Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp. 54–55 and chap. 7.

11 Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, FG 16, Report of the Deputy Judge Advocate, fol. 3, for the dates of U.S. “Dachau” trial preparations. On the U.S. “Dachau” trial series, see Sigel, Robert, Im Interesse der Gerechtigkeit: Die Dachauer Kriegsverbrecherprozesse, 1945–48 (Frankfurt am Main, 1992)Google Scholar.

12 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp. 66–67.

13 Aronson, Shlomo, “Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The OSS, Charles Dwork, and the Holocaust,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12 (1998): 257–81, here 261–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 191, “Justice Jackson's story,” fols. 1046–47.

15 Ibid.; Smith, Bradley F., Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York, 1977), pp. 8290Google Scholar.

16 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p. 83.

17 See, e.g., Frei, Norbert, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit (Munich, 1996)Google Scholar, on German reactions to the Nazi past and the occupation period.

18 For example, Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg.

19 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, chap. 17.

20 Ibid.; Taylor, Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London, 1993), chap. 20Google Scholar.

21 For an expansion of the subject matter in this section, see Bloxham, Donald, “‘The Trial That Never Was’: Why There Was No Second International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg,” History 87 (2002): 4160CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Neave, Airey, Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Trial of the Major War Criminals (London, 1978), pp. 3032, 212Google Scholar. As well as contributing to Germany's illegal rearmament after Versailles, Gustav was thought to have organized contributions from industry to the Nazi Party after 1933.

23 Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 90–94; Manchester, William, The Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968 (New York, 1970), pp. 89Google Scholar; Neave, Nuremberg, pp. 29–32.

24 At the London Conference of June–July 1945.

25 Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), War Office (WO) 311/39, Maxwell-Fyfe to BWCE, 25 January 1946.

26 Neave, Nuremberg, p. 209; Ellwood, David W., Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London, 1992), pp. 5253Google Scholar.

27 Taylor, Anatomy, pp. 80–92.

28 PRO, Premier (PREM) 8/391, Orme Sargeant to Clement Attlee, 31 July 1946; Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, concludes that “for the British the desire for a prompt start always overcame any other consideration” (p. 138).

29 Jackson Papers, container 98, Office Files, U.S. chief-of-counsel, chief prosecutors' meeting of 5 April 1946; Shawcross to Jackson, 25 July 1946, cited in app. J in Taylor, Telford, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 283–84Google Scholar. See also PRO, Foreign Office (FO) 371/57583, Shawcross to Basil Newton, 28 February 1946.

30 Tusa and Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p. 373.

31 Jones, Frederick Elwyn, In My Time: An Autobiography (London, 1983) p. 126Google Scholar; PRO, PREM 8/391, Sargeant to Attlee, 31 July 1946; see also comments throughout this file. Deighton, Anne, The Impossible Peace (Oxford, 1990), pp. 2528Google Scholar, and p. 78 on the importance of Sargeant. In a low-profile case the British did try two industrialists of the Tesch and Stabenow firm who had supplied the poison gas Zyklon B to the SS. See United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 15 vols. (London, 1947), 1:93103Google Scholar.

32 National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Md. (hereafter NARA), Record Group (RG) 260, OMGUS, Adjutant General's Decimal Files, 1945–48, box 2, W. B. Smith to Jackson, 5 December 1945; General McNarney to chief of staff, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1945.

33 Deighton, The Impossible Peace, pp. 78, 115, 224.

34 National Library of Wales, Papers of Lord Elwyn Jones, C14, Elwyn Jones to Warren, 9 August 1946; Scott-Fox to Maurice Reed, 15 August 1946. See also Taylor, Final Report, pp. 25–26.

35 PRO, Lord Chancellor's Office (LCO) 2/2989, Scott-Fox to Reed, 18 August 1946; Elwyn Jones papers, C14, Elwyn Jones to Shawcross, 22 August 1946.

36 Taylor, Final Report, app. K, p. 285, substance of note addressed to London, Moscow, and Paris Embassies, 22 January 1947.

37 University of Connecticut Archives, Papers of Thomas J. Dodd, box 319, file “General memoranda 1945 Oct.–1946 Apr.,” general memorandum no. 3, “subsequent proceedings division,” 12 January 1946.

38 John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Papers of Drexel Sprecher, box 57, file “Administrative matters,” memorandum for all section heads from Telford Taylor, 23 July 1946.

39 PRO, FO 371/57583, Basil Newton to Hartley Shawcross, 26 March 1946; PRO, LCO 2/2989, Sargeant to the lord chancellor, 23 October 1946.

