¹ The social and political movements during the era of Taishō (1912–26) inherited a legacy of liberal thought that reached back to the impact of Western civilization upon Japanese feudalism in the declining days of the Tokugawa rulers. By 1920 some political leaders were attacking revered institutions and patterns of conformity with increasing frequency, criticizing the restraints placed upon the individual. They were demanding government by political parties, extension of voting rights, purification of political life, curbs upon the influence of the military, and changes in the composition and powers of the House of Peers. These men in the Diet often exposed the errors of the governing oligarchy, and the awakening political consciousness of the Japanese citizen showed some promise of forcing the militarists and bureaucrats into reluctant retreat.

² The party was christened the Dōshikai (League of the Similarly-Minded) at the inauguration ceremony in February 1913, but when it absorbed several splinter groups in October 1916, the organization became known as the Kenseikai (Constitutional party).

³ See Norman, E. H., Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, New York, 1940, Chap. IIIGoogle Scholar; Gubbins, J. H., The Making of Modem Japan, London, 1922, Chap. XVGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Ibid., Chap. XVI; S. Iizawa, Politics and Political Parties in Japan, Tōkyō, 1938, 1–15; K. Hayashida, Nihon Seitō Shi (History of Japanese Political Parties), Tōkyō, 1927, I, 178–81.

⁵ Ibid., I, 426–7; W. W. McLaren, “Japanese Government Documents,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, XLII, Pt. 1, 495–504, 539–50; Uyehara, E., Political Development of Japan, 1867–1909, London, 1910, 95–7Google Scholar.

⁶ See Ozaki, Y., The Voice of Japanese Democracy, trans, by De Becker, J. E., Yokohama, 1918, 93–4Google Scholar.

⁷ K. Hayashida, op. cit., I, 426–7; S. Iizawa, op. cit., 17.

⁸ Future Dōshikai-Kenseikai personalities who were associated with either the Jiyūtō or the Kaishintō included such men as Ozaki Yukio, Ōishi Masami, Minoura Katsundo, Shimada Saburō, Taketomi Tokitoshi, Takagi Seinen, Takata Sanae, Kōno Hironaka, Tomita Kōjirō, and others. Ōura Kanetake, Adachi Kenzō, and Shiba Shirō were politically active during this early period but not in the political parties mentioned.

⁹ Apparently Itagaki and a section of his Jiyūtō made the first compromise, aiding the government of Yamagata Aritomo in the passage of his budget by the lower house of the Diet. Yamagata, a leader of Chōshū and a member of the genrō, had undertaken the construction of a Japanese army. On Ozaki's hopes of accomplishing reform by affiliation with a political party that controlled the lower house, see Japan Weekly Chronicle, Jan. 6, 1910.

¹⁰ Katsura, a protégé of Yamagata, had become premier twice since 1901. During most of his tenure he was supported by the Seiyūkai (Party of the Friends of Constitutional Government), with roots leading back to the Jiyūtō.

¹¹ On the formation and composition of the Dōshikai, see Itō, S., Katō Kōmei (Life of Katō Kōmei), Tōkyō, 1929, I, 685–732; K. Hayashida, op. cit., II, 161–2, 209–14; T. Tachibana, “Influence of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Japanese Political and Economic Life,” China Weekly Review, April 14, 21, 1934; and issues of Japan Weekly Chronicle and Japan Weekly MailGoogle Scholar.

¹² There is a fine line of continuity extending from the Teiseitō in 1882, the Taiseikai (Great Achievement party) in 1890, the Kokumin Kyōkai (National Society), the Teikokutō (Imperialist party) formed by Yamagata in 1899, the Daidō Club, and the Chūō Club. The moving spirits of these associations were Sassa Tomofusa, Saigō Takamori, Shinagawa Yajirō, Miura Gorō, and others. They were all well known for their drumbeating nationalism, their manipulation of sōshi, and their resort to violence.

¹³ Ōura, an unpopular police official and head of the Chūō Club, was something of a hatchet man for Katsura, keeping a list of publicists and politicians marked for arrest. Adachi, a protégé of Sassa, had also been associated with the imperialist parties, and was implicated in the assassination of the Korean Queen.

¹⁴ The Kaishintō, after several transformations, had become the Kokumintō, the party with which Count Ōkuma had long been associated.

