¹ Holland, Max, “Citizen McCloy,” The Wilson Quarterly, 15 (Autumn 1991), 23.Google Scholar This issue also included John B. Judis, “Twilight of the Gods”; and a piece on “Background Books: The Rise and Fall of the American Establishment.” I am greatly indebted to Holland and to Dr. Michael Lacey of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, for providing me with copies of this issue.

² Much of the material upon earlier historiography on the American foreign policy Establishment is drawn from an article of mine which appeared some years ago, “The American ‘Eastern Establishment’ and Foreign Affairs: A Challenge for Historians,” The Society for Historians of American foreign Relations Newsletter, 14, No. 4 (1983), 9–28, and 15, No. 1 (1984), 8–19. See also “Background Books,” 56–57.Google Scholar

³ Rovere, Richard H., “The American Establishment,”Google Scholar in idem, The American Establishment and other reports, opinions and speculations (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 233–49Google Scholar, quotation from 238. See also Rovere's, later reassessment, “Postscript: A 1978 Commentary,” Wilson Quarterly, 2 (Summer 1978), 180–82.Google Scholar

⁴ Silk, Leonard and Silk, Mark, The American Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1980), esp. chs. 6–8, quotation from 184.Google Scholar

⁵ White, Theodore H., The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 65–69, quotation from 68.Google Scholar

⁶ Kraft, Joseph, Profiles in Power: A Washington Insight (New York: New American Library, 1966), esp. 187–92, quotation from 188.Google Scholar

⁷ May, Ernest R., American Imperialism: A. Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968), esp. 17–94, 198–230.Google Scholar Quotation from idem, “American Imperialism: A Reinterpretation,” Perspectives in American History, 1 (1967), 187.Google Scholar May's portrait of the influentials should be compared with those in Adler, Kenneth P. and Bobrow, David, “Interest and Influence in Foreign Affairs,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (1956), 89–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rosenau, James N., National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Cohen, Bernard C., The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), esp. 84–88, quotation from 84.Google Scholar

⁹ Divine, Robert A., Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967), esp. 6–28Google Scholar, quotations from 22–23. On the interwar internationalists, see also Adler, Selig, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth- Century Reaction (New York: Free Press, 1957), 113–17, 119–28, 132–33, 138–39, 148–50, 177–96Google Scholar; idem, The Uncertain Giant, 1921–1941: American foreign Policy Between the Wars (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 23, 25–28, 33–42Google Scholar; Osgood, Robert E., Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), 322–23.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Nicholas, H. G., The United States and Britain (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), 120–21.Google Scholar

¹¹ Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 128–29, quotation from 128.Google Scholar

