¹ The figures for 1920 and 1950 are based on Nippon toshi nenkan 1952 [Japan municipal yearbook 1952], a publication of the Tōkyō Shisei Chōsa Kai (Tokyo Institute of Municipal Research), pp. 19, 24, 37Google Scholar. Those for 1953 are based on Chihō jichi nenkan 1954 [Local autonomy yearbook 1954], Statistical Part, p. 6Google Scholar; those for 1954 on the monthly publication of the National Association of City Mayors, Shisei, III (May 1954), 2Google Scholar. The terms “living in cities” and “living in towns and villages” have been used to denote what Japanese statistics usually call shibu and gumbu. Because many cities include large rural areas, the actual degree of urbanization is somewhat less than these figures seem to imply.

² Weber, Max, “Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany,” in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Gerth Wright, trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1946), p. 363.Google Scholar

³ Kai, Tōkyō Shisei Chōsa, Chihō jichi gojūnen shi [Fifty years of local self-government] (Tokyo, 1940), pp. 265f.Google Scholar

⁴ Regarding the attitude of most peasants towards government, see Ward, Robert E., “Patterns of Stability and Change in Rural Japanese Politics,” Occasional Papers, Center for Japanese Studies, No. 1 (Ann Arbor, 1951), pp. 1f.Google Scholar

⁵ Chihō jichi nenkan 1954, Statistical Part, pp. 14–15Google Scholar. Towns are usually more densely populated and have a greater incidence of trading people than villages. Otherwise there is little difference between the towns and villages, and laws and statistics always refer to them together.

⁶ The Local Autonomy Law (Law No. 67 of 1947), deals with so-called property wards in Art. 294–297. Most property wards are in fact ōaza or buraku which maintained or created common property such as forest lands, shrines, net-drying vats, or meeting halls. The actual significance of ōaza and buraku extends far beyond this economic aspect as will be shown later.

⁷ Cabinet Order 15 of May 3, 1947.

⁸ This task has been performed by Ward, Robert E. in “The Socio-Political Role of the Buraku (Hamlet) in Japan,” APSR, XLV (Dec. 1951), 1025.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ On the subject of the relationship between family system and democracy, see the author's “Post-War Changes in the Japanese Civil Code,” Washington Law Review, XXV (Aug. 1950), 289f.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Local Autonomy Law, Art. 141, 142.

¹¹ As of 1952, there were 53 different laws assigning functions of this type to the mayors. In regard to these national functions, they are subject to the direction of the prefectural governor and of the competent minister. Assignment of national functions to the local entity as such constitutes the so-called “entity delegation.”

¹² Law No. 261 of 1950. The schoolteachers are under the supervision of the local Boards of Education and special regulations for them have been enacted.

¹³ Provisions are also made for member bills, but their number is negligible. The budget has to be presented by the mayor.

¹⁴ While the buraku organization was outlawed, the buraku head assumed a variety of titles as a sort of protective coloring. Even today he is often referred to as “liaison official” (renraku in). On these officials, see Dull, Paul S., “The Political Structure of a Japanese Village,” FEQ, XIII (Feb. 1954), 175.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Local Autonomy Law, Art. 177 and 178.

¹⁶ Ward, Robert E., “Some Observations on Local Autonomy at the Village Level in Present-Day Japan,” FEQ, XII (Feb. 1953), 192.Google Scholar

¹⁷ In the absence of a clear articulation of individual views and of a vote the announcement of the consensus is largely a matter of intuition. This gives considerable latitude in guiding the process to the chairman or the person of high social status, who makes the announcement. See Ward, , “Buraku,” p. 1030Google Scholar; Kerlinger, Fred A., “Decision-making in Japan,” Social Forces, XXX (1951), 36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Ward, , “Local Autonomy,” p. 190Google Scholar. Where the decision of the village assembly contains an element of discretion and where the interests of the various buraku are antagonistic—e.g., in the question of where a new schoolhouse is to be located—the unanimity of the assembly often breaks down.

¹⁹ While it may be that under this system more types of functions are exercised by the villages according to higher standards than would be the case if every village were left to its own devices, it is important to note that the lack of independent activities is destructive of local self-government and that first priority does not go to work which the villagers themselves consider important to their own well-being.

²⁰ See, especially, Local Autonomy Law, Art. 146, 150, 177, 179, 246–252. Because of the general central government controls (described below) the provisions for mandamus proceedings have not once been used during the eight years of their existence.

²¹ Ward, , “Local Autonomy,” p. 196Google Scholar; Dull, , p. 179.Google Scholar

²² We mentioned earlier that the villages are artificial creations and that the attitude of the villagers to government is predominantly a passive one. For these reasons the villages also lack the vitality which would be necessary for keeping the control from above within fixed limits.

