¹ See Chandra, Satish, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707–1740 (Aligarh, 1959), pp. xlvii–xlixGoogle Scholar; and Ali, M. Athar, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb (Aligar, 1966), pp. 92–94Google Scholar. For evidence of recent wide acceptance of this view see P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 20–21; S.A.A. Rizvi, “The Mughal Elite in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century” Abr-Nahrain, XI, 1971, p. 79; and by the same author, “The Breakdown of Traditional Society” in The Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge, 2 vols, 1970) II, p. 69. Irfan Habib, also of the Aligarh school, agrees that a shortage of jagirs did exist but he holds a divergent view of imperial decline. For his views on the jagir crisis see The Agrarian System of Mughal India (Aligarh, 1963), pp. 269–271. Habib argues that the empire collapsed because of a structural flaw in the system of jagirs which allowed and encouraged ever-increasing exploitation and oppression of the producers by the jagirdars. The flaw—put simply—is that jagirs were transferred so frequently as to preclude any sense of responsibility for the welfare of the peasantry from arising in the mind of the jagirdar. The end result was migration or flight, followed by armed resistance by the peasants and their leaders, the zamindars. In the end, it was a series of revolts of zamindars that brought down the empire. In his evidence for oppression and revolt, Habib leans heavily on descriptive accounts of events in the Deccan for the period 1690–1707. In addition, more recently, M. Athar Ali has published an essay in which he articulates a larger view of the breakup of the Mughal empire within the context of world history at that time. See Ali, M. Athar, “The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case” in Modern Asian Studies, IX (1975), pp. 385–396CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Cf. Habib, “Other Hasil Statistics,” p. 409. Habib's figures are taken from the Zawabit-i Alam-giri, British Museum Persian mss. Add. 6598 and Or. 1641 dated circa 1687–91. If the Deccan kingdoms had maintained these nobles on their payrolls, we might assume a priori that the same lands in Mughal control could also pay their salaries.

³ After the 1687 conquest, the Emperor divided the territories of Golconda into two nearly equivalent territories: Hyderabad province (suba), consisting of the twenty districts to the north of the Krishna and Gundlekamma rivers; and the faujdari of the Hyderabad Karnatik, the districts to the south of this line. Hyderabad proper, to which all references in this paper apply, was the object of sustained administrative reorganization in the period 1687–1700. Efforts at a similar consolidation in the Hyderabad Karnatik were cut short by the 1689 rebellion of the Telugu nayaks and the flight of the Maratha king to Jinji in 1690. Aurangzeb devoted all revenues and men he could obtain from the Karnatik to a continued war with the Marathas until 1698. See my article “The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687–1707,” Modern Asian Studies, IX (April 1975). pp. 241–260.

⁴ These figures are taken from a report titled “List of the parganas of province dar-al jehad Hyderabad with the exception of the Karnatik, to the end of 1100 A.H. (1689–90 A.D.),” Nos. 1/7/72 to 1/7/105 in the Inayat Jang Collection of Mughal documents from the Deccan provinces. This collection, now in the possession of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, will be cited hereafter as I.J. Coll.; the serial number of each document will be given. For simplicity, precise figures given in the sources have been rounded off and converted from dams to rupees, when necessary.

⁵ According to figures supplied by Habib (p. 273 n.), the proceeds (hasil) of the imperial khalisa prior to the Deccan annexations were approximately 26.1 million rupees. Addition of the Hyderabad khalisa revenues would have raised that figure-to 32.8 million rupees. Any lands similarly allocated in Bijapur would also have raised the figure.

⁶ I.J. Coll., I/n/498; I/14/264.

⁷ I.J. Coll., I/16/143.

⁸ This figure is an estimate arrived at by a series of calculations using data from jagir assignment papers for the governor and other Mughal officers sent to Hyderabad. For further details, see J. F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda (Oxford 1975) pp. 105–107.

⁹ Athar Ali, p. 78, citing a Mughal newsreport.

¹⁰ I.J. Coll., I/14/129–30. Unassigned paibaqi revenues in the Bijapur Konkan were an additional 839,000 rupees; in the Bijapur Karnatik 6.9 million rupees; and in the Hyderabad Karnatik, 1.9 million rupees.

¹¹ I.J. Coll., I/18/269.

¹² I.J. Coll., I/14/129–30. Numerous documents from Hyderabad, showing return of jagirs to paibaqi status for failure to meet branding regulations, testify to the accuracy of this analysis.

