¹ For recent contributions to the literature see Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)Google Scholar, Johnson, John J., ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and McWilliams, Wilson C., ed., Garrisons and Government (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967)Google Scholar.

² For a discussion of the terminological problem see Isaacs, Harold L., India's Ex-Untouchables (New York: John Day, 1964)Google Scholar. Useful reports and monographs include the annual Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and Beteille, Andre, “The Future of the Backward Classes,” in Perspectives, supplement to the Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1965), 1–39Google Scholar. For a recent study indicating academic interest in caste and untouchability in the military see Rao, M. S. A., “Caste and the Indian Army,” Economic Weekly, Aug. 29, 1964.Google Scholar

³ We use the term “class” in the same sense as it was employed by the British. It was synonymous with clan, caste, race, or religion, and comprised the unit of recruitment. Thus a particular Hindu caste (jati) may have comprised a discrete military “class,” but so did various categories of Muslims. Thus, Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Deccan Muslims, etc., were all separate “classes.” The term carried with it no sense of “social” class as understood in contemporary usage, although some classes were regarded as relatively high and others relatively low.

⁴ For general surveys of this period see Sarkar, Jadunath, The Military History of India (Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar, 1960)Google Scholar, and Sharma, G., Indian Army Through the Ages (New Delhi: Allied, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁵ The sepoy system of recruitment—originally devised by the French—represented a major accomodation to traditional society in that it meant that Indian manpower was substituted for foreign manpower, but it was modern in the sense that recruitment was relatively systematic, and the officer corps was relatively professional. Sepoy armies had many of the characteristics of modern rational hierarchies; Indian attempts to emulate the sepoy system were generally unsuccessful, the crucial link being a unified officer corps.

⁶ The opinion of Sir J. Hope Grant, recorded in the Precis of Replies Connected with the Re-Organization of the Armies of India, Library of the Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. Grant's comments were recorded in connection with the work of the Eden Commission, of 1879, which was examining the structure of the Indian military. Only Grant and two other officers specifically urged the recruitment of low-caste soldiers out of several dozen officers whose opinion was solicited. For a study of the recruitment patterns of the Bengal Army see Barat, Amiya, The Bengal Native Infantry, 1796–1852 (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), pp. 119 ffGoogle Scholar.

⁷ See Dodwell, Henry, Sepoy Recruitment in the Old Madras Army (Calcutta: Indian Historical Records Commission, 1922)Google Scholar.

⁸ SirCadell, Patrick, History of the Bombay Army (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938)Google Scholar. Appendix Two, Class Composition. The British also recruited at various times: Bhils, Santals, Mhairs, Moplahs, Ahirs, Minas, Christians, Kolis, and other scheduled tribes and castes.

⁹ For an informed and suitably scathing attack on this policy see the series of articles by one of India's most remarkable students of military policy, Chaudhuri, Nirad C., “The ‘Martial Races’ of India,” The Modern Review (Calcutta), July, Sept., 1930, Jan. Feb., 1931Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The ninth Guru, Tegh Bahadur, had been slaughtered by Aurangzeb in 1675. His quartered body was snatched from a Muslim crowd in Delhi's Chandni Chowk by three Chuhras and carried back to Tegh Bahadur's son, the great Guru Govind Singh. As a reward for their effort the sweepers were admitted to the Khalsa and bestowed with the title, “Mazbhi”: faithful. They thus became a special subcaste of outcastes in the Sikh community, and in fact distinguish among themselves between recent and historic converts to the faith. See Rose, H. A., (comp.), A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, Vol. III (Lahore: Punjab Government, 1914)Google Scholar.

¹¹ MajorBarstow, A. E., Sikhs (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publications Branch, 1928), pp. 74–75Google Scholar. This volume is one of the series of Handbooks on each class recruited to the Indian Army which were published periodically over several decades beginning in the late nineteenth century. At the same time a few Mazbhis were enlisted by the British for service in Pioneer regiments.

¹² MacMunn, George, The History of the Sikh Pioneers (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., n.d., probably 1934–5), pp. 20–22Google Scholar. See also Brander, H. R., 32nd Sikh Pioneers: Regimental History (Calcutta: Thacker & Spink & Co., n.d., probably 1907–8)Google Scholar.

¹³ The unit histories of several untouchable regiments (all written by British officers) indicate a generally high standard of performance. So did official inspections of such units, conducted on an annual basis. See, for example, Report of 1874 by Maj.-Gen. A. MacDonnell [a military inspector] reprinted in: Gt. Britain, H.M.S.O., Copy of Recent Correspondence on the Subject of the Organization of the Native Army, Cd. 1698, 1877.

