¹ For the introduction of international law, see Takeki, Osataki, Kokusaihō yori mitaru bakumatsu gaikō monogatari [Tales of bakumatsu diplomacy as viewed from international law] (Tokyo, 1930)Google Scholar, passim; Shimomura Fujio, “Iwakura kōshō izen ni okcru jōyaku mondai” (Treaty revision problems before the Iwakura negotiations), in Nagoya daigaku bungakubu kenkyū ronshu, V, Part 2 (March, 1953), 72–73. See also Zengo, Ohira, “Japan's Reception of the Law of Nations,” reprinted from Japanese in The Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy, IV (October, 1953), 55–66.Google Scholar

² Gaimusho, , Nihon gaikō bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents] (Tokyo, 1936–)Google Scholar, I, document 97 and letter appended to document 99; hereafter cited as NGB. See also Iwakura kō jikki [Authentic records of Prince Iwakura], ed. hozonkai, Iwakura kō kyūseki (Tokyo, 1966), II, 192–93.Google Scholar

³ There has been considerable confusion about the true nature of the embassy's mission, and a number of accounts state that its primary purpose was treaty revision. As explained above, the embassy as finally constituted was a complex diplomatic and learning venture. For a review of the evidence, see Mayo, Marlene J., “The Iwakura Embassy and the Unequal Treaties, 1871–1873” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961), pp. 88–132.Google Scholar

⁴ Kunitake, Kume, Tokfimei zenken taishi Bei-ō kairan jikki [A true account of the special embassy in America and Europe], I (Tokyo, 1878), 41–48Google Scholar; Daily Aha California (San Francisco newspaper), January 16 ff.; see also Lanman, Charles, Leaders of the Meiji Restoration in America, ed. Okamura, Y. (Tokyo, 1931), (originally published in 1872 in New York under the title The Japanese in America), pp. 1–20.Google Scholar

⁵ Itō Hirobumi den [Biography of Itō Hirobumi], ed. tsuishōkai, Shumpo kō, I (Tokyo, 1940), 635–43.Google Scholar

⁶ The contents of the Emperor's letter are discussed later. “General instructions” is a free translation of chokushi or imperial wishes (NGB, IV, 3rd in series appended to document 89), and “separate revision instructions” refers to betchokushi, literally, separate imperial orders (NGB, IV, 4th in series appended to document 89).

⁷ Some contend that they hoped to win agreement on a rough draft. The point is raised in: Hidesuke, Moriya, “Iwakura zenken taishi no Bei-ō kairan,” (The tour in America and Europe of the Iwakura Embassy), Tōzai kōshō shiron [Historical essays on the relations between East and West], ed. Shigakkai, (Tokyo, 1939), II, 970–71Google Scholar; Yoshitake, Oka, Kindai Nihon no keisei [The making of modern Japan] (Tokyo, 1952), p. 183Google Scholar; and in Oyama Azusa's two articles: “Iwakura shisetsu to taibei kōshō” (The Iwakura Embassy and the American negotiations), Nihon Rekishi, No. 86 (Sept.–Oct., 1955), 50–55, and “Iwakura taishi to jōyaku kaisei” (The Iwakura Embassy and treaty revision), Rekishi Kyōiku, XII (February, 1954), 69–73Google Scholar. The missionary Guido Verbeck, a source of information and misinformation to the Japanese on correct diplomatic procedure, probably inspired some of Itō's thoughts. In 1869, when he heard rumors of an impending embassy, Verbeck had suggested that the Japanese ambassador request in writing from officials abroad, as a preliminary step to treaty revision, “an enumeration of these supposed essential measures to be taken by his Government for the establishment of political equality.” See his letter of advice sent June 11, 1869, to ōkuma Shigenobu, reproduced in Altman, Albert, “Guido Verbeck and the Iwakura Embassy,” Japan Quarterly, XIII (January-March, 1966), 60.Google Scholar

⁸ Lanman, pp. 26–31; Evening Star (Washington, D. C, newspaper), March 4, 1872; State Department, Notes from the Japanese Legation (documents housed in the National Archives), I, Mori to Fish, March 1, 1892.

⁹ English texts of both addresses are reproduced in Lanman, pp. 28–31; the Japanese versions are in NGB, V, appended to document 19.

¹⁰ Since the members of the embassy were special ambassadors, theoretically their credentials and full powers could have been combined in one document or issued as two separate ones. Generally the second practice was followed in the West. Even resident envoys were required to exhibit a special letter of full powers in order to negotiate and sign treaties. See Jones, J. Mervyn, Full Powers and Ratification (Cambridge, England, 1946), pp. xii, 29, 34–38, 40–43Google Scholar; Dana, R. H. edition of Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (8th ed.; Boston, 1866)Google Scholar, paragraphs 217–18; Wilson, George G., Handbook, of International Law (3rd ed.; St. Paul, 1939), pp. 173–74Google Scholar. Wheaton's work had been translated into Chinese in 1864 and shortly thereafter into Japanese.

