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Border Enforcement and Firm Response in the Management of Invasive Species

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2015

Holly A. Ameden ,
Sean B. Cash  and
David Zilberman
Holly A. Ameden
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA
Sean B. Cash
Affiliation:
Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
David Zilberman
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA, and Giannini Foundation
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Abstract

This analysis presents a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement and evaluates both the intended and unintended effects under two enforcement regimes: destruction versus treatment of contaminated shipments. The results indicate that importers may respond to increased inspection by reducing shipments and decreasing due care. In response to increased pest populations, firms may reduce shipments and increase due care, indicating that an enforcement response may not be necessary. The analysis reveals the importance of the nature of the due-care technology, as well as the relationships underlying the probability of detection, in determining the effects of enforcement.

Keywords

border enforcementenvironmental regulationinvasive speciestrade and environmentF18L51Q17Q56Q58
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 39 , Issue s1 , October 2007 , pp. 35 - 46
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 2007

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