¹⁴ Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in India (2 vols., London: Bentley and Son, 1897), II, 383, 441Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Madras was notorious as a backwater. One British officer posted to an obscure and desolate post in the Madras command made good use of his time by reading and studying before he wangled his way out: he was Winston Churchill, whose later disparaging opinion of the Indian Army may have been formed at that time.

¹⁶ Anon., Organization of the Native Army (n.d., n.p.). This volume is a reprint of a series of articles in the Pioneer which originally appeared in June, 1879. The copy used is in the Ministry of Defense Library, New Delhi.

¹⁷ Creagh, O'Moore [Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, 1909–14], Indian Studies (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.), p. 233Google Scholar. An identical theory was propounded by Field Marshal Ayub Khan on the occasion of the signing of the new Pakistan Constitution. He noted that for the successful operation of a parliamentary system, “above all, you need a really cool and phlegmatic temperament, which only people living in cold climates seem to have.” Radio Broadcast, March 1, 1962. New York Times, March 2, 1962.

¹⁸ For World War I see: Army H. Q., India, Recruiting in India Before and During the War of 1914–1918 (Army H. Q., Oct., 1919) [an unclassified and unpublished printed volume on file in the Archives of the Ministry of Defence Historical Section, New Delhi]; also, Government of India, The Army in India and Its Evolution (Calcutta: Supt. of Government Printing, 1924)Google Scholar. For World War II see: Prasad, Sri Nandan, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organization, 1939–45 (Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan: Orient Longmans, 1956) pp. 84 ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Cadell, pp. 297–98.

²⁰ MacMunn, p. 518.

²¹ Total figures by class, region, and service for the 1939–45 period are in various appendices of Prasad. Exact annual recruitment figures by absolute number and percentage are on file in the Ministry of Defence (Historical Section), New Delhi.

²² For an exploration of the entire question see Andrzejewski, Stanislaw, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954)Google Scholar; specifically, see Levy, Marion J. Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), II, 600–1Google Scholar.

²³ There are obvious parallels between the place of the untouchable and the role of the Negro in American society. See Berreman, Gerald D., “Caste in India and the United States,” American Journal of Sociology, 67 (Sept., 1960), 120–127CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Dollard, John, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday and Co., 1957)Google Scholar, and for the military parallels, see Mandelbaum, David G., Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952)Google Scholar, and more recently, Moskos, Charles C. Jr., “Racial Integration in the Armed Forces,” American Journal of Sociology, Sept. 1966, 132–48CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. One study indicates certain parallels between Japanese Burakumin and untouchables, even in their recruitment to the military. See De Vos, George and Wagatsuma, Hiroshi, Japan's Invisible Race (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1966), pp. 41, 51Google Scholar.

²⁴ Beteille, p. 27.

²⁵ At one time B. R. Ambedkar seriously considered conversion to Sikhism. The Sikh belief in meeting oppression with a “love for the cause” of martial Sikhism, and fighting back to defend one's interests held great attraction for him and other scheduled caste leaders. After negotiations with Sikh leadership, Ambedkar rejected Sikhism, fearing a second-rate status within the community. See Keer, Dhananjay, Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission (2nd ed. rev.; Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962), pp. 275Google Scholar ff.

²⁸ “All Sikh traditions whether national or religious are martial in times of political excitement—and to the Sikhs politics and religion are closely allied—the military spirit re-asserts itself.” Barstow, p. 40.

²⁷ “A Sikh Village,” in Singer, Milton, ed., Traditional India: Structure and Change (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1959), p. 280Google Scholar.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Gandhi's own position was a typical blend of principle tempered by compassion. After a Harijan worker (who believed in military training) stated that “those who join the army are rid of fear and untouchability and learn of self-respect,” Gandhi replied:

You have gone to die wrong man with this question. You know that I do not believe in military training. Nor do I believe with you that Harijans who join the army are so suddenly transformed. But I should not make an attempt to dissuade diose Harijans who voluntarily want to enlist as recruits. If sons of die well-to-do go in for military training and if Harijans would like to follow their example, how can I prevent them? It is a difficult thing any day to teach the lesson of Ahimsa. How can one inculcate Ahimsa to those who are doubly suppressed? The wonder to me is that even among the suppressed there are some Harijans who have truly learnt the lesson of Ahimsa.

The Removal of Untouchability (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1954), p. 257Google Scholar.

³⁰ The government and the military are careful to praise particular classes for unusual military accomplishments or on festive occasions. See, for example, Dharm Pal, Traditions of the Indian Army (Delhi: Publications Division, 1961), and the military weekly, Sainik Samachar.

