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Monotone stopping games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

John W. Mamer
John W. Mamer*
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
*
∗Postal address: Graduate School of Management, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA.
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Abstract

We consider the extension of optimal stopping problems to non-zero-sum strategic settings called stopping games. By imposing a monotone structure on the pay-offs of the game we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in non-randomized stopping times. As a corollary, we identify a class of games for which there are Nash equilibria in myopic stopping times. These games satisfy the strategic equivalent of the classical ‘monotone case' assumptions of the optimal stopping problem.

Keywords

NON-COOPERATIVE GAMESNASH EQUILIBRIAMYOPIC STOP RULES
Type
Research Papers
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 386 - 401
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1987 

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Footnotes

This research was supported by a grant from the Research Project in Managerial Economics and Public Policy, UCLA Graduate School of Management.

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