²³ Takeo, Fujita, “Nihon chihō zaisei no tokushitsu to kadai” [“Characteristics and problems of Japanese local finance”], Shisei, III (Jan. 1954), 11.Google Scholar

²⁴ The subsidy system is not without political consequences. Because the national government has almost consistently been in conservative hands, conservative Diet members are considered to be more useful in obtaining subsidies than their progressive opponents. Similarly, a conservative mayor is often favored, because he is likely to be on good terms with his prefectural “superiors.” Since the local entities appear within this framework as “petitioners,” little thought is given to the notion that a good mayor should stand up for the independence of the village from central control.

²⁵ Based on Chihō jichi nenkan 1954, Statistical Part, pp. 52fGoogle Scholar. The first figure includes local loans, usually advanced by the Finance Ministry in agreement with the Autonomy Board.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 54f.

²⁷ Based on the Autonomy Board's Chihō zaisei no jōkyō hōkoku [Report on the state of local finance] (Mar. 1954), pp. 5f.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Ward, , “Buraku,” pp. 1034fGoogle Scholar; Masamichi, Rōyama, Nōson jichi no hembō [Transformation of self-government in agricultural villages] (Tokyo, 1948), pp. 267fGoogle Scholar. and passim; Prefecture, Kanagawa, Hakone kankō chitai jittai chōsa hokokushō [Report on a survey of actual conditions in the Hakone sightseeing area] (Yokohama, 1953).Google Scholar

²⁹ Characteristically, the voting percentage is highest in primarily rural prefectures. In 1951, for instance, Fukushima, Yamanashi, and Gumma topped all other prefectures with a voting rate of 97.3 per cent. Tokyo and Kyoto, with 77.1 per cent and 74.9 per cent respectively, were at the bottom of the list.

³⁰ Even on a nation-wide basis, the number of candidates exceeds the number of vacant positions only slightly. In 1951, there were on the average only 1.3 candidates for each city, town, and village assembly seat.

³¹ In municipalities where only one candidate is nominated, no election takes place. This is usually the case in about one third of Japan's municipalities. On a nation-wide basis the ratio of candidates to positions in 1951 was slightly less than 2:1.

³² The avoidance of competitive elections and of campaigns ties in with the high value put on the appearance of harmony and on individual self-effacement.

³³ In 1951, there were 63 direct demands in cities, towns, and villages. See Chihō jichi nenkan, pp. 277fGoogle Scholar. The Local Autonomy Law provides for direct demands in Art. 74r-88.

³⁴ Neighborhood associations, exerting a conservative influence, exist sometimes also in cities and, more especially, in the sections inhabited by artisans and shopkeepers. But they are often artificially maintained by “bosses” and their henchmen, whose power is based on the threat of coercion.

³⁵ The function of liaison with the village office may well continue where it finds a basis in the geographical isolation of the buraku, but it is not likely to keep the traditional elements in the buraku alive.

³⁶ See Norbeck, Edward, Takashima, A Japanese Fishing Community (Salt Lake City, 1954), p. 102.Google Scholar

³⁷ The family which today forms the constituent element of the buraku is usually no longer the traditional Japanese “house,” but a smaller unit consisting of no more than two or three families in the Western sense, living together. This is significant because the family system was originally based on the “house” and was characterized by the control of the “head of the house” over its members. The “house” was a large-scale, hierarchical unit, built around a vertical axis of ancestor-descendant. The abolition of the house system by the reform of the Civil Code brought the law into conformity with existing trends.

³⁸ Even among the informal conservative leadership, we find persons who achieved their position as construction bosses, or by accumulation of wealth, and who thus are an exception to the rule that status is ascriptive rather than achieved. Since contractors for the village are ineligible only for the position of the mayor, but not for village assembly seats, they often constitute an important political influence in the village. This influence is strengthened by the existence of the oyabun-kobun system, a loyalty-dependency relationship of assimilated kinship character.

³⁹ Interesting questions are raised by the recent program for village amalgamations, sponsored by the government. The reasons for this move are, on the one hand, the need for units capable of carrying out the nationally assigned tasks and of raising the necessary finances and, on the other hand, the saving of wasteful expenditures involved in maintaining a separate administrative machinery for a small number of people. Often the units to be amalgamated strive to retain a degree of independence. Probably as the price to be paid for mergers, the government seems to be willing to assure a certain separateness. Thus the amalgamated villages may become so-called property wards. It is not impossible that the entire development will decrease the importance of the buraku. On the other hand, it is questionable whether it will be possible to create a civic spirit within the new villages.

⁴⁰ A type of ostracism (mura hachibu) is sometimes applied within the buraku or village against nonconformists. The formal decision, made for this purpose, often starts with the statement that “they disturbed the harmony of the otherwise peaceful community.”