³¹ Our use of the term is somewhat different from that of Fox, William T. R. in his “Representativeness and Efficiency: Dual Problems of Civil-Military Relations,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (Sept., 1961), 354–366CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² This is obviously the case with sweepers, menials, porters, and caretakers of animals, but is at least partly true of military bands.

³³ The British took great care to separate Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, and saw to it that the latter group never had their own “pure” regiment. It was the classic expression of the ‘divide and rule’ doctrine, and also caused great difficulty for Pakistan, which received no large intact military formations.

³⁴ Interview with a Mazbhi Sikh M.P., New Delhi, 1964. Free translation from Hindi.

³⁵ Keer, p. 8.

³⁶ See the reply of the Defense Minister (Y. B. Chavan) in the Lok Sabha to charges of discrimination made by scheduled caste politicians, including a Congress Chamar. They urged the creation of a Bhil unit and the re-raising of the Chamar Regiment; Chavan reiterated government policy: no new caste-based units were to be raised, and indicated that the British bore the responsibility for the disbanding of the Chamar unit. The Hindu (Madras), Sept. 23, 1964.

³⁷ This was carried to great lengths in India as British officers came to identify with relatively high caste soldiers. This identification was carried to the extreme case of some officers who refused to permit their high-caste troops to play hockey with troops from a lower caste. This kind of ritualistic caste-consciousness has practically vanished from the Indian Army. For an account of the incident see Candler, Edmund, The Sepoy (London: John Murray, 1919), p. 47Google Scholar.

³⁸ Before World War I there were situations in which high-caste soldiers were reluctant to obey orders from low-caste NCO's. The British used this fact to argue against the recruitment of all Mahars, but the latter countered by pleading for separate regiments of Mahars, or for separate companies of Mahars attached to Muslim regiments. They expected fairer treatment from the Muslims than from their Hindu coreligionists. See Navalkar, H. N., The Life of Shivaram Janba Kamble (Poona: S. J. Kamble, 1930), PP. 143–157Google Scholar. According to Professor Eleanor Zelliot, Mahar leadership was at one time drawn in large part from retired non-commissioned officers.

³⁹ See Mandelbaum, , Moskos, , and Ginzburg, Eli, “The Negro Soldier,” in his The Negro Potential (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ The Bihar Regiment is half-Adivasi. “Proud Record of the Bihar Regiment,” Sainik. Samachar, Feb. 16, 1964.

⁴¹ The Sikh Light Infantry, composed of untouchable Sikhs, was formerly called the Mazbhi and Ramadasias Sikhs (M & R Sikhs), but under pressure from scheduled caste politicians the name was altered to remove what was thought to be a disparaging caste title.

⁴² MajorPaloskar, R. D., MC, “Man-Management in Guards Battalions,” United Service Institution of India Journal 91 (April-June, 1962), 107–9Google Scholar. A critical rejoinder by Maj. Gulcharan Singh was printed in the U.S.I. Journal 92 (Oct.-Dec, 1962), letter to the editor.

⁴³ Correctly or incorrectly, the attitude of many untouchable politicians is reflected in the statement of a young Chamar M.P. in an interview in 1965: “I know I could do as well as anyone else, but what about my people? Would most of them be treated fairly? Imagine a Chamar and a Brahmin applying for the same job, and being judged by Brahmin or high-caste employers. Who do you think would get the job? Don't try to tell me what would happen!”

⁴⁴ Absolute figures of the numbers of individuals from scheduled castes and tribes are not released by the Ministry of Defense. Percentage of increase/decrease in the number of persons of these categories are made available through the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but lacking a comparative base or starting point the figures are virtually worthless. From 1961 to 1962 the Army reported a 6.82% gain in scheduled caste officers and a 17.83% gain in Junior Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Other Ranks. Report of the Commissioner …, 1962–63, p. 161.

⁴⁵ Levy, II, 600–1, Srinivas, , Social Change in Modern India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 48, 66Google Scholar. Levy notes the great impact of military service on individual soldiers, but also argues that this is minimized by the isolation of the military.

⁴⁶ This statement is based on interviews with several dozen Indian officers of various ranks. Most acknowledge the inequalitarian implications of caste-based units, but argue that India has still not reached a point where patriotism can be substituted for regional, caste, or martial traditions. As one very high ranking “left wing” officer of international fame put it: “for morale purposes and fighting spirit men have to be in one class; otherwise it is like having Americans, Frenchmen, Germans, Swedes in one unit, it will not work. Instead you can tell a Sikh and he will fight like a tiger, or tell a Mahratta of Shivaji, and so forth.”