¹² See, e.g., Sparks, Nelson, One Man – Wendell Willkie (New York: Raynor Publishing Company, 1943)Google Scholar; Schlafly, Phyllis, A Choice not an Echo (Alton, IL: Pere Marquette Press, 1964).Google Scholar On the division within the Republican party between the “isolationists” and “internationalists,” a split which seems to coincide with that between those Republicans who opposed intervention before Pearl Harbor and favoured an “Asia First” policy after the war and those who were interventionists prior to Pearl Harbor and subsequently supported a “Europe First” policy, see Caridi, Ronald J., The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), esp. 19–20, 126–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Evans, M. Stanton, The Liberal Establishment (New York: Devin-Adair, 1965)Google Scholar; Stormer, John A., None Dare Call It Treason (Florissant, MO: Liberty Bell Press, 1964), esp. 200–27Google Scholar; Viguerie, Richard A., The Establishment vs. the People: Is a New Populist Revolt on the Way? (Chicago: Regnery Gateway Inc., 1983). Indeed, even today the Republican Right harbours grave reservations as to the conservative bona fides of the Trilateralist and Yale-educated Bonesman George Bush, who openly admits his preference for foreign over domestic issues and his fundamental admiration for the foreign policy Establishment's achievements.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), esp. 274–75Google Scholar; also idem, “The Power Elite: Military, Economic, and Political,” in Problems of Power in American Democracy, ed. Kornhauser, Arthur (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959), 145–72, 175–83Google Scholar; idem, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” in Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of Mills, C. Wright, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 23–38.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hodgson, Godfrey, In Our Time: America from World War II to Nixon (London: Macmillan, 1977), esp. 111–33Google Scholar, quotations from 118 and 115. See also idem, “The Establishment,” Foreign Policy, 9 (1972–73), 3–40.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Barnet, Richard J., Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 48–75, 179–82Google Scholar, quotations from 48. Several other historians and social scientists have also commented from a rather more radical standpoint upon the extent to which a relatively small group of men from the great business institutions have dominated American foreign policymaking since World War II. See Mills, , The Power Elite, esp. 274–75Google Scholar; Domhoff, G. William, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 97–107Google Scholar; Kolko, Gabriel, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 16–26.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Donovan, John C., The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (New York: D. C. Heath, 1974), quotations from 21.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See, e.g., Williams, William Appleman, The Contours of American History (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1961)Google Scholar; idem, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. (New York: Dell, 1972)Google Scholar; Chomsky, Noam, American Power and the New Mandarins (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964)Google Scholar; Domhoff, G. William, Who Rules America?Google Scholar; idem, The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study in Class Cohesiveness (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)Google Scholar; idem, The Powers That Be: Process of Ruling Class Domination in America (New York: Random House, 1979)Google Scholar; Lasch, Christopher, “The Foreign Policy Elite and the War in Vietnam,”Google Scholar in idem, The World of Nations: Reflections on American History, Politics and Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 232–49Google Scholar; Gardner, Lloyd C., A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (London: Macmillan, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1980, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).Google Scholar

²⁰ Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). Two of Kennedy's strongest critics are Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy in the 1990s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). See also Kennedy's review of several such works, “Fin-de-Siècle America,” New York Review of Books, 28 June 1990, 51–40.

²¹ Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 86–87.Google Scholar

²² Destler, I. M., Gelb, Leslie H. and Lake, Anthony, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, revised and updated ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).Google Scholar

²³ See comments by Galbraith, Kissinger, and Ball on the dustjacket of the book's hardcover edition; Steel, Ronald, “Cohort of the American Century,” New York Times Book Review, 2 11 1986, 3, 40Google Scholar; Broder, David S., “NATO: What Comes After America's ‘Wise Men’?,” International Herald Tribune, 27–28 05 1989, 11.Google Scholar Some academic reviewers were far less appreciative of the subjects' supposed merits; see, e.g., Little, Douglas, “Crackpot Realists and Other Heroes: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Diplomatic Elite,” Diplomatic History, 13 (1989), 99–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Isaacson, Walter and Thomas, Evan, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).Google Scholar

²⁵ Recent years have seen the publication of biographical studies of Dean Rusk and such lesser-known but by no means insignificant Establishment men as Grenville Clark and Lewis W. Douglas, while works on McCloy, Acheson, and Harriman are in the pipeline. Most of these volumes made some reference to their subjects' status within the Establishment, though without sustained analysis of the concept. The flood of memoirs and autobiographies also continues unabated; while Acheson and Harriman had their say many years ago, only in the past two or three years did Nitze and Rusk take the plunge. Nitze's arms control efforts have been the subject of a separate major study, and two volumes by J. Garry Clifford concentrated upon Clark's efforts to revitalize American defenses before each world war. Schoenebaum, Thomas J., Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988)Google Scholar; Dunne, Gerald T., Grenville Clark: Public Citizen (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1986)Google Scholar; Browder, Robert Paul and Smith, Thomas C., Independent: A Biography of Lewis W. Douglas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986)Google Scholar; Nitze, Paul H., with Smith, Ann M. and Rearden, Steven L., From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision – A Memoir (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989)Google Scholar; Rusk, Dean, As I Saw It (New York: Viking, 1991)Google Scholar; Talbott, Strobe, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988)Google Scholar; Clifford, John Garry, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1020 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972)Google Scholar; idem and Spencer, Samuel R. Jr, The First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).Google Scholar

