¹ See, for example, John H. Aldrich, Why Parties: The Origins and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995); and Stephen E. Frantzich, Political Parties in the Technological Age (New York: Longman, 1989).

² See Cornelius Cotter and Bibby, John F., “Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline,” Political Science Quarterly, 95 (1980), 1–27Google Scholar; David E. Price, Bringing back the Parties (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1984); A. James Reichley, “The Rise of National Parties,” in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The New Direction in American Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 175–200; Larry Sabato and Bruce A. Larson, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future (New York: Longman, 2001).

³ Ray Bliss, “The Role of the State Chairmen,” in James Cannon, ed., Politics U.S.A: A Practical Guide to the Winning of Public Office (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 170.

⁴ See Aldrich; as well as John F. Bibby, “State Party Organizations: Strengthened and Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization,” in L. Sandy Maisel, ed., The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 19–46.

⁵ See Paul S. Herrnson, “National Party Organizations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” in Maisel, 47–78.

⁶ Aldrich, 273.

⁷ Ibid., 273.

⁸ See John C. Green, “Politics, Professionalism, and Power: Introduction,” in idem, ed., Politics, Professionalism, and Power: Modern Party Organization and the Legacy of Ray C. Bliss (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 2–4.

⁹ Bibby, 31.

¹⁰ Aldrich, 273.

¹¹ Herrnson, 52.

¹² Ibid., 52.

¹³ The Democrats began to embrace the service concept in the 1980s, but prior to that most of that party's reform efforts were procedural rather than organizational in nature. See David Menefee-Libey, “Embracing Campaign-Centered Politics at the Democratic Headquarters: Charles Manatt and Paul Kirk in the 1980s,” in Green, Politics, Professionalism, and Power, 166–85; as well as Sabato and Larson, The Party's Just Begun, 83.

¹⁴ Bibby, “State Party Organizations,” 29.

¹⁵ Ray Bliss, “Report of Committee on Big City Politics,” in Paul L. Kesaris, ed., Papers of the Republican Party (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1961), microfilm, 48.

¹⁶ The influence of two such Republican state leaders had an unmistakable influence on Bliss: Will Hays of Indiana and John Hamilton of Kansas. As Indiana state chair, Hays oversaw an ambitious statewide program to rebuild the party in advance of the 1916 election. At the time, the Indiana Republican Party operated on a year-round basis from a central office in Indianapolis, and was reported to have had as many as 40,000 active workers throughout the state. Hamilton brought a similar organizational acumen to a defeated and internally divided Republican Party in Kansas as state party chair in the early 1930s. See Ralph M. Goldman, The National Party Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 284; Francis W. Schruben, Kansas in Turmoil: 1930–1936 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969); and Lamb, Karl, “John Hamilton and the Revitalization of the Republican Party, 1936–40,” Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, 46 (1960), 233–50Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Gibson, James L., Cotter, Cornelius P., Bibby, John F., and Huckshorn, Robert J., “Assessing Party Organizational Strength,” American Journal of Political Science, 27 (1983), 199CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Price, Bringing back the Parties, 34.

¹⁹ There were, in addition to a Campaign Division, which covered both congressional and state legislative races, a Publicity Division, a Research Division, Field and Speakers Divisions, and several specific clientele divisions. See “Divisions at Republican State Headquarters,” 16 Sept. 1950, box 5, Ray C. Bliss Papers, MSS 768. Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio (hereafter cited as Bliss Papers).

²⁰ “Unexpected Ohio Victory Shows Firm GOP Organization,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 43 (1960), 2005Google Scholar.

²¹ Such organizational continuity can be seen not only in the ORP's yearly personnel budgets, but also in the budgets for the separate party divisions. During the 12-year period between 1950 and 1962, the party's yearly personnel budget averaged just over $108,000, and varied by less than 10 perecent between on and off years. Divisional budgets exhibited a similar continuity, averaging $138,000 a year with a diminishing margin over time between on- and off-year elections. See “Breakdown of Budget and Expenditures,” box 6, Bliss papers.

²² Bliss, “The Role of the State Chairmen,” 160.

²³ Ibid., 160, 161.