¹³ I.J. Coll, I/16/947–48. This order assigns five parganas in Hyderabad to help defray the wage bill of one thousand mansabdars (rank 40 to 250 zat) serving under Khan Firuz Jang. Another jagir worth 365,000 rupees was established in Bijapur for the same purpose.

¹⁴ I.J. Coll., I/18/269.

¹⁵ In 1704, a Dutch merchant reporting on conditions at Hyderabad noted that no caravans had come to the provincial capital (formerly the capital of Golconda) in the past two years because of the depredations of bandits and Marathas. He went on to comment that “Whereas the Emperor Aurangzeb concerns himself more to conquer the far distant territories of the Marathas than to demonstrate scarcely any concern for the affairs of the conquered kingdoms of Golconda and Bijapur, His Majesty's great governors [in those provinces] are not sufficiently empowered to do so. As a result trade everywhere has come to a halt.” Koloniaal Archief of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, “Inkomend Briefboek” Volume 1584 (2.2.1704), fol. in. Although but one comment, this does suggest that contemporary observers noticed the problems caused in the eastern Deccan by the Emperor's expansive policies.

¹⁶ Cf. All, M. Athar. “Provincial Governors Under Aurangzeb—An Analysis,” in Medieval India: A Miscellany, Nizami, K. A., ed. (Aligarh, 1969), pp. 96–133Google Scholar. A complete analysis of the origins of fauj-dars and fortress commanders has not been corn-pleted, but no Maratha officers were appointed in that capacity in Hyderabad.

¹⁷ My definition of khanazads, who numbered close to half the Mughal nobility in the period 1679–1707 is taken from Athar Ali, Mughal Nobility, pp. 11—12. However (unlike Athar Ali), I have used the term “noble ” to indicate generally those mansabdars with ranks over 500 zat (rather than 1000 zat), thus increasing the number of the nobility to well over a thousand. Mansabdars holding ranks as low as 500 zat, or even lower, frequently held responsible positions us faujdars and corresponded directly with the Emperor. See also Day, U.N., The Mughal Government A.D. 1536–1707 (New Delhi, 1970), p. 184Google Scholar, for a discussion of the classification of mansabdars.

¹⁸ See Hasan, Ibn, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire (Karachi, 1967 reprint), pp. 65–91Google Scholar for a detailed description of the Emperor's daily routine and the audiences held by him.

¹⁹ For one index to the amount of time and effort expended by the Timurids on mansabdari affairs, note the frequent references to such matters in the Memoirs of Jahangir, trans. A. Rogers and H. Beveridge (Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1909–1914, 2 vols). See also, for Aurangzeb's reign, the Ma'asir Alamgiri of Saqui Musta'id Khan, trans. Jadunath Sarkar (Calcutta, 1947).

²⁰ In the absence of well-documented studies of the world-view of the Mughal nobility, this assertion is, of course, speculative. That men like the Rajput general Jai Singh, who served Aurangzeb so well in numerous campaigns, possessed such a view of the empire would be hard to deny. Cf. Jagdish Sarkar, “The Haft Anjuman of Udairaj Alias Tale'gar, Munshi of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh,” Bengal Past and Present, LXXXI (1962), pp. 69–75; LLXXXII (1963). pp. 65–73; LXXXIII (1964), pp. 43–55; LXXXIV (1965), pp. 63–76; LXXXV (1966), pp. 113–122.

²¹ As Athar Ali points out, one of Akbar's major contributions was the “enunciation of an essentially humane approach to the individuals constituting the nobility” (p. 8). Unlike the Safavids or the Uzbeks, the Mughals did not execute members of the nobility for offenses less serious than rebellion. See M. Athar Ali, “The Mughal Empire in History,” Presidential Address Section II, Medieval India, Indian History Congress, 33rd Session, Muzaffarpur, 1972, pp. 8–9.

²² Other important examples include Raja Bakht Buland, the Gond ruler of Deogarh, who, despite his conversion to Islam, fledfrom Aurangzeb's service in 1696. Sarkar, Seejadunath, History of Aurangzib (Calcutta, 5 vols, 1912–1930) V, pp. 408–412Google Scholar. The Telugu raja of Venkatagiri, Yachim Na'ir, alternated between rebellion and acceptance of Mughal service before he was finally executed by Aurangzeb. For details, see my article “The Hyderabad Karnatik….” cited above.