²⁶ The radical leftwing view of the Council on Foreign Relations is given at length in Shoup, Lawrence H. and Minter, William, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977)Google Scholar; cf. Sklar, Holly, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Government (Boston: Shankman, 1980).Google Scholar A representative example of works arguing the rightwing view is Smoot, Dan, The Invisible Government (Dallas: Dan Smoot Report, 1962).Google Scholar

²⁷ Schulzinger, Robert D., The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

²⁸ Hodgson, Godfrey, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson 1867–1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). I am greatly indebted to Mr. Hodgson for giving me a copy of this book when it proved impossible to obtain one in England.Google Scholar

²⁹ Holland, , “Citizen McCloy”; Alan Brinkley, “Minister Without Portfolio,” Harper's (02 1983), 32–46Google Scholar; Schwartz, Thomas Alan, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Reviewing Hodgson's biography of Stimson, Brinkley likewise commented: “Stimson's bequest [to the next generation of the foreign policy elite] included a certitude about the righteousness of American ideals and their suitability for other nations; a conviction that diplomacy must be insulated from popular and legislative whims (and hence from democracy); and a social and cultural elitism – born of his own rarefied station - that survived in foreign policy circles long after it had been repudiated by the rest of American society. But Stimson also brought to public life a personal integrity, a lack of self-interest and of hypocrisy, and a commitment to the ideal of public service that compensated for many of the shortcomings of his social and political vision.” Brinkley, , “The Good Old Days,” The New York Review of Books, 17 01 1991, 30.Google Scholar

³¹ The Anglophile Lewis Douglas, McCloy's brother-in-law and a former Ambassador to Great Britain, by then retired and living in Arizona, was one; the journalist Walter Lippmann, whose writings on foreign affairs from World War I onwards encapsulated much Establishment dogma, another. Browder, and Smith, , 396–99Google Scholar; Steel, Ronald, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), 577–84.Google Scholar

³² Dileo, David L., George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 211.Google Scholar

³³ See, e.g., Matks, Sally, “The World According to Washington,” Diplomatic History II (1987), 265–82Google Scholar; Christopher Thorne, “After the Europeans: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast Asia,” ibid., 12 (1988), 201–08; idem, “Diplomatic History: Some Further Reflections,” ibid., 14 (1990), 602–05; Robert J. McMahon, “The Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or International History?” ibid., 554–64; Michael H. Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History,” ibid., 15 (1991), 1–12.

³⁴ Bradford Perkins, D. Cameron Watt, and Michael Fry have all drawn attention to the manner in which certain British statesman and politicians, notably the liberal imperialists who had once surrounded Lord Milner and later congregated at Cliveden, and others who included Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Edward Grey, and Arthur Balfour, encouraged the United States to take a greater role in world affairs, and hoped for an Anglo-American alliance. According to Lord Bullock, in the post-World War II years the “worst” fear of Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, was of “a settlement between the USA and the USSR which Britain would be left to accept and the consequent withdrawal of American interest from Europe and the Mediterranean.” Perkins, Bradford, The Great Rapprochement: Britain and the United States, 1898–1914 (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 51–53, 65–67, 84–86Google Scholar; Watt, D. C., Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place 1900–197; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 24–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: Longmans, 1965), 19–52Google Scholar; Fry, Michael G., Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918–22 (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1972)Google Scholar; Roberts, Priscilla, “The American ‘Eastern Establishment’ and World War I: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy Tradition” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1981), 223–29, 385–89, 406–15, 501–09Google Scholar; Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (New York: Norton, 1983), 239.Google Scholar

³⁵ Schulzinger, , Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, 3–6Google Scholar; Hodgson, , 172–75Google Scholar; Schwartz, , 6–7, 302–03Google Scholar; Dileo, , 24–28.Google Scholar

