¹ The author has in preparation an article on the problem of Chinese anti-foreignism during these years.

² Fairbank, John K., The United States and China (Cambridge, 1948), p. 7.Google Scholar

³ Hummel, Arthur W., ed., Eminent Chinese of the Chʻing Period (Washington, 1943), I, 319–320Google Scholar. Chinese characters for all proper names used in this article are omitted unless they do not appear in Hummel.

⁴ Imperial Maritime Customs, III (Miscellaneous series: No. 30), Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states, (Shanghai, 1908) I, 160Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as Treaties.

⁵ Treaties, I, 160. The Chinese text reads chi chiü “to dwell temporarily” and chiang kʻou,^b literally “creek's mouth” and thus “port” or “harbor.” Although the phrase “to dwell temporarily” was changed in the later treaties to read simply “reside at,” the phrase “at the ports of the five coastal cities of Canton, etc.” was retained. The Chinese-British Supplementary Treaty of 1843, for example, reads chü chu,^e “to dwell” or “reside at,” as do the French and American treaties. Treaties, I, 200, 474, 560.

⁶ The Foreign Office Correspondence, China, key number 17, vol. 57, encl. #30 in desp. #38, Pottinger to Aberdeen, September 3, 1842, in the Public Record Office, London. Hereafter cited as FO17/—.

⁷ Ibid., encl. #31.

⁸ Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence respecting insults in China (London, 1857), pp. 24–25. Hereafter cited as Insults. This is one of many Blue Books published during the period and presented to the House of Lords or House of Commons or both. Wherever possible, however, I shall cite directly from the Foreign Office records.

⁹ Insults, p. 21.

¹⁰ Insults, pp. 22–23.

¹¹ Insults, pp. 25–26.

¹² FO 17/102, desp. #165, Davis to Aberdeen, Nov. 26, 1845.

¹³ Ibid., encl. #2 in desp. #179, Davis to Aberdeen, Dec. 22, 1845.

¹⁴ Treaties, I, 208–209.

¹⁵ The Chinese Repository, XV (July 1846), 364–373. Hereafter cited as Chin. Rep.

¹⁶ Chin. Rep., XV (Aug. 1846), 431.

¹⁷ Chin. Rep., XV (Nov. 1846), 576.

¹⁸ FO 17/121, unnumbered, Palmerston to Davis, Jan. 9, 1847; Ibid., desp. #1, Palmerston to Davis, Jan. 12, 1847.

¹⁹ FO 17/124, desp. #45, Davis to Palmerston, March 27, 1847. For the attack at Fushan see Chin. Rep., XVI (March 1847), 142–147.

²⁰ SirDavis, John F., China, During the War and Since the Peace (London, 1852), II, 165–166.Google Scholar

²¹ FO 17/124, encl. #3 in desp. #45, Davis to Palmerston, March 27, 1848.

²² FO 17/125, desp. #53, Davis to Palmerston, April 5, 1847.

²³ Ibid., encl. #6.

²⁴ ibid.

²⁵ Treaties, I, 210–211.

²⁶ Details as to these incidents, and others, may be found in many sources. See especially: Insults; Parliamentary Papers, Papers relating to the murder of Six Englishmen in the neighborhood of Canton in the month of December 1847 (London, 1847–1848)Google Scholar; pertinent issues of The Chinese Repository.

²⁷ Chin. Rep., XVIII (May 1849), 277.

²⁸ Chʻou-pan i-wu shih-mo [The Beginning and End of the Management of Barbarian Affairs] (Peiping, 1929–1930)Google Scholar, Tao Kuang section, chuan 74, p. 46a. Hereafter cited as IWSM.

²⁹ Kuang-chou fu-chih, (Canton, 1879), chuan 81, p. 43bGoogle Scholar. That high-ranking officials were not immune from attack by their own people in Canton was shown quite clearly in 1846 when the Kuang-chou prefect, Liu Hsün^e was roughly handled by a mob and his yamen destroyed. Chin. Rep., XV (Jan. 1846), 51–52; IWSM, 75, 11a–12b.

³⁰ Chin. Rep., XV (Jan. 1846), 48.

