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Ringisei—Traditional Values or Organizational Imperatives in the Japanese Upper Civil Service: 1868–1945

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Bernard S. Silberman
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Abstract

Perhaps the most widely and persistently reported characteristic of Japanese organizational development in the period 1868–1945 is the pattern of behavior known as ringisei. The literature defines ringisei as a system, emerging first in the 1870's and becoming endemic after 1900, characteristic of both public and private bureaucracies in Japan. In this system of decision-making, policy was and, apparently, still is drafted at lower departmental levels by “specialists” and circulated by document or formal approval, indicated by the affixing of a seal, to successively higher levels of the administrative hierarchy. The policy thus circulated was said to become official when the document reached the minister or senior executive official and he affixed the final seal to the document. It is this pattern that is usually viewed as being synonymous with decision-making from below. This assumption appears to stem from the often repeated belief that once drafted in response to a request from superiors the document (ringisho) met only approval or stalling but never rejection on its journey through ever-higher levels of the administrative hierarchy. Analysts have consistently seen the ringisei system as a major, if not the key, factor in the civil bureaucracy's inability to innovate and as the means by which officials were able to avoid individual responsibility for decisions. The system is also often viewed as the means by which, in the pre-World War II period subordinates were able to impose policies on their superiors without being held accountable.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , February 1973 , pp. 251 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1973

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References

1 For descriptions of this system see Kiyoaki., Tsuji “Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of Ringisei,” in Ward, Robert E.Google Scholar (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1970).Google Scholar 457–75; Nikṓ, Kawanaka, Gendai no fan-ryōsei (Tokyo, 1962);Google ScholarYasuo, Watanabe, “Kanryō-kikō no kōzōkaikaku,” Chūō Kōron, 10 (October, 1961), 115–31.Google Scholar

2 Tsuji, 462–66.

3 Ibid., Chic, Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 64–66.Google Scholar

4 l am indebted to James D. Thompson and Arthur Tudcn for the concept of computational decision-making. See their “Strategies Structures, and Processes of Organizational Decision-Making,” in Thompson, James D. et al. , (eds.). Comparative Studies in Administration (Pittsburgh, 1959), 195–216.Google Scholar

5 Ibid., 200–16.

6Kazuo, Imai, Kanryō—sono seitai to uchimaku (Tokyo, 1953), P, 118.Google Scholar

7 Nakanc, 64–66; Tsuji, 462–66.

8 Nakanc, p. 65.

9Thompson, and Tuden, , op. cit. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1964), pp. 337–39.Google Scholar

10 Tsuji, fn. 2, p. 457.

11Grusky, Oscar, “The Effects of Succession: A Comparative Study of Military and Business Organization,” in Janowitz, Morris (ed.). The New Millitary (New York, 1964). 83–109, especially pp.Google Scholar 96–97; Grusky, Oscar, “Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession,” American Journal of Sociology 67 (November 1961),Google Scholar 261–69; Grusky, Oscar, “Career Mobility and Organizational Commitment,” Administrative Science Quarterly 10, 4 (March 1966), 488–503;Google ScholarKricsberg, Louis, “Careers, Organization Size and Succession,” American Journal of Sociology 68 (November 1962), 355–59.Google Scholar

12 Grusky, “The Effects of Succession: … ,pp. 96–98.

13 For this approach to succession see Guest, R. H., “Managerial Succession in Complex Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology 68 (July 1962), 47–54;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGrusky, Oscar, “Administrative Succession in Formal Organizations,” Social Forces 39 (December 1960), 105–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 The permanent ranks or the upper civil service were legally defined as sūnin and chūkunin or their equivalents. Sūnin rank consisted of grades 8–3 and chūkunin of grades 2–1 in the permanent civil service grades.

15 Although strictly speaking the sample should have been a stratified one, the size of the population was sufficiently small so as to make the differences between the two minimal. In light of this, the simple random sample procedure was used since it entailed considerably less investment in time and effort.