³⁶ Charles Maier, “The Making of ‘Pax Americana,’” unpublished paper presented at a Diplomatic History Workshop, Harvard University, October 1988, cited in Schwartz, 392 n. 13; cf. idem, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; idem, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe,” American Historical Review, 86 (1981), 327–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Hogan, Michael J., The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1912 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also idem, “Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad,” Diplomatic History, 8 (1984), 287–310Google Scholar; Carew, Anthony, Labour under the Marshall Plan: The politics of productivity and the marketing of management science (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Burr, William, “Marshall Planners and the Politics of Empire: The United States and French Financial Policy, 1948,” Diplomatic History, 15 (1991), 495–522CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Ambrosius, Lloyd E., “Wilson, the Republicans, and French Security after World War I,” Journal of American History, 59 (1972), 341–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁸ See Buckingham, Peter H., International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the former Central Powers, 1921–29 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1983)Google Scholar; Cohen, Warren I., Empire Without Tears: America's Foreign ‘Relations, 1921–1933 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Costigliola, Frank C., Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Hogan, Michael J., Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Diplomacy, 1918–1928 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Kent, Bruce, The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918–1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Leffler, Melvyn P., The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979)Google Scholar; McDougall, Walter A., France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The East Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; McNeil, William C., American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Schuker, Stephen A., The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Daives Plan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Silverman, Dan P., Reconstructing Europe after the Great War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meter, Robert Hardin Van Jr, “The United States and European Recovery, 1918–1923: A Study of Public Policy and Private Finance” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971)Google Scholar; Wilson, Joan Hoff, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1971)Google Scholar. The literature on the 1920S is reviewed more fully in Jacobson, Jon, “Is There a New International History of the 1920S?”, American Historical Review, 88 (1983), 617–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McKercher, Brian, “Reaching for the Brass Ring: The Recent Historiography of Interwar America Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History, 15 (1991), 565–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ The literature on corporatism, and the studies which attempt to explore the concept or which employ it in their analysis of United States domestic and diplomatic history, is extensive and growing. For discussions, see McCormick, Thomas J., “Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History,” Reviews in American History, 10 (12 1982), 318–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gaddis, John L., “The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View,” Diplomatic History, 10 (1986), 357–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hogan, Michael J., “Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal,”Google Scholaribid., 10 (1986), 363–72; idem, “Corporatism,” Journal of American History, 77 (1990), 153–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ Many of the studies cited in the two previous notes, and also the works by the Radical Revisionists cited earlier in this essay, regard Establishment figures as essentially concerned with safeguarding and promoting the American capitalist system. The close connections which many such men have with big business interests has not unnaturally-led a number of scholars to adopt this interpretation. Dileo, for example, while not following this approach, gives an excellent description of Ball's ties to various multinational corporations, and of his belief that, as he wrote in a 1967 Fortune article, there are “few things more hopeful for the future than the growing determination of American business to regard national boundaries as no longer fixing the horizons of their corporate activity.” Dileo, 23–27, 208–10, quotation from 209.

⁴¹ van der Pijl, Kees, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴² Isaacson, and Thomas, , Wise Men, 480–504Google Scholar; Donovan, , Cold Warriors, 86–103Google Scholar; Wells, Samuel F., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC–68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security, 3 (1968), 116–58Google Scholar; Sanders, Jerry W., Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 23–50.Google Scholar

⁴³ Sanders, , 51–129.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Leffler, Melvyn P., “National Security”, Journal of American History, 77 (1990), 143–52, quotations from 149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁵ Idem, Preponderance of Power; idem, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48,” American Historical Review, 89 (1984), 346–81.Google Scholar See also Leffler's “Reply” to the “Comments” by John Lewis Gaddis and Bruce Kuniholm, all in ibid., 382–400.

