¹ See for example, Bailey, Jackson, “The Origin and Nature of the Genrō,” in Sakai, Robert K. (ed.), Studies on Asia, 1965 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1965), pp. 129–41Google Scholar; Yoshitake, Oka, Kindai Nihon seijishi (Tokyo: 1963), I, 254–55Google Scholar; Gakkai, Nihon Gaikō (comp.), Taiheyō sensō genin ron (Tokyo: 1953), pp. 32–33Google Scholar; Yamada Shikazo, Seiji kenkyū (Tokyo: 1926), pp. 35–36.Google Scholar

² There is very little evidence available to support or deny the existence of these rules. However, it is difficult to see how any decision-making group in which all the members were approximately equal could operate otherwise. Consistent flouting of any or all of these rules would lead to either dissolution of the group or a state of constant conflict in which decisions could not be reached.

³ Thompson, James D. and Tuden, Arthur, “Strategies, Structures, and Processes of Organizational Decision,” in Thompson, James D. et al. , (eds.), Comparative Studies in Administration (Pittsburgh: 1959). pp. 195–216.Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid., p. 197.

⁵ The remaining three types may be described as follows: 1) DECISION BY COMPUTATION—when there is agreement on goals and when knowledge is available or believed to be available, decision-making is a technical or mechanical matter. The solution appears to be largely a matter of common sense. The structure emerging from such a situation will be one of specialists, one for each computational problem that can be anticipated. Their behavior will tend to be constrained by the following rules: a) specialists are constrained from making decisions on issues lying outside their competence; b) each specialist is bound to the organization's hierarchy of preferences; c) all pertinent information must be routed to each specialist; d) every issue must be routed to the appropriate specialist. Such a structure closely approximates the Weberian rational-legal bureaucrate type. It should also be noted that computational decision-making may also exist in situations dominated completely by traditional and customary behavior. Thus, in a relatively undifferentiated and diffuse social system where custom and tradition fix the goals and the means for achieving them, decisions are a mechanical matter. However, since custom and tradition rather than economy and efficiency are dominant norms, different types of structures emerge depending on the content of tradition and custom. 2) DECISION BY COMPROMISE—when there is agreement on knowledge and its expected consequences but not on goal preferences, a bargaining or compromise structure is likely to emerge since the only alternative to conflict is arriving at a common preference. Since bargaining or compromise involves detailed and subde exploration of the different goal preferences, the decision unit must be small enough to permit sustained exchange. At the same time the unit must be large enough to include all important factions. The type of structure which emerges is some kind of representative organization embodying the following rules: a) each faction must be represented in the structure; b) each faction must have as its top preference the desire to reach agreement; c) each faction must have veto power and; d) each faction must be given all pertinent information regarding the means to achieving varying preferences. 3) DECISION BY INSPIRATION—when there is neither agreement on preferences or on knowledge and its expected consequences or pertinent knowledge is simply not available, the result is likely to be organizational breakdown leading to the emergence of a charismatic leader who by his personal mystique is able to impose his own goal preferences and create or decide what knowledge and/or kinds of knowledge are most pertinent to achieve these goals. It is for this reason that charismatic organizations are notoriously unstable. Knowledge is contested or unavailable and consequently the chances of a charismatic leader making major policy blunders are very great.

⁶ In English see for example Borton, Hugh, Japan's Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), pp. 93–110Google Scholar. In Japanese this view is summed up well by Yoshitake, Oka, “Seiji,” in Tadao, Yanaihara (ed.), Gendai Nihon shoshi (Tokyo: 1952), I, 70–77.Google Scholar

⁷ The civil bureaucracy is the focus of this analysis primarily because given the goal preferences which emerged by the early eighteen eighties nearly all of the major decisions and their implementation took place within the civil bureaucracy.