³¹ FO 17/142, desp. #23, Bonham to Palmerston, April 26, 1848.

³² Ibid.

³³ FO 17/143, encl. in desp. #25, Bonham to Palmerston, May 4, 1848.

³⁴ Ibid., desp. #25.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., encl. #1 in desp. #55, Bonham to Palmerston, June 21, 1848.

³⁷ Ibid., encl. #2.

³⁸ Ibid., encl. #3.

³⁹ FO 17/144, desp. #69, Bonham to Palmerston, July 20, 1848.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., unnumbered, Bonham to Palmerston, July 20, 1848.

⁴² FO 17/139, desp. #85, Palmerston to Bonham, Sept. 19, 1848.

⁴³ Ibid., desp. #90, Palmerston to Bonham, Oct. 7, 1848.

⁴⁴ FO 17/145, desp. #113, Bonham to Palmerston, Oct. 23, 1848.

⁴⁵ FO 17/139, desp. #122, Palmerston to Bonham, Dec. 30, 1848.

⁴⁶ IWSM, 79, 23a–24a. An interesting problem as to the sources of Chinese intelligence arises here. Hsü's memorial was written presumably at about the same time as Bonham was composing his #113 to Palmerston. In this despatch he [Bonham] intimated that the forces at his disposal were not adequate for an attack upon the city and proposed a mission to the north. As far as I know these ideas had never, up to this point, been mentioned by Bonham to Hsü. The latter, apparently, had some access to information as to what was going on in Sir George's office.

⁴⁷ IWSM, 79, 24b–25a.

⁴⁸ FO 17/146, encl. in desp. #146, Bonham to Palmerston, Dec. 29, 1848.

⁴⁹ FO 17/153, encl. #1 in desp. #12, Bonham to Palmerston, Jan. 26, 1849.

⁵⁰ Ibid., desp. #9, Bonham to Palmerston, Jan. 23, 1849.

⁵¹ Ibid., encl. #2 in desp. #12, Bonham to Palmerston, Jan. 26, 1849.

⁵² Ibid., encl. #3.

⁵³ Ibid., encl. #4.

⁵⁴ FO 17/161, Admiralty to Foreign Office, April 18, 1849.

⁵⁵ FO 17/153, encl. #2 in desp. #22, Bonham to Palmerston, Feb. 21, 1849.

⁵⁶ Hsü was not being entirely insincere about this, for in his memorial to Peking reporting the February 17 meeting he plaintively remarked that “during the past year, our meetings and conferences have taxed energy and intelligence. Now our wisdom is exhausted and our strength gone. If the Emperor still wants me to act according to the circumstances, surely in a situation such as this, I am not one to shirk responsibility. But to what extent is the affair of entering the city the result of the decision of Chʻi-ying? … I have no way to manage, and so I must ask the Emperor for instructions, and at the same time offer myself up for punishment.” IWSM, 79, 38b.

⁵⁷ FO 17/153, encl. #2 in dcsp. #22, Bonham to Palmerston, Feb. 21, 1849.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ FO 17/161, Admiralty to Foreign Office, April 18, 1849.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Mar. 21, 1849.

⁶¹ Ibid., April 18, 1849.

⁶² IWSM, 79, 36b–38b.

⁶³ IWSM, 79, 37b.

⁶⁴ See footnote 56.

⁶⁵ IWSM, 79, 37b.

⁶⁶ IWSM, 79, 38a.

⁶⁷ FO 17/153, encl. #1 in desp. #28, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 19, 1849.

⁶⁸ ibid.

⁶⁹ Chin. Rep., XVIII (Feb. 1849), 112.

⁷⁰ FO 17/153, encl. #5 in desp. #28, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 19, 1849.

⁷¹ IWSM, 79, 38b. Hsü was being something less than honest with the British on this point, for on March 13 he informed Consul Elmslie, at Canton, that he had had no contact with the commercial community in Canton and was powerless to force them to carry on the trade (FO 17/153, encl. #5 in desp. #28, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 19, 1849).

⁷² Chin. Rep., XVIII (Mar. 1849), 163.