40 PRO, FO 937/143, secret memo from permanent secretary of FO, 16 September 1946; PRO, LCO 2/2989, Garner to Shawcross, 2 October 1946; Control Commission for Germany (CCG), Berlin, to Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA), 21 September 1946; PRO, FO 937/143, FO minute, 17 October 1946; PRO, LCO 2/2989, Sargeant to lord chancellor, 23 October 1946; PRO, FO 371/57583, minute by Beaumont, 13 April 1946.

41 PRO, FO 371/57576, u436/436/73; PRO, WO 309/1455 contains a series of extradition requests, including one for Ohlendorf; Taylor, Final Report, pp. 77–78.

42 Woetzel, Robert, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (London, 1960), pp. 219–26Google Scholar.

43 PRO, LCO 2/2980, Wardrop to Coldstream (of LCO), 18 April 1945; emphasis added.

44 PRO, LCO 2/2980, minutes (taken in early April) by attorney general of a meeting with American and FO representatives.

45 PRO, LCO 2/2980, Wardrop to Coldstream, 18 April 1945. The expression “Nuremberg character,” used by the secretary of state for war, Frederick Bellenger, in 1947, reflected ongoing suspicion of the novel, American-led IMT trial. PRO, WO 311/648, Bellenger to Bevin, 3 October 1947.

46 PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly report of legal section WCG North West Europe (NWE) October to December 1947.

47 PRO, FO 371/64712, suggested redraft of report, initialed by Patrick Dean, Brown et al., 5 June 1947.

48 PRO, FO 371/64713, c8815/7675/180, FO brief for secretary of state, 2 June 1947.

49 PRO, FO 371/64712, draft report of lord chancellor on war crimes trials, and comments on draft report by Dean et al., 5 June 1947.

50 See, e.g., PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly reports of legal section WCG (NWE), July to September 1947, October to December 1947. On the Arbeitserziehungslager, see Lofti, Gabrielle, KZ der Gestapo: Arbeitserziehungslager im dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 2000)Google Scholar. More generally on the Royal Warrant series, see Rogers, A. P. V., “War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice, 1945–1949,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990): 780800CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 PRO, FO 371/64723, c15911/7675/180, Barratt (of JAG) to O'Grady, 9 December 1947; Jones, Priscilla Dale, “Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen: Stalag Luft III and the End of British War Crimes Trials,” Historical Journal 41, no. 2 (1998): 543–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 PRO, WO 309/1, cable, WO to Headquarters (HQ) 21 Army Group, British Army of Occupation of the Rhine (BAOR), 19 June 1945; WO 309/1, Chilton to WO, 16 December 1945; commander-in-chief of Rhine Army to undersecretary of state in the WO and JAG, 3 November 1945.

53 PRO, WO 309/1, minute, fols. 30, 31 October 1945.

54 PRO, FO 371/64718, c13471/7675/180, note on policy by Shapcott, 15 October 1947.

55 Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, Wade Papers I, file 1, app. C, case 47.

56 PRO, WO 309/1, commander in chief of BAOR to undersecretary of state (WO) and JAG, 3 November 1945.

57 Dale Jones, “Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen,” p. 548.

58 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 28, minute of 30 October 1945; WO 309/1642, Deputy Military Governor's Office, CCG British Element, to regional commissioners, n.d., on British and German desire to end the whole process of trials generally.

59 PRO, PREM 8/391, Command Paper (CM) (46) 94th Conclusions, 4 November 1946.

60 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 27, minute of 12 November 1945, signature illegible.

61 See Dale Jones, “Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen”; PRO, FO 371/66555, u515/2173, minute on number of war criminals tried, 25 February 1947.

62 See the quarterly reports of the legal section WCG (NWE) in PRO, WO 309/1674 for figures of tried; WO 309/1, fol. 42, BAOR to WO, May 1946.

63 Establishing such a prima facie case was by no means straightforward. For the peculiarities of German law in this connection, see, e.g., Broszat, Martin, “Siegerjustiz oder strafrechtliche Selbstreinigung: Aspekte der Vergangenheitsbewältigung der deutschen Justiz während der Besatzungszeit,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 29 (1981): 477–544, here 480–81Google Scholar.

64 PRO, WO 309/1646, fol. 146A, HQ Hamburg District to HQ BAOR, 20 March 1948; fol. 168, note by Dyas, 13 August 1948.

65 Cited in Dale Jones, “Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen,” p. 549.

66 Bower, Blind Eye to Murder.

67 PRO, WO 309/1, cable, WO to HQ 21 Army Group, BAOR, 19 June 1945.

68 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 42, BAOR to WO, May 1946.

69 PRO, WO 309/1, fol. 27, minute of 12 November 1945, signature illegible.

70 PRO, WO 309/1, Chilton to WO, 16 December 1945; WO 311/9, lord chancellor's report Overseas Reconstruction Committee (47) 27; Hoffman, J. H., “German Field Marshals as War Criminals? A British Embarrassment,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 1736, here 18–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 On the diminishing of interest and even the growth of opposition to trials in Britain after the trial of the major war criminals, see University of Sussex Archive, Mass-Observation Archive file report 2424A, 27 September 1946; directive replies, September 1946.

