No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Superprophet inequalities for independent random variables
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2016
Abstract
As well as having complete knowledge of the future, a superprophet can also alter the order of observation as it is presented to a player without foresight, whose strategy is known to the prophet. It is shown that a superprophet can only do twice as well as his counterpart, if the underlying random sequence is independent.
Keywords
MSC classification
Secondary:
62L15: Optimal stopping
- Type
- Short Communications
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1996
References
[1]
Gilat, D. (1987) On the best order of observation in optimal stopping.
J Appl. Prob.
24, 773–778.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2]
Gnedin, A. V. and Krengel, U. (1995) A stochastic game of optimal stopping and order selection.
Ann. Appl. Prob.
5, 310–321.Google Scholar
[3]
Hill, T. P. (1983) Prophet inequalities and order selection in optimal stopping problems.
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.
88, 131–137.Google Scholar
[4]
Hill, T. P. and Hordijk, A. (1985) Selection of order of observation in optimal stopping problems.
J. Appl. Prob.
22, 177–184.Google Scholar
[5]
Hill, T. P. and Kertz, R. P. (1982) Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables.
Ann. Prob.
10, 336–345.Google Scholar
[6]
Krengel, U. and Sucheston, L. (1978) On semiamarts, amarts and processes with finite values.
Adv. Prob.
4, 197–266.Google Scholar
[7]
Samuel-Cahn, E. (1984) Comparisons of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent non-negative random variables.
Ann. Prob.
12, 1213–1216.Google Scholar
[8]
Wittmann, R. (1995) Prophet inequalities for dependent random variables.
Stochastics
52, 283–293.Google Scholar