¹¹ NGB, IV, document 76; State Department, Dispatches from Japan (documents housed in the National Archives), De Long's reports for the months September-December, 1871. One very important dispatch in which De Long exaggerates his role in inspiring the embassy has not been bound in the regular series but can be found in American Legation, Tokyo, July 15, 1871–September 2, 1873 (kept in the National Archives), No. 251, November 22, 1872. For the request of postponement sent to the British, see Foreign Office, Correspondence, Japan (Public Record Office, London), CXLII, Enclosure 1 in Adams to Granville, No. 120, December 2, 1871.

¹² NGB, IV, first in series appended to document 89. The official English translation is in Lanman, pp. 28–29.

¹³ Lanman, pp. 31–34; NGB, V, second in series appended to document 19; United States, House of Representatives, Journal, 2nd Sess., 42nd Congress (1871–1872), pp. 455–56.

¹⁴ Entry for March 6 in diary of Garfield (Garfield papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division).

¹⁵ See, for example, Kido Kōin bunsho [Documents of Kido Kōin], ed. kyōkai, Nihon shiseki (Tokyo, 1939–41), IV, letter of February 21, 331; and NGB, V, document 83.Google Scholar

¹⁶ These notes and memoranda, as well as minutes of the interviews between Fish and the ambassadors and the treaty drafts they exchanged, are collected in a special volume compiled by the State Department under the title Japanese Embassy, Minutes of Conferences, Drafts of Treaties Submitted, Etc., 1872 (National Archives). Hereafter cited as State Department, Minutes.

¹⁷ Entry for March 6 in the diary of Hamilton Fish, Fish papers, p. 258 (hereafter cited as Fish, Diary). The references here are to a copy of the diary in typescript. Both the original and the typescript are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.

¹⁸ John Basset Moore in the introduction to Corning, A. Elwood, Hamilton Fish (New York, 1918), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Corning, letter to James A. Hamilton, September 12, 1856, p. 40.

²⁰ See his Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (rev. ed.; New York, (1957)Google Scholar. For his as an administrator, see Stuart, Graham H., The Department of State (New York, 1949). pp. 140–51.Google Scholar

²¹ The account given here of the first interview is based on three sets of minutes: State Department, Minutes; a second set in English attested by Consul Brooks and filed with the State Department records under the title Annex to Volume of Japanese Embassy, Minutes of Conferences, First and Second Conferences; and the Japanese version in NGB, V, document 67. A comparison of the Brooks' and Japanese version reveals them to be almost identical. The paper read by Brooks is bound after the minutes for the first interview in State Department, Minutes, but has not been reproduced in Japanese documentary collections. As noted above, the English original was sent at the request of Fish to President Grant (State Department, Notes from the Japanese Legation, I, Mori to Fish, March 11, 1872). Either the secretaries of the embassy never made a copy of it or it was misplaced in die Gaimusho archives.

²² Whatever particular meaning was assigned to the word, the protocol itself was part of a formal process leading to a final settlement. Unthinkingly, the Japanese were using the word much too loosely, a dangerous thing to do with a stickler for tradition like Fish. See Satow, Ernest, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th ed.; London, 1958), ed. Brand, Nevile, pp. 338–39.Google Scholar

²³ Fish, Diary, p. 255. Before that, on January 18, he had told the Austrian Ambassador that he understood unofficially the embassy wished to postpone revision until it returned to Japan (Diary, p. 215).

²⁴ Shinobu Jumpei tells the apocryphal tale that Fish sketched a cartoon of the Japanese and glanced in annoyance at his watch as they consulted each other in great consternation over his questions; “Meiji shonen Iwakura taishi kengai shimatsu” (“The complete story of the dispatch abroad of the Iwakura Embassy in the early years of Meiji”), Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi, XXV (September, 1926), 40.Google Scholar

²⁵ The emperor's letter, in fact, did not even clearly specify that the ambassadors intended to discuss the problem of treaty revision.

²⁶ This was an allusion to difficulties experienced with the Prussian and French representatives when Japan declared neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71).

²⁷ NGB, V, note at the end of document 68; Kido Kōin nikki [Diary of Kido Kōin], ed. kyōkai, Nihon shiseki (Tokyo, 1933), II, 145Google Scholar. The Gaimusho document, which is undated and unsigned, has been placed after the second interview by the compilers, but the contents indicate that it predated that meeting. Shimomura Fujio accepts the document as authentic and genuine in “Iwakura shisctsu no ō-Bei hakken to taibei kōshō” (The dispatch of the Iwakura Embassy to Europe and America and the negotiations with the United States), Nihon shakai shi no kenkyū [Studies in Japanese Social History], ed. Kōta, Kodama (Tokyo, 1955), p. 414, footnote 9.Google Scholar

²⁸ March 14 a cable was sent to Tokyo asking that full powers be issued to Mori “in connection with a treaty”; NGB, V, document 73. Iwakura wrote Sanjo Sanetomi, lamenting his inadequate knowledge of foreign countries. This was now all the more painful to him since the embassy was going ahead with plans to conclude, as he put it, a “karijōyaku”; provisional treaty (dated March 17 and quoted in Itō Hirobutni den, I, 648–49).