⁷³ FO 17/162, Admiralty to Foreign Office, May 24, 1849.

⁷⁴ Williams, F. W., The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, LL.D. (New York, 1889), p. 169.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ FO 17/155, encl. #1 in desp. #66, Bonham to Palmerston, May 18, 1849.

⁷⁶ FO 17/162, Admiralty to Foreign Office, May 24, 1849, and FO 17/153 desp. #28, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 19, 1849.

⁷⁷ IWSM, 79. 39b–40a.

⁷⁸ IWSM, 79, 40a.

⁷⁹ The text of the edict read tsan chun ju chʻengʻ.

⁸⁰ Consul Elmslie informed Bonham on March 28 that there was “a rumour to the effect that Commissioner Seu [Hsü] had received the Imperial Reply … and that the answer was in favor of our being admitted into the city” (FO 17/154, desp. #40, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 30, 1849). The Reverend Charles Gutzlaff, chief interpreter at Hong Kong, reported to Bonham on March 30 that the Imperial Edict had arrived in Canton on March 25 and that the Chinese officials had been ordered to “temporize, throw the whole blame upon the people, and carefully avoid a collision.” (Ibid., encl. #3).

⁸¹ It should be noted that Palmerston's instructions to Bonham of December 30, in which the latter was ordered not to use force should his demand be refused, arrived in Hong Kong on Mar. 19 (FO 17/153, desp. #32, Bonham to Palmerston, Mar. 22, 1849). According to Dr. John Bowring, who assumed his position as British consul at Canton on April 13 (and who was at the Canton Consulate at the time?), Hsü would have acceded to the British demands “had it not unfortunately happened that Howqua [Wu Chung-yueh] (whose informant was probably the American Consul) was enabled to assure the Imperial Commissioner that he might safely resist—that no warlike measures would be really taken—and that the appearance of the fleet was a meaningless demonstration” (FO 17/188, desp. #1, Bowring to Granville, April 19, 1852).

⁸² Chin. Rep., XVIII (April 1849), 220–221.

⁸³ Chin. Rep., XVIII (April 1849), 221.

⁸⁴ FO 17/154, encl. #2 in desp. #45, Bonham to Palmerston, April 18, 1849.

⁸⁵ Ibid., encl. #3.

⁸⁶ Ibid., encl. #4. During succeeding years there was a continuing dispute as to whether or not the British had definitely waived the “right of entry.” While the English text of the above note would indicate that Bonham had done no such thing, the Chinese text could be read as an abandonment of the British claim (See FO 17/213, encl. #1 in desp. #46, Bowring to Clarendon, May 24, 1854).

⁸⁷ FO 17/154, desp. #45, Bonham to Palmerston, April 18, 1849.

⁸⁸ A more detatiled analysis of the correspondence between Canton and Peking is called for at this point. Nothing bearing the slightest resemblance to Hsü's “false edict” appears in any published source I have examined. It is not in IWSM; nor in Ta Chʻing li-chʻao shih-lu [The True Records of the Successive Reigns of the Chʻing Dynasty] (Mukden, 1937)Google Scholar; nor in Hsien-chʻien's, WangTung Hua Hsü Lu [A Continuation of the Tung Hua Records] (Peking, 1890)Google Scholar. The edict from Peking allowing “temporary entrance” appears, as noted, in IWSM, 79, 39b–40b. It is referred to in a subsequent edict which appears in IWSM, 79, 47a–48a, in the Ta Chʻing li-chʻao shih-lu, 465, 12, and in the Tung Hua Hsü Lu, Tao Kuang Section, 59, 4b.

The “temporary entrance” edict was issued on Mar. 11. According to Professors Fairbank and Teng, the time most often recorded for the transmission of an edict from the capital to Canton was fifteen days. The average time was twenty-four days (Fairbank, J. K. and Teng, S. Y., “On the Transmission of Chʻing Documents,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, IV [May 1939], 43Google Scholar). The urgency of the matter at hand undoubtedly required that this document be sent at top speed, and thus it probably arrived at Canton on or soon after Mar. 26. As noted above, Canton was full of such rumors. Hsü, himself, wrote Bonham that he had received the Imperial Edict on Mar. 31, and in a later memorial to Peking he reported that he had received it on April 1 (IWSM, 80, 1a). One must conclude that the Mar. 11 edict was received by Hsü prior to the writing of his letter to Bonham of April 1, and that the Governor-General suppressed its contents and substituted a version of his own.