⁴⁶ Larsen, Deborah Welch, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), quotation from 353.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 270–88Google Scholar, quotations from 270, 271, and 273; on Mahan, see also Seager, Robert II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, 1977)Google Scholar; Crowl, Philip A., “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Paret, Peter with the collaboration of Craig, Gordon A. and Gilbert, Felix (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444–77.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Pearlman, Michael, To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive Era (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984)Google Scholar, quotation from 6; cf. Clifford, Citizen Soldiers; Finnegan, John Patrick, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974).Google Scholar The same themes are also brought out in Chambers, John Whiteclay II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 1987), esp. 87–101.Google Scholar Studies of American nativism and the Americanization movement have already demonstrated that many preparedness supporters used the movement as a means of “Americanizing” immigrants, instructing them in what their teachers believed were basic American values. Higham, John, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925, 2nd ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 242–49Google Scholar; Kennedy, David M., Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 53–88.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Scott, James Brown, Robert Bacon: Life and Letters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924), 155Google Scholar; Nicolson, Harold, Dwight Morrow (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935), 66–67, 225–226Google Scholar; Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Koot, 2 vols (New York, 1938), 1, 218Google Scholar; Stimson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper, Dodd, Mead, 1948), 17.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Pearlman, , esp. 58–76Google Scholar; Aldrich, Nelson W., Old Money: The Mythology of America's Upper Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 169–82.Google Scholar On the turn–of-the-century cult of manliness and romanticized idealization of war in both Britain and the United States, see Adams, Michael C. C., The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Stromberg, Roland N., Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914 (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1982)Google Scholar; Eksteins, Modris, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Clifford, , 57, 68.Google Scholar

⁵² Clifford and Spencer, First Peacetime Draft. In his study of those Americans involved in the Century Group and Fight for Freedom who strongly supported American intervention prior to Pearl Harbor, Mark Lincoln Chadwin pointed out that the great majority of these individuals could plausibly be regarded as members of the Establishment. The Warhawks: American Interventionists Before Pearl Harbor (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), esp. 69–71.Google Scholar

⁵³ These might well be seen as the heirs of Theodore Roosevelt; it is also at least possible that they corresponded with those who had inherited money, rather than being self-made men, and so felt a corresponding need to prove themselves. It would include such figures as William J. Donovan and Allen W. Dulles, who took with such enthusiasm to clandestine operations overseas. Arguably and ironically the ultimate heirs of this tradition, intoxicated with force, eager for permanent military commitments, may well be such fervent anti-Communists as Colonel Oliver North.

⁵⁴ Griffith, Robert, “Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” American Historical Review, 87 (1982), 87–122CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Here one would find such individuals as McCloy and David K. Bruce, who in 1951 hoped that the American commitment to the NATO alliance would not last longer than a decade; or Lovett, who by the 1950S had grave reservations as to the wisdom of some of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations. Schwartz, , America's Germany, 218–19Google Scholar; Isaacson, and Thomas, , Wise Men, 574.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Thus although private bankers, primarily the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company, organized the loans which enabled the Allies to buy vast quantities of essential war supplies in the United States and so survive until American intervention in April 1917, the Wilson administration's decision to sanction such financial transactions was just as important in enabling the Allied government to continue the war. It is equally arguable that these loans, organized by bankers in many ways at the heart of the Establishment, were responsible for the American war trade which, in its turn, brought about the successive diplomatic crises with Germany and ultimately entangled the United States in war with Germany. On these loans and their significance, see Burk, Kathleen, Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914–1918 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 11–95Google Scholar; also Cooper, John Milton Jr, “The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915–1917,” Pacific Historical Review, 45 (1976), 209–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁶ In the 1950S Osgood pointed out that with almost no exceptions even those Americans most committed to American intervention before 1917 did not believe that Germany would win the war, and felt no real apprehensions that the United States itself was in danger. Osgood, , Ideals and Self-interest, chs. 6–12Google Scholar passim, esp. 205–22, 255–63. The case against the need for American intervention in World War II is made in Russett, Bruce M., No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Roberts, , “Eastern Establishment,’” esp. 161–68, 578–83.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Susman, Warren I., Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pantheon, 1984), esp. xx–xxiv, 41–42, 271–85.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See, e.g., references in Roberts, , 563, n. I.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Symptomatically, George Bush's assumption of the presidency generated a slew of approving articles pointing out the degree to which he embodied the Establishment's foreign policy tradition. See, e.g., Dionne, E. J. Jr, “Which Way Does the New Breeze Blow?,” New York Times, Pt. 4, I; Broder, “NATO.”Google Scholar

⁶¹ Judis, , “Twilight of the Gods,” 54–55.Google Scholar