¹⁵ All of these leaders had been associated with the early political parties which demanded concessions from the Meiji oligarchy. In 1907 Ōkuma, under fire from these malcontents, left the presidency of his party, and this faction sought rapprochement with the second Katsura cabinet. Failing in this venture, Ōishi and his group returned to the Kokumintō fold and bided their time.

¹⁶ The fact that Ōishi and some of his cohorts had close association with Mitsubishi and that the group had once supported Katsura made the transition easier. Y. Takekoshi says that the faction had been linked with Katsura since 1907 when the Premier had ordered them to ostracize Ōkuma. Prince Saionji, Kyōto, 1933, 245. Shimada said that the seceders had asked for the appointment of civilians to the service portfolios in the cabinet as a condition for their support, and that Katsura had agreed in principle. japan Weekly Mail, Jan. 25, 1913. Apparently Katsura intended to use the Kokumintō men, and any others who could be persuaded, to reenforce the Chūō Club which he dominated.

¹⁷ The line between the bureaucratic stream and the business element is blurred, since some members of the former group were closely connected with Mitsubishi. On Katō's entrance into the Dōshikai, see S. Itō, op. cit., I, 719–32.

¹⁸ Ōishi and Katō had been old friends, the former acting as Katsura's intermediary in bringing the Count into the new party. On the conflict between the Chūō men and the Kokumintō seceders, see Japan Weekly Chronicle, Mar. 13, 1913.

¹⁹ Ōishi and Ozaki, who supported the Dōshikai during the Ōkuma ministry, had been displeased at the proposed selection of ōura for the post of Home Minister and his eventual appointment on the eve of the 1915 election. Ōishi resigned from the party and disappeared from overt political life. In later years he appears to have lost faith in party government and spoke of the advantages of non-party cabinets. In 1914 Katō was criticized for having secured the appointment of bureaucrats to official positions to the exclusion of party men. See Meiji Taishō Shi (History of the Meiji-Taishō Eras), VI Seiji Hen (Politics), 308–9; S. Itō, op. cit., II, 8–9; Japan Weekly Chronicle, June 22, 1922.

²⁰ The Ōishi faction had attempted to alter the rules of the party in 1906–7 with the object of transferring the power wielded by the president to a council so that it could make its bid for the favor of Katsura. Ibid., July 3, 1913. Shimada Saburō and Ozaki Yukio both left the Kenseikai over the question of manhood suffrage. Shimada's intermittent absences from the party conclaves exhibited his dissatisfaction with the leadership of the organization.

²¹ “Constitutional Government in Japan,” Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society of London, 1931–2, 35. See also Senzoku, R., “Seitō Shinri Tōjin Konjō” (“Psychology of Political Parties and the Characteristics of the Party Man”), Chōū Kōron, Jan. 1917Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Mail, Jan. 16, 1915; Japan Weekly Chronicle, April 3; 1930.

²² See S. Itō, op. cit., I, 42–3; II, 340, 491, 565–6; S. Washio “The House of Peers,” Trans-Pacific, Aug. 23, 1924; Japan Weekly Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1919, Jan. 8, 1920; japan Times and Mail, Mar. 18, 1921; and other newspapers during this period.

²³ See S. Itō, op. cit., I, 41, II, 4–8; S. Washio, “The Dilemma Faced by the”Katō Ministry,” Trans-Pacific, June 28, 1924; “New Tokyo Mayor,” Japan Advertiser, July 22, 1926; Japan Weekly Chronicle, Sept. 7, 1916. T. Baba reported that Katō had originally opposed the entrance of Ozaki into the Ōkuma cabinet and then secured his appointment to a minor post. Ibid., April 3, 1930. Dissatisfied job-seekers were inclined to blame the Kenseikai leadership, especially Katō, for the paucity of employment opportunities. See newspapers for March-April 1914, June-July 1924, and August 1925. For an example of latent anti-bureaucratic sentiment in the Kenseikai, see Japan Times and Mail, June 29, 1920.

²⁴ Yokoyama, K., Kenseikai Shi (History of the Kenseikai) Tōkyō, 1926, 8–15Google Scholar.

²⁵ See S. Itō, op. cit., II, 11–12; Japan Weekly Chronicle, Mar. 30, 1922; and issues of the Ōsaka Mainichi for Nov. 1923.