⁸ For a description of this education see Dore, Ronald, Education in Tokugawa Japan (Berkeley, California and London: 1965).Google Scholar

⁹ Harootunian, Harry D., “Jinsei, Jinzei, and Jitsugaku: Social Values and Leadership in Late Tokugawa Thought,” in Silberman, Bernard S. and Harootunian, Harry D. (eds.), Modern Japanese Leadership: Transition and Change (Tucson, Arizona: 1966), pp. 83–86.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For a description of this development see Tomitarō, Karasawa, Nihon no kyōikushi (Tokyo: 1955)Google Scholar. Also Passin, Herbert, Society and Education in Japan (New York: 1965).Google Scholar

¹¹ Western education is defined in this context as the knowledge of a Western language and/or knowledge of some aspect of Western categories of science, military or civil technology, economics, political economy and law, or residence and/or travel in the West for a period of six months or longer. Traditional education is defined as knowledge acquired through attendance at domain, Bakufu or court schools to the exclusion of all Western knowledge as defined above.

¹² It should be noted that prior to 1900 all cabinets with the exception of the short-lived Okuma-Itagaki cabinet of 1898 were bureaucratic cabinets, that is, all ministers were drawn from the bureaucracy.

¹³ The incumbent population was determined from the following sources: Tsunekichi, Ijiri, Rekidai kenkanroku (Tokyo: 1925)Google Scholar; Shinzan, Shishido, Meiji shokkan enkakuhyō (Tokyo: 1886–1893), 19 vols.Google Scholar; Insatsukyoku, Naikaku, Shokuinroku (Tokyo: 1886–1900)Google Scholar, annual. Biographical data was obtained from a large number of sources of which the major ones are: Heibonsha, Dai jinmei jiten (Tokyo: 1957–1958), 10 vols, in 5Google Scholar; Eikichi, Igarashi, Taishō jinmei jiten (Tokyo: 1914)Google Scholar; Hensankai, Ishin Shiryō, Gendai kazokju fuyō (Tokyo: 1929)Google Scholar; Kōshinjo, Jinji, Jinji kōshinroku (Tokyo: 1903, 1908, 1911)Google Scholar; Eiichi, Shibusawa et al. , (eds.), Meiji Taishöshi: jinbutsu hen (Tokyo: 1930), vols. 13–15Google Scholar; Masaji, Teraishi, Tosa ijin den (Tokyo: 1923), 2 vols.Google Scholar; Takeshi, Osatake, Bakumatsu ishin no jinbutsu (Tokyo: n.d.)Google Scholar; Jinkai, Yamaguchi Ken, Yamaguchi ken jinbutsu shi (Tokyo: 1933), 3 vols.Google Scholar; Kuwano, Araki, Kumamoto ken jinbutsu shi (Tokyo: 1959)Google Scholar. In addition to these a large number of other regional biographical dictionaries, prefectural histories and biographies were utilized.

¹⁴ The population was determined on the basis of: 1) all those who were appointed by the central government as governors of officially designated prefectures in the period May, 1868 to December 31, 1899; 2) the exclusion of the 273 daimyō who retained their positions until their domains were reorganized and amalgamated into new prefectures by the end of 1871. The population was determined from the following sources: Ijiri, Rekidai kenkanroku; Insatsukyoku, Naikaku, Shokuinroku, 1886–1900Google Scholar; Kyōku, Naikaku Kiroku, Meiji shokkan enkakuhyōGoogle Scholar. The biographical data were derived for the most part from sources identical with those used for Sample I.

¹⁵ Dore, Ronald, Education in Tokugawa Japan, pp. 160–75.Google Scholar

¹⁶ This conflict is perhaps best exemplified by the split among government leaders in 1873 over the so-called “Korean Question.” Saigō Takamori of Satsuma han and a number of supporters were convinced that the road to development lay by way of immediate external expansion in the direction of Korea through the use of a traditional samurai army. His attempt to force the new government to undertake this venture in 1873 was foiled by those in the government committed to internal development by means of applying Western technology and techniques. Saigō attempted to put the question to a test in 1878 by raising an army of samurai in Satsuma and challenging the new Western-style conscript army. The government's victory was a major milestone in proving the wisdom of the commitment to Western knowledge and internal development.