72 Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, 8 vols. (London, 1988), 8:438–42Google Scholar.

73 Cesarani, David, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals (London, 1992)Google Scholar; see also the letters page of the Daily Telegraph (5 April 1999).

74 Gilbert, Churchill, 8:441–42. See also Bloxham, Donald, “Punishing German Soldiers during the Second World War: The Case of Erich von Manstein,” Patterns of Prejudice 33, no. 4 (1999): 2545CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 PRO, WO 309/1674, quarterly report of legal section WCG (NWE), October to December 1947.

76 PRO, LCO 2/2989, J. P. Henniker (of FO) to Addis (of 10 Downing St.), 6 February 1947.

77 PRO, WO 309/1646, fol. 168, note by Dyas, 13 August 1948; and throughout WO 309/1670.

78 In fact, Rundstedt was officially an American prisoner; he had been loaned to the British for interrogation after his capture in May 1945 and had thereafter caused confusion at Nuremberg by declaring himself to be a British prisoner.

79 PRO, WO 309/1456, memo to Parker, OCCWC liaison with BAOR, from Norma Ervin of OCCWC, 4 February 1947.

80 Hoffman, “German Field Marshals as War Criminals?” pp. 17–18; NARA, RG 260, Records of the Chief-of-Staff, box 1, Clay to Douglas, 19 August 1947.

81 PRO, LCO 2/2994, Reed to Shawcross, 14 November 1947. Feelings stimulated by direct experience of German disdain for the trials.

82 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (48) 47th Conclusions, 5 July 1948.

84 In June 1948 they were respectively 67, 73, 61, and 69 years old.

85 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (48) 47th Conclusions, 5 July 1948, memo to cabinet from Emmanuel Shinwell, 28 March 1949.

86 PRO, PREM 8/1112, memo to cabinet from Shawcross, 22 June 1948; Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, p. 252.

87 PRO, PREM 8/1112, memo to cabinet from Shinwell, 28 March 1949: Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, pp. 259–60.

88 PRO, PREM 8/1112, CM (49), 24th Conclusions, 31 March 1949; CM (49), 32d Conclusions, 5 May 1949.

89 LHCMA, LH 9/24/77, Walter Grimm to Liddell Hart, 18 May 1949.

90 Hankey, Lord, Politics, Trials and Errors (Oxford, 1950), p. 145Google Scholar.

91 Classic statements of this often one-eyed support of German soldiery may be found in Paget, R. T., Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial, (London, 1951)Google Scholar. See also Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors; Belgion, Montgomery, Epitaph on Nuremberg: A Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Friend Temporarily Abroad (London, 1946)Google Scholar; Veale, F. J. P., Advance to Barbarism: How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War-Trials Menaces Our Future (Appleton, Wis., 1948)Google Scholar. Of the welter of current literature on the criminality of parts of the Wehrmacht, see esp. Heer, Hannes and Naumann, Klaus, eds., Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 1995)Google Scholar.

92 PRO, PREM 8/1112, Shinwell to Lord Jowitt, 8 November 1948.

93 Paget, Manstein, pp. 71–74.

94 See ibid., generally; Veale, Advance to Barbarism.

95 Wade papers, Wade I, file 1.

96 PRO, PREM 8/1570, CP (51) 45, memo by attorney general to cabinet, 8 February 1951.

97 On the issue of rearmament, see Large, David Clay, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996)Google Scholar.

98 Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, pp. 202, 207, 249, 292.

99 PRO, PREM 8/1570, CP (51) 38, 6 February 1951, secret memo by minister of state.

100 PRO, FO 371/57671, u5804/5488/73, minute by Dean, 18 June 1946.

101 PRO, FO 371/85914, CG786/48/184, Shinwell to Bevin, 13 February 1950; emphasis added.

102 PRO, FO 800/846, Churchill to Eden, 29 November 1951; Churchill to Eden, 8 June 1952.

103 PRO, FO 800/846, Eden to Churchill, 29 August 1952.

104 PRO, FO 371/104159, CW1663/13, Kirkpatrick to Eden, 23 April 1953; PRO, Cabinet 129/48, C (51) 54, foreign secretary's note to cabinet, 18 December 1951.

105 PRO, FO 371/104159, CW1663/13, Kirkpatrick to Eden, 23 April 1953.

106 See Bloxham, Donald, Genocide on Trial: The War Crimes Trials in the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory (Oxford, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kushner, Tony, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination (Oxford, 1994)Google Scholar; Dale Jones, “British Policy towards German Crimes against German Jews.”