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Mutations, perturbations and evolutionarily stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

W. G. S. Hines
W. G. S. Hines*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
*
∗Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1.
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Abstract

The changes in diversity of competitive strategies in a Maynard Smith population model with mixed strategies are related to the changes in population mean strategy. The effects of slight mutations in strategy frequencies, and of slight perturbations of the contest payoff rules are then investigated, and found to increase and decrease diversity respectively (to a third-order approximation). A relation among mutational effects, payoff perturbation effects and stable population diversity is suggested.

Keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESPOPULATION DYNAMICSANIMAL CONFLICT MODELSMUTATIONAL EFFECTSCONTEST PERTURBATION
Type
Short Communications
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 1982 , pp. 204 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1982 

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Footnotes

Research supported by a National Science and Engineering Research Council Grant A6187.

References

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