²⁶ On some of the discussion of the two systems of party organization, see S. Itō, op. cit., II, 231–3, 440–52; Ōsaka Mainichi, Dec. 4–7, 1923; Japan Advertiser, April 25, 1927. Sometimes the creation of a board of managers was suggested when there was lack of agreement on who should head the coalition.

²⁷ The complexities of shifting Kenseikai policy on the suffrage question are briefly presented in K. Yokoyama, op. cit., passim; S. Itō, op. cit, II, 328–43, 576–95; K. Hayashida, op. cit., II, 267–85. One can get additional information about the party politics involved in this important issue by investigating the newspapers of this period.

²⁸ See, for example, Trans-Pacific, Sept. 29, 1928; Ōsaka Mainichi, Dec. 6 and Dec. 7, 1923, June 25, 1924; S. Itō, op. cit., II, 446; Japan Weekly Chronicle, July 3, 1913; japan Weekly Mail, April 25, 1914; and Japan Advertiser, April 25, 1927. The managerial system was, of course, also suggested when bargaining for leadership had reached an impasse, but the factors mentioned above were often present.

²⁹ The agitation for coalition was generally one of complex motivations. Some Kenseikai members were interested in fusion to make more easy the transition to a cabinet formed by their party when the existing government was defeated. Some wanted to oust Katō because he had antagonized the genrō, supposedly making remote his chances of becoming premier. It is the writer's contention that on some of these questions the party liberal, often exhibiting an anti-bureaucratic bias, had hopes of improving his own position in the party, as well as accomplishing some of the reforms he was advocating, by such amalgamation ventures.

³⁰ See S. Itō, op. cit., II, 11–14; Japan Daily Mail, Oct. 6, 1916, Jan. 12, 1917; S. Washio, “Why Terauchi is Doomed,” Japan Advertiser, Feb. 23, 1918; issues of Ōsaka Mainichi for Nov. 1923; K. Hayashida, op. cit., II, 280–3.

³¹ On the expulsion of Ozaki and Tagawa, see K. Yokoyama, op. cit., 316–18. For examples of the conflict between the advocates of manhood suffrage without qualification and the leaders of the Kenseikai, see Japan Advertiser. Nov. 18, 1919, July 2, 1920; S. Washio, “Viscount T. Katō and his Ministry,” Trans-Pacific, June 14, 1924; and issues of Japan Times and Mail and Japan Weekly Chronicle for March and April, 1921. See also S. Itō, op. cit., II, 328–43. Itō is of the opinion that Katō” had become converted to the idea of manhood suffrage by mid-1919 but was withholding his opinion until the rest of the “gradualist” school had become convinced of the need. This, however, is questionable. Some of Katō's words and deeds after that date would still tend to place him in the conservative camp on the issue.

³² Ozaki's repentance for his part in the creation of the two army divisions for use in Korea in 1914 is recorded in Japan Weekly Chronicle, Sept. 23, 1920. On the military question consult summaries of Diet Proceedings in ibid. for this period. See also Japan Times and Mail, Feb. 1921.

³³ On this aspect of the Peers issue, see S. Itō, op. cit., II, 490–2, 563–7; K. Yokoyama, op. cit., 684; Diet Proceedings, Japan Weekly Chronicle, July 24, 1924; S. Washio, “The House of Peers,” Trans-Pacific, Aug. 23, 1924. The Seiyūkai, of course, was pressing for action on the Peers question to embarrass Katō with members of his own party and the bureaucracy, as well as to wring concessions from him as the price of their support in the coalition.

³⁴ During the pillaging of Nanking by the forces of Yuan Shih K'ai, Japanese citizens took refuge in the consulate. When some of them ventured outside the bounds of Japanese jurisdiction, they were murdered by Chinese soldiers. In the ensuing fray Japanese troops were assaulted and the flag torn into shreds.

³⁵ For statements of these nationalistic pronouncements see Diet Proceedings reported in Japan Weekly Chronicle, Feb. 2, 1911; ibid., June 6, 1918, Feb. 13, 1919, Sept. 29, 1921; Japan Advertiser, May 2, 1919; and Japan Weekly Mail, Sept. and Oct. 1913.

³⁶ Historicus, “The Political Outlook,” Japan Weekly Chronicle, Oct. 23, 1913.