²⁴ Frederick M. Wirt, “The Organization Man in Politics: Ray Bliss and the 1960 Election” in Green, Politics, Professionalism, and Power, 69.

²⁵ Ibid., 69.

²⁶ Reflecting the state party's deference to local knowledge and control, the manual instructed the individual field organizer to always “reiterate that he is a service man for State Headquarters, that his only objective is to provide whatever assistance he can to the county political operation, and that he will provide liaison between the county and all departments of headquarters.” ORP field personnel were there to advise candidates and local officials, but they were always to defer to the decisions and plans of the county chair. They could certainly “suggest programs and activities recommended by Headquarters,” the manual instructed. In fact, they were encouraged to do so. But they should never “organize, direct or otherwise become involved in any county or district's political activity without the knowledge and consent of the local leadership.” Bliss knew that any support provided by ORP staff to unauthorized candidates or groups could jeopardize his programs. So he impressed upon his field organizers to always take their lead from the county chair. See Wirt, 70.

²⁷ Bliss, “Report of Committee on Big City Politics,” 42.

²⁸ A similar strategy of centralized fundraising had been developed at the national level by Mark Hanna in the 1890s, and was later expanded upon by Carlton Ketchum, Republican National Committee finance director in the 1930s. See Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 30–31.

²⁹ James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 462.

³⁰ “Republican State Committee: Summary of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 1952–1964,” box 6, Bliss Papers.

³¹ Bliss, “The Role of the State Chairmen,” 165.

³² For a more detailed analysis of “Old Guard” Republicanism, as well as the other traditions that formed within the postwar Republican Party, see Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans from 1952 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3–9; David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 1–14; and A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 22–37.

³³ Bliss, “The Role of the State Chairmen,” 168–69.

³⁴ George W. Knepper, “Ohio Politics: A Historical Perspective,” in Alexander P. Lamis, ed., Ohio Politics (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1994), 12.

³⁵ John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 136–37.

³⁶ Ibid., 149.

³⁷ John H. Kessel, “Ray Bliss and the Development of the Ohio Republican,” in Green, Politics, Professionalism, and Power, 49.

³⁸ “Rudiments of Political Organization,” The Ohio Federation of Republican Women's Organizations, box 5, “Summit County, Republican Central Committee, 1950–1951,” Bliss papers. In a confidential letter to Bliss, Gene Judd, director of public relations at Goodyear, stressed the need to counter “false labels” associated with Taft, such as “old guard, labor's enemy, negative reactionary.” “The task then is to establish the proper label in the minds of Ohio voters and not, through default, to permit false ones to weigh as they do,” he explained. Gene Judd to Ray Bliss, 9 Mar. 1949, box 9, “Taft File, 1949,” Bliss papers. See Royster, Vermont, “Taft and Lausche,” Wall Street Journal, 29 June 1950Google Scholar, 6; Thompson, Howard, “Big Gain for Taft Seen by Ohio G.O.P.” New York Times, 4 Dec. 1949, E11Google Scholar.

³⁹ V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 73.

⁴⁰ See Fenton, 148.

⁴¹ See William O'Neill to Ray Bliss, 18 Nov. 1952; Dwight Eisenhower to Ray Bliss, 13 Nov. 1952; Richard Nixon to Ray Bliss, 27 Feb. 1953, box 16, Bliss papers.

⁴² Thompson, Howard, “GOP Planning Super Drive in '56,” Ohio State Journal, 10 Oct. 1955Google Scholar.

⁴³ In fact, Bliss was so eager to share what he learned in Washington that he organized a similar campaign school in Columbus that fall, and instructed county officials to do the same statewide.

