Serfdom was pervasive in Tibet and all laymen with the exception of a few hundred aristocratic families were hereditary serfs, tied to a lord through an estate. Nonetheless, the Tibetan social system was not rigid and closed. There was a significant modicum of mobility although mobility only between various serf substatuses.

The article examines the nature of the major serf sub-statuses and particularly focuses on the status of “human lease.” In a sense analagous to leasing land, the human-lease serf leased his personal freedom of movement and livelihood from his lord and was no longer obligated to work his lord's estate. But he was still a serf. He still had to pay an annual “lease” fee to his lord, and moreover, this linkage to his lord was still passed on to his offspring. The most striking feature of traditional Tibetan social structure emerges not as rigidity or flexibility but rather as the incorporation of a significant potential for mobility with a matrix of pervasive and hereditary serfdom. The institution of human lease reinforced the ideology underlying the estate system while providing the system the flexibility it needed to adapt to changing political and economic conditions.

For many reasons, including the importance of local geographic variation, twentieth century Chinese phenomena such as “warlordism” must be examined in individual sub-national cases. Szechwanese provincial militarists maintained a high degree of independence from outside control and stood aloof from central government politics from the end of the Northern Expedition until 1935. However, a combination of communist military pressure and provincial economic collapse finally induced Szechwan's leading militarist to seek Nanking's help. From early 1935, the National Government attempted to bring Szechwan within its sphere of military, economic, and political influence. In its struggle with entrenched provincial militarists, Nanking employed a complex set of reforms, at the heart of which were measures for the restricting of local administration and the extension of formal administrative control into local society. When the Sino-Japanese War Erupted in July 1937, however, Nanking had achieved only very partial success. The Nationalists' final peacetime opportunity to solve the modern dilemma of central vs. sub-national power in China had passed.

Buddhism in Thailand has been both subjected to integrative policies advanced by the Thai government and manipulated as an instrument for promoting national integration. As a result of reforms instituted at the end of the nineteenth century, several different traditions of Therevada Buddhism were united into a national religious system. In recent years, the Thai government has attempted to involve the Buddhist Sangha in efforts to promote economic development among the Thai peasantry and assimilation of tribal peoples into Thai society. While the policies designed to integrate Buddhism within Thailand were successful, the efforts to use Thai Buddhism as instrument of national policy could prove deleterious rather than advantageous to the attainment of national goals.

Differing both in structure and operation from its parent Mughal model, the political system which came to be known as Hyderabad State developed in the Deccan in the second half of the eighteenth century. The major structural difference lay in the great power of two hereditary daftardars, the keepers of the central revenue records—these men could usurp the Diwan's (Chief Minister's) traditional control of government finances. Without overemphasizing contrasts with the Mughal model, for few behavioral studies have been made of Mughal administration, other apparent differences lay in Hyderabad's complete reliance on private contractors for revenue collection, the customary treatment of jagirs (land grants) as inheritable, and clear functional distinctions within the mansabdari system. Loosely structured patron-client relationships and the use of vakils or intermediaries characterized the operation of the system. The participants—nobles, local rulers, military men, bankers, record-keepers—were of diverse origins. The recruitment and composition of the Hyderabad nobility reflected the flexibility of the political system, as illustrated by an examination of the career patterns of the acknowledged “ten leading families” of the Hyderabad nobility.

The article describes the types of written records available to scholars of late Yi dynasty Korea, in particular, daily chronicles compiled under official auspices. Koreans were indebted to the Chinese for the chronological format of compilation, the Confucian moralistic purpose for historical writing, the respect for bare fact, and the necessity for truthful reporting. These objectives were often violated, however, because the recorders were also active bureaucrats involved in political disputes.

For the modern historian, these sources have certain advantages and disadvantages. They are good for institutional and administrative history, and they provide raw data for political history. On the other hand, they reflect the biases of the recorders, they do not reveal the really private thoughts of kings and officials, they are confined to the formal apparatus of the official communication and the court conference, and they are comprised over much of moralistic exhortation and general preachment, rather than with concrete discussion of the problems of economy, society, and policy. They do, however, represent an enormous body of material hitherto neglected by Western scholars.

Around 1700, the Osaka publisher Shibukawa seiemon collected and printed twenty-three medieval short stories and put them on sale labelled Otogi bunko, or The Companion Library. Shibukawa's sales techniques, aimed at selling his anthology to female readers, led later scholars to view these stories anachronistically as women's literature from the Muromachi period. Evidence from medieval diaries, however, makes it clear that these stories were not originally written for women. To date close to five hundred of these largely anonymous stories have emerged to form a substantial medieval genre. Although present scholarship tends to seek authorship of the stories through analysis of social classes depicted in them, it is submitted that the more fruitful approach is rather through analysis of textual origins in pre-Muromachi literary traditions: Heian novel, Kamakura military epic, religious narrative, or oral folktale; and that the most important source proves to be the religious narrative tradition, where textual comparison reveals clearly some Muromachi stories are derivations from such works as Shintō shū. Medieval jongleurs and missionaries such as biwa hōshi, etoki hōshi, and Kumano bikuni played a crucial role in spreading medieval tales, popularizing the picture scroll and book, and contributing to the development of the short story genre.

When the duplicitous Hou Ching, the Eastern Wei satrap of Honan, declared his independence from the mother state, he invited both Western Wei and Liang to assume his allegiance and his territories. While Liang, capital at modern Nanking, eagerly accepted Hou Ching's bid, Western Wei, capital at Ch'ang-an, rejected it. But Western Wei did reluctantly allow one of its officers, the daring but personally insecure Wang Ssu-cheng, to occupy and try to hold Hou Ching's exposed city of Ch'ang-she in north-central Honan. After neatly sweeping Hou Ching and his Liang allies out of Honan, Eastern Wei turned its forces against Wang Ssu-cheng in Ch'ang-she. A long and costly siege ensued in which Wang Ssu-cheng brilliantly and doggedly fought against the overwhelmingly superior strength of Eastern Wei. Wang Ssu-cheng finally sur-rendered, not to save his own life but to save those under his command; he was honored both by his captors and by Western Wei.