⁸⁹ IWSM, 79, 43a–45b.

⁹⁰ IWSM, 79, 44a–44b. This memorial, which was received in Peking on April 14, is another piece of evidence which can be used to convict Hsü of forgery. The Imperial Edict of March 11 used, at one point, the phrase ju-chʻeng i-yu,⁸ which might be translated as “to enter the city for one look around” (IWSM, 79, 40a, line 3 and 40b, line 9). As far as I know, this was the first time that this expression was used in correspondence relating to the “entry question.” In the memorial received in Peking on April 14, Hsü asked: “… if such is the case, how will a mere wandering about [italics mine] satisfy them?” The same expression i-yu appears in this sentence (IWSM, 79, 43b, line 5).

Furthermore, Hsü reported that “within a few days” he expected to notify Bonham that “the Emperor will not be willing to oppose them [the people] in order to fulfill the wishes of the barbarians. …” This sentence bears a close resemblance to the one in the “false edict” which reads: “The Chinese Government cannot go against the wishes of the people in order to comply with the wishes of the people from afar. …”

Clearly, Hsü's memorial, discussed here, was written subsequent to the arrival in Canton of the March 11 edict and prior to his April 1 note to Bonham. It is also evident that, at the time of the writing of the latter, Hsü had already decided upon the wording of the “false edict.”

⁹¹ IWSM, 79, 47a–48a.

⁹² IWSM, 79, 47a–47b.

⁹³ IWSM, 80, 4a–4b.

⁹⁴ IWSM, 80, 5a.

⁹⁵ IWSM, 80, 15a–15b.

⁹⁶ IWSM, 80, 13a–13b, 15b.

⁹⁷ IWSM, 80, 15b–16a.

⁹⁸ FO 17/155, encl. #1 in desp. #66, Bonham to Palmerston, May 18, 1849.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Costin, W. C., Great Britain and China, 1833–1860 (London, 1937), p. 139Google Scholar; Morse, H. B., The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, 1910), I, 397Google Scholar; Williams, S. W., The Middle Kingdom (New York, 1883), II, 573Google Scholar; Bonner-Smith, D., and Lumby, E. W. R., The Second China War, 1856–1860 (London, 1954), pp. xvi–xvii.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Costin, p. 135; Bonner–Smith and Lumby, p. xv; Swisher, Earl, China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study on Sino-American Relations, 1841–1861 (New Haven, 1953), pp. 20, 179.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Except, perhaps, Dr. Bowring, who remarked in a private despatch to Lord Palmerston: “The course of action we shall have to pursue must be regulated by the answer which Scu [Hsü] will receive, or may profess to have received, to his application to the Emperor for instructions.” (FO 17/160, unnumbered, Bowring to Palmerston, Mar. 27, 1849.) Oddly, Bowring never took the next logical step and accused Hsü of forgery.

¹⁰² An example of this occurred at Nanking in 1842 when the chief Chinese negotiators granted British subjects the right to trade at Foochow, despite the fact that an Imperial Edict expressly forbade such a concession. (Fairbank, J. K., Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854 [Cambridge, 1953], I, 102–103).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Bonham, in fact, was reprimanded by Palmerston in Sept. 1849, for collecting “in the neighborhood of Canton [in March] a threatening force without previous authority.” (FO 17/152, desp. #80, Palmerston to Bonham, Sept. 3, 1849).

¹⁰⁴ Some recent studies are: Eastman, Lloyd, “The Kwangtung Anti-Foreign Disturbances during the Sino-French War,” Papers on China, 13 (1959), pp. 1–31Google Scholar; Fairbank, J. K., “Patterns behind the Tientsin Massacre,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, XX (Dec. 1957), 480–511.Google Scholar