¹⁷ In the area of government and administration, the lade of expertise and of even general knowledge was reflected in the journeys of high civil servants to Europe in the eighteen seventies and eighteen eighties, especially Germany, to seek guidance in creating a viable centralized administrative system. Subsequently, a number of German constitutional and administrative experts, most notably Hermann Roesler and Albert Mosse, were brought to Japan to teach and provide technical aid in developing the administrative system and the governmental structure. See Yasuzō, Suzuki, Kempō seitai to Roesler (Tokyo: 1942)Google Scholar: Yasuzo, Suzuki, Kempō rekishiteki kenkyū (Tokyo: 1934)Google Scholar. Also see the recent and most definitive study of the establishment of the Meiji Constitution, Masatsugu, Inada, Meiji kempō seiritsushi (Tokyo: 1960–1962), 2 vols.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The emergence of the Jiyūminken or People's Rights Movement in the eighteen seventies from which the political parties in large part evolved made it very evident that nonbureaucrats could not be trusted to support completely the goals which the bureaucracy had decided upon. The Jiyūminken political party leaders had somewhat different goals. In political terms they wanted less centralization of power and in economic terms they tended to support short-term rather than long-term developmental goals. The latter reflected in the demands of the Jiyūtō supporters for lighter land taxes—the major source of government development capital. See Ike, Nobutake, The Origins of Politcal Democracy in Japan (Baltimore: 1950), pp. 83–85.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Thus for example Itō Hirobumi, the member of the genrō chiefly responsible for framing the Meiji Constitution, pointedly remarked in a speech on June 2, 1899 that:

In the next place we must know the aims and policies of our country. Political parries and others may have their arguments and views about the government, but these must be kept within the bounds of the goals and policies of the government.

Hirobumi, Itō, Itō Kō zenshū (Tokyo: 1928), II, 144.Google Scholar

²⁰ This view is supported by the data on educational backgrounds of those in Sample I (Table I). Two-thirds of this group had some Western knowledge or education—an extraordinarily large number in view of the restricted opportunities to acquire such knowledge. Further support is provided by the fact that by 1873 all of those who left the upper civil service were characterized by traditional education. Silberman, Bernard S., Ministers of Modernization: Elite Mobility in the Meiji Restoration 1868–73. (Tucson, Arizona, 1964), pp. 50–55.Google Scholar

²¹ As it was the constant presence of the genrō behind the scenes and the presence of several of their members in every Cabinet but one before 1900 evoked considerable bitterness and some loss of faith in their ability among the second level bureaucrats. Witness Itō Miyoji's comments in his diary in 1901:

Although the genrō have controlled politics since 1881, their power today is not what it once was. Nevertheless, the glow of their great achievements lingers so that they are immediately called on whenever a problem arises. This practice was not questioned in the past but now people are tired of these kinds of activities on the part of the genrō. Furthermore, without the help of others the efforts of the genrō lead to nothing. When they are arrogant and ignore those of the second level and below then it must be said that the genrôrole in politics will decline. Haven't you and others experienced this kind of treatment for many years? … While we must respect the genrō, we should allow them to reveal their incompetence to the nation by letting them fend for themselves. Popular support for the genrō will disappear and public opinion will demand that the second level statesmen step forward.

As quoted in Hirota, Kurihara, Hakushaku Itō Miyoji (Tokyo: 1940), p. 353.Google Scholar

²² As quoted in Ōkurashō Kyoku, Insatsu, Gikai seido nanajūnenshi: kenseishi gaikan (Tokyo: 1963), p. 34.Google Scholar

²³ Thus, for example Itō Miyoji in the quote cited in footnote 21 above suggests that the “genrō have controlled politics since 1881 ….” This conclusion raises the question of why the activities of genrō members were given much wider publicity in the eighteen-nineties than in the eighteen-eighties. This may be explained in part by the growing and evident discrepancy between those who formally and those who actually made decisions after the institution of the cabinet system in 1885. After several Cabinets had made their appearance, it became clear that each did not include all those who seemingly held positions of power. Under these conditions it would have been extremely surprising if the newspapers of the period, which had become well developed, had not become curious about the exact status of these men who appeared to have great power and influence but who did not consistently hold office. Their status would have become an even greater object of curiosity by the appointment of several of these men as genkun or elder advisors by the Emperor. From this point of view the newspapers' assiduous pursuit, in the late eighteen-eighties and early eighteen-nineties, of the activities of these men is easily understood. I suggest that it was the emergence of this discrepancy which resulted in increased publicity not the emergence of the institution itself.