⁴⁴ See Gilbert J. Gall, The Politics of Right to Work: The Labor Federations as Special Interests, 1943–1979 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 18–19; Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans, 6–9; Reinhard, The Republican Right, 144–45. For a broader analysis of the Right-to-Work issue, see Canak, William and Miller, Berkeley, “Gumbo Politics: Unions, Business and Louisiana Right-to-Work Legislation,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 2 (1990), 258–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; as well as Moore, William, “The Determinants and Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature,” Journal of Labor Research, 19, 3 (1998), 445–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ Nixon, Marc, “Movements, Counter-movements and Policy Adoption: The Case of Right-to-Work Activism,” Social Forces, 87, 1 (2008), 479Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Albright, Robert, “Ohio's Amendment, ‘Right to Work’ Stirs Dust,” Washington Post, 14 Oct. 1958, A13Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ See, Fenton, John H., “The Right-to-Work Vote in Ohio,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 3, 3 (1959), 243CrossRefGoogle Scholar; as well as William Russell Coil, “‘New Deal Republican’: James A. Rhodes and the Transformation of the Republican Party, 1933–1983,” Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2005, 170–71.

⁴⁸ Kessel, “Ray Bliss,” 59.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Fenton, “Right-to-Work,” 242. See also Fenton, Midwest Politics, 136–37.

⁵⁰ See “17 States Viewed as Election Key,” New York Times, 18 Oct. 1960, 46Google Scholar; “50-State Survey Gives Nixon Lead,” New York Times, 3 Oct. 1960, 19Google Scholar; and “Kennedy Victory in Ohio Foreseen,” New York Times, 6 Nov. 1960, 77Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Bliss, “Report of Committee on Big City Politics,” 51–53.

⁵² “Unexpected Ohio Victory Shows Firm GOP Organization.”

⁵³ Bliss, “Report of Committee on Big City Politics,” 52.

⁵⁴ See Robert Novak, The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964 (New York: MacMillan, 1965), 11.

⁵⁵ At the time a number of factors were cited to explain Nixon's success in Ohio, including a recent tax increase endorsed by the Democratic governor, as well as fears promulgated about Kennedy's religion. But as a Congressional Quarterly analysis of the election noted, “most observers attributed the unexpected result … first of all to the Republican state organization.” Republican leaders certainly pointed to the ORP. For the Republican National Committee chair, Thurston Morton, for example, Nixon's victory in Ohio was “directly traceable to Bliss.” See “Unexpected Ohio Victory Shows Firm GOP Organization”; Flinn, Thomas, “How Nixon Took Ohio: A Short Reply to Senator Kennedy's Question,” Western Political Quarterly, 15, 2 (1962), 274–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ After the 1962 election, Time identified Bliss as the man “most responsible” for the remarkable Republican victories in Ohio both that year and in 1960. See, “Man behind the Desk,” Time, 23 Nov. 1962, 12.

⁵⁷ Once in Washington, Bliss sought to “transplant the vital elements of the … Ohio system,” argue Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, including “taut administration, ideological neutrality, centralized control … from High Street in Columbus to I Street in Washington.” See Evans, Rowland and Novak, Robert, “The Ordeal of Ray Bliss,” Saturday Evening Post, 6 Nov. 1965, 34Google Scholar. See also John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn, “Out-Party Strategy: Republican National Committee Rebuilding Politics, 1964–1966,” in Bernard Cosman and Robert Huckshorn, eds., Republican Politics: The 1964 Campaign and Its Aftermath for the Party (New York: Praeger, 1968), 215.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Zimmerman, Richard, “Rhodes' First Eight Years, 1963–1971,” in Lamis, Ohio Politics, 76Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Michael F. Curtin and Julia Barry Bell, The Ohio Politics Almanac (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996), 89.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 89.

⁶¹ Quoted in Zimmerman, 76.

⁶² Following the example left by Bliss, the party, they explain, once again “strengthened its ties to the local committees, provided candidates with extensive in-kind contributions, and built a sophisticated headquarters organization, complete with computer technology and a competent staff.” See John C. Green and Daniel M. Shea, “Ohio,” in Andrew M. Appleton and Daniel S. Ward, eds., State Party Profiles: A 50-State Guide to Development, Organization, and Resources (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), 254.

⁶³ As Stephen Hess and David Broder calculate, “by the time [Bliss] yielded the reins as state chairman in 1965, the Ohio Republicans had outscored the Democrats 51 to 20 on statewide races (including three out of four presidential elections), 125 to 59 in Congressional battles, 694 to 403 in assembly races and 140 to 87 in state senate contests.” See Stephen Hess and David Broder, The Republican Establishment: The Present and Future of the G.O.P. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 43.