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Entrepreneurship, Sanctions, and Labor Contracting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2017

Leo C. Polopolus  and
Robert D. Emerson
Leo C. Polopolus
Affiliation:
Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida
Robert D. Emerson
Affiliation:
Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida
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Abstract

Entrepreneurs innovate their individual business organizations not only to deal with production and price risks, but also to cope with the risk of sanctions or penalties imposed by society's laws and regulations. More specifically, labor-intensive agricultural firms, faced with potentially large fines for violation of immigration and labor laws, increasingly modify the organization of their firms by shifting the management of routine seasonal labor jobs to independent farm labor contractors. The use of labor contracting is further intensified because of the effectiveness of labor contractors in the recruitment of illegal aliens.

Keywords

entrepreneurshipsanctionslabor contractingfarm laborharvest labor
Type
Invited Papers and Discussions
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , July 1991 , pp. 57 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 1991

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