The population or governors was determined on the basis of: 1) all those who were appointed by the central government as governors of officially designated rural and urban prefectures (fu and ken) in the period May 1, 1868-September 30, x945 a) the exclusion of the 273 daimyū or domain lords who retained their positions until their domains were transformed and/or amalgamated into new prefectures by the end of 1871. The incumbents were determined by use of the following government sources: Tsunekichi, Ijiri, Rekidai kenkanroku (Tokyo, 1925);Google ScholarNaikaku Insatsukyoku, Shoktimrofyi (Tokyo, 1886–1945).Google ScholarThe biographical and career background data were derived from the above and a large number of sources of which the major and most representative are: Heibonsha, (eds.), Dai jinmei jiten (Tokyo,Google Scholar 1957–58), 10 vols.; Eikichi, Igarashi, Taishō jinmei jiten (Tokyo, 1914);Google ScholarHensankai, Ishin Shiryō, Gendai kazoku fōyū (Tokyo, 1929);Google ScholarShimbunsha, Osaka Mamichi (eds.), Gendai jinmei roku (Osaka, 1926–1935);Google Scholar Jinji Kōshinjo leds.), jinji kōshin roku (Tokyo, I903, 1908, 1911, 1915. 1918, 1921, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, 1937, 1939, 1941, 1943, 1948, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959); Tcikoku Daigaku Shu-shinroku Hensanjo, Teikpktt daigaku shushinroku (Tokyo, 1922, 1934); Shimbunsha, Asahi (eds.), nertkan, Asahi (Osaka, 1920–1945);Google ScholarNobuhisa, Kaneko, Hokkaidō jinmei jishō (Sapporo, 1923); Hideichi, NoyoriGoogle Scholar (ed.), Taishōshi, Meiji: jinbutsu hen (Tokyo, 1930), Vols. 13–15; Takeo, OkamotoGoogle Scholar (ed.), Shiga ken jinbutsushi (Otsu, 1930); Gen-suke, MatsudaGoogle Scholar (ed.), Bōchō jinshi hatten kan (Yamaguchi, 1932).Google Scholar In addition, a large number of other regional biographical dictionaries, prefectural histories and biographies were utilized.

18 Creation or a rormaiiy aennea universalistic career structure began in 1884 with the establishment of the civil service retirement pension system which provided a specific schedule of rewards for prolonged service. (See Hōrei zenshō, Dajōkan Ordinance 1, January 4, 1884). The system substantially the same throughout the pre-1945 period. Relatively minor adjustments were made in 1890 and 1923. (See Hōrei zenshō, Diet Law 43, June 20, 1890; Diet Law 48, April 13, 1923). The second major aspect of the upper civil service career emerged in 1887 with the establishment of the upper and lower civil service examination systems. The former system, as it was to be elaborated in future years, placed primary emphasis on an extensive knowledge of jurisprudence and law. The final elements of the career structure came in 1899 with the promulgation of the Civil Service Appointment, Status and Disciplinary Ordinances. (See Hōrei zenshō, Imperial Ordinances 61, 62, 63, March 28, 1899). The first of these restricted recruitment of the highest civil servants almost completely to those within die civil service. While some free appointments continued to exist, the vast majority of appointments to high office were limited to those with bureaucratic service in grade. Freedom from random dismissal was secured by the Status and Disciplinary Ordinances. The major impact of the statutes was to limit dismissal to failure to perform adequately or conviction for a criminal offense. In the former case, the disciplinary statute provided for disciplinary and investigating committees staffed by senior civil servants- The civil service career was thus almost completely insulated from outside interference after 1899. By 1900 the bureaucratic role had come to be defined in terms of a protected life-time career.

17 For a statiscally based description of these disparities see, Silberman, Bernard S., Ministers of Modernization: Elite Mobility in the Meiji Restoration, 1868–73 (Tucson, Arizona, 1964).Google Scholar

18Sclznick, Philip, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, III., 1957), p. 105.Google Scholar

19 Grusky, “The Effects of Succession &,” pp. 95–96.

20 Silberman, Ministers oj Modernization & , pp. 50–70.

21 Grusky, op. cit., 107.

22 Imai, op. cit., 108.

23Goldner, Fred H. and Ritti, R. R., “Profes-sionalization as Career Immobility,” American Journal of Sociology (March 1967) 489–502.Google Scholar “Cooling out” here refers to the attempt to maintain the organizational commitment of the individual who can no longer aspire to upward mobility. See Goffman, Erving, “On Cooling the Mark Out;” “Some Adaptations to Failure,” Psychiatry, XV, 0952), 451–63.Google Scholar

24Blau, Peter, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, (Chicago, 1963), p. 258.Google Scholar

25Silberman, Bernard S., “Structural and Functional Differentiation in the Political Modernization of Japan,” in Ward, Robert E.CrossRefGoogle Scholar (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1970), 53–61.Google Scholar