²⁹ Fish, Diary, March 12, p. 263. See also Kido Kōin nikki, II, 145.

³⁰ ōyama Azusa has constructed a theory, based primarily on an undated document labeled “Japanese- American Draft Treaty Carried by the Embassy,” that the ambassadors came prepared to work on the contents of a provisional treaty, “to sign and seal” it. This, in turn, was to be the basis of a formal treaty to be concluded and signed later in Tokyo, after the embassy's return; “Iwakura shisetsu to taikei kōshō,” pp. 50–55. This document is reproduced in Gaimusho, Jōyaku kaisei Nihon gaikō buns ho tsuiho [Supplement to Japanese diplomatic documents concerning treaty revision] (Tokyo, 1952), item 5. The compilers have tentatively assigned to this twelve point draft the date of December 21, the day on which the ambassadors sailed from Yokohama. Internal evidence shows, however, that the draft was prepared after the embassy decided to negotiate with Fish. That nothing elaborate had yet entered the minds of the embassy before their first interview with Fish is further borne out by Iwakura's hesitation and by certain letters of Iwakura and Kido indicating they would be in Washington only about a month; Kido Kōin bunsho, Kido to Kawakita, March 9, IV, 336; and Iwakura Tomomi kankei bunsho [Collected documents of Iwakura Tomomi], ed. kyōkai, Nihon shiseki (Tokyo, 1926–35), V, Iwakura to Samejima, March 9, 98.Google Scholar

³¹ NGB, V, document 68; State Department, Minutes, March 13; State Department, Annex, March 13.

³² NGB, V, document 24.

³³ Fish, Diary, 267–68.

³⁴ A cursory account of the negotiations, based on American records, may be found in Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853–1895 (Stanford, 1932), I, 426–49. For a more extensive account based on Japanese and American archives, see Shimomura Fujio, Meiji shonen jōyaku kaiseishi no kenkyō [Studies in the history of early Meiji treaty revision] (Tokyo, 1962), pp. 157–226; and my dissertation, pp. 167–211, 259–307.

³⁵ A final Japanese draft of early July was forwarded to the State Department but never discussed. NGB, V, draft treaty appended to document 95; Kido Kōin nikki, II 193.

³⁶ Kido Kōin nikki, II, 148–50. Kido included similar sentiments in his letter to Inoue Kaoru of April 18, Kido Kōin bunsho, IV, 342–46. The diary entry and the letter show Kido to be tense and nervous, and he incorrectly charged Fish with taking all and giving nothing in the negotiations.

³⁷ Kido Kōin nikki, II, May 26, 179–80.

³⁸ June 4, letter reproduced in Itō Hirobumi den, I, 660–62.

³⁹ Kido Kōin nikkt, H, June 26–30, 193–94; NGB, V, document 87 and appended diary entries for June 27–30; Maximilian von Brandt, Drei und dreissig Jahre in Ost-Asien (Leipzig, 1901), II, 343–44.

⁴⁰ NGB, V, document 89.

⁴¹ Fish papers, Correspondence, copy of Babcock to Grant, Washington, July 6, 1872; and Grant to Fish, Long Branch, July 7, 1872.

⁴² Fish, Correspondence, Fish to Grant, Garrison, July 8, 1872.

⁴³ NGB, V, document 90; Fish, Diary, July 10, pp. 339–40; Fish, Correspondence, Fish to Robert S. Chew (chief clerk of the State Department), July to, 1872; and Fish to Grant, July 11, 1872.

⁴⁴ Fish, Correspondence, Grant to Fish, July 16, 1872.

⁴⁵ NGB, V, document 92; State Department, Minutes, July 22, 1872.

⁴⁶ Precisely what happened in Tokyo is difficult to disentangle. Officials there were alarmed but did issue new credentials on June 19 (in the form of two documents, a letter of credence and of full powers); NGB, V, document 92, and Itō Hirobumi den, I, 657–58. On May 24, Foreign Minister Soejima had already alerted the diplomatic corps that there would be a new grant of powers; NGB, V, document 78. For the Tokyo reaction to the embassy's change of course, see my dissertation, pp. 212–58.

⁴⁷ Diplomatic Relations, I, 447–48.

⁴⁸ NGB, V, document 39.

⁴⁹ Chargé Samejima, June 16, in Gaimusho, Jōyaku kaisei Nihon gaikō bunsho tsuiho, document 15.

⁵⁰ The embassy's report to Tokyo proves that it was acting on its own initiative and not under the thumb of the home government: “We have changed to the opinion that no use should be made of the full powers and credentials brought back by the envoys.” NGB, V, document 39. For an extended discussion on the “sane, realistic” diplomacy of the Meiji oligarchs, see Conroy, Hilary, The Japanese Seizure of Korea (Philadelphia, 1960).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Kido Kōin nikki, II, July 22, 201–02; Kido Kōin bunsho, IV, letter to Yamada, August 5, 1872, 371.

⁵² Diplomatic Relations, I, 449.