²³ For the Bedars and their relations with the Mughals, see Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurang-zib, IV, pp. 387–89; V, pp. 214–234. Also see Muhammad Hashim Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-al Lubab, eds. K. D. Ahmad and Woseley Haig, Bibliothecha Indica No. 60 (Calcutta, 3 vols 1860–74), II pp. 369–70 and 524–27.

²⁴ Cf. Sarkar, “Their tribal organization under the heads of families and the judicial authority of their hereditary headmen ensured discipline and solidarity among them.” History of Aurangzib, V, pp. 214–215.

²⁵ Khafi Khan, II, p. 370.

²⁶ Ibid. Another vivid description appears in the Ma'asir-i Alamgiri (translation), pp. 185–87.

²⁷ See Khan, Yusuf Husain, Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign (Hyderabad, 1958), pp. 205–206Google Scholar.

²⁸ Bhimsen, “Nuskha-i Dilkusha,” British Museum Persian Ms. Oriental 23, fols. 98a-98b).

²⁹ This detailed account of Padiyah's activities is taken from Khafi Khan, II, pp. 526–528.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Jagia, desbmukh of Nasratabad, was given an increase in his mansab in 1706. Ma'asir-i Alamgiri, P. 305.

³² In October 1692 the Dutch reported that Padiyah Nayak's bands (troepen), in combination with the Marathas of Ram Raja, daily raided the interior districts near Hyderabad city. These raiders levied taxes (contributien) and robbed many merchants on the roads. Koloniaal Archief, Vol. 1408, (25.4., 1692), fol. 697.

³³ See Richards, J. F., “Mughal Rule in Golconda, 1687–1724,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, 1970, p. 206Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 14811. Rustam Dil Khan's grandfather migrated from Iraq via Khurasan to serve Jahangir in the early seventeenth century. At one time, under the title Mukhtar Khan, the grandfather held the governorship of Delhi. Rustam Dil Khan's own rank was that of an amir at 1500 zat and 1000 suwar.

³⁵ The obligations of a Mughal governor to sustain peace and order were well-established from the founding of the empire. See Qureshi, I. H., The Administration of the Mughul Empire (Karachi, 1966), pp. 228–229Google Scholar. For a model patent of office addressed to a Mughal governor see British Museum, Persian ms., Or. 1779, fol. 215b.

³⁶ See Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda (Oxford, 1975), p. 218.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 227–28.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 219–20.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 239.

⁴⁰ Ibid. A Mughal fiscal officer statione d at Machilipatnam tried to report this fact to the imperial wazir in 1708 but was prevented from doing so by Rustam Dil Khan.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid. 240–41.

⁴³ Irvine, W., Later Mughals (New Delhi, 1971 reprint) Sarkar, Jadunath, ed., I, pp. 52–54Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See I.J. Coll., I/16/126 for a summary of the combined salary jagirs of both Jan Sipar Khan and Rustam Dil Khan in 1700. I.J. Coll., I/16/143 supplies details of Rustam Dil Khan's jagirs in Hyderabad after 1700.

⁴⁵ For summaries of conditions of appointment of deshmukhs in Hyderabad, see I.J. Coll., I/16/602 to I/16/636. For a similar accommodation in the western Deccan see Muzaffar Alam, “The Zamindars and Mughal Power in the Deccan, 1685–1712,” The Indian Economic and Social History Review, XI (March 1974), pp. 74–91. Dr. Alam, following Nurul Hasan, makes an important and necessary distinction between the intermediary, more powerful zamindars and the primary, or smaller village-level ones. Because most Mughal documents for Hyderabad do not distinguish between the two levels of zamindars, I have not been able to follow his exampie. The conclusions reached and generalizations made for the deshmukhs in Hyderabad almost certainly apply to the remainder of the intermediary zamindars. The entire question of the possibility of differing responses on the part of primary zamindars needs further examination.

⁴⁶ Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda, pp. 254–263; Alam, pp. 81–84.

⁴⁷ Khafi Khan, II, pp. 630–643 provides a detailed narrative of Pap Rai's rise and fall. Official Mughal news reports from Hyderabad verify and corroborate the essential accuracy of the chronicle in regard to Pap Rai's exploits. See also Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda, pp. 245–52. pp. 224–235.

⁴⁸ For events in Hyderabad in 1711–12, see Ibid., pp. 252–63. For the increased incidence of revolt by deshmukhs in Bijapur at the same time, see Alam, pp. 86–88.

⁴⁹ Sinha, S. N., Subah of Allahabad under the Great Mughals (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 72–82Google Scholar.