¹ The extensive nature of the so-called amendments has given rise to a lively debate on whether a constitution of 39 articles could be amended with and replaced by a more elaborate and lengthy one of 69 articles or whether this is, in reality, a new constitution. See Kamto, M., “Révision constitutionelle ou écriture d'une nouvelle constitution” Lex Lata (1996) 23–24 17–20.Google Scholar

² See Spaeth, H. S., Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction, San Francisco, 1979, 13;Google Scholar and generally, Licht, R. A. (ed.), Is the Supreme Court the Guardian of the Constitution?, Washington, 1993.Google Scholar

³ I Crunch 137.

⁴ See Kamto op cit. n. 1.

⁵ See generally, Fombad, C. M., “The constitutional and legal framework of Cameroonian freedom of expression” forthcoming, and, generally, the same author in ‘Judicial power in Cameroon's amended constitution of 18 January1, 1996” (1996) Lesotho Law Journal 1–11.Google Scholar

⁶ See articles 14, 19 and 33 of the Federal Constitution of 1961 and, in general, Anyangwe, C., The Cameroon Judicial System, Yaounde, 1987, 137–139,Google Scholar and Enochong, H. N. A., Cameroon Constitutional Law: Federalism in a Mixed Common-Law and Civil-Law System, Yaounde, 1967, 223–234.Google Scholar

⁷ Article 34 of the Federal Constitution of 1961.

⁸ See further Anyangwe op. cit. n. 6 at 136–147.

⁹ This can be translated thus: “… a system characterised by many juridical brakes founded notably on a political control organ which is judge and party at the same time, an almost paralysed juridical control organ and a certain impregnability of the domain of laws and statutory rules which negatives respect for legality.” This is found in his article, “Vers un nouveau modele de controle de la constitutionalite des lois au Cameroun,” in Conac, G. (ed.), Les Corns Supremes en Afrique. Tome 2 La Jurisprudence, Paris, 1989, 46.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid, at 45–46. This can be translated thus “… the principle of justiciability which gives the constitution of every state the supremacy indispensable for its prevalence over the other legal norms and thus constitutes the indispensable base to democracy, does not appear to have found effective consecration in the Cameroonian political system; in particular, the ineffectiveness of the control of the constitutionality of laws …”

¹¹ The amended constitution deals with “judicial power” in part 5 and with the Constitutional Council separately in part 7.

¹² Brewer-Carias, A., Judicial Review in Comparative Law, Cambridge, 1989, 252.Google Scholar

¹³ See art. 51(1) of the amended constitution of 1972. Unless otherwise indicated, all similar references in this work should be taken to refer to the amended 1972 constitution.

¹⁴ See art. 51(2).

¹⁵ “Bureau” in this essay refers either to the members of parliament or the Senate elected to various posts of responsibilities and constituting some sort of executive of these bodies.

¹⁶ See article 33 of the unamended 1972 constitution.

¹⁷ See Abraham, H. A., The Judicial Process, 2nd ed, New York, 1968, 296.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid, at 296–297.

¹⁹ A president who is forced to resign in favour of a more acceptable person may still use his position as “ex-officio” member for life of the Constitutional Council to protect the new President and thus may perpetuate an unacceptable political philosophy.

²⁰ See Abraham, op. cit. n. 17 at 299.

²¹ See J. M. Breton and N. Makoundiz-Wolo, “L'organisation et le régime du contrôle de constitutionnalite en Republique Populaire du Congo de 1962 á 1986” in G. Conac (ed.), Tome II op. cit. 79.

²² Sec arts. 47(2), 48(2) and 48(3).

²³ A law of 21 April, 1983, amending the Congolese Constitution combines the French with the US and German systems and in principle makes the Congolese citizen one of the best protected in the world. See further Breton and Makoundzi-Wolo, op. cit. 79–80.

²⁴ It is doubtful if art. 65, which declares the preamble to be “part and parcel of the constitution”, actually adds anything. See further Kobilla, J. M., “Le préambule du texte constitutionelle du 18 Janvier, 1996: De L'enseignc decorative a I'etalage utilitaire” (1996) 23–24Lex Lata, 33–38.Google Scholar

²⁵ This is probably inspired by the reform initiated in 1974 in France by the then-president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Sec further Vede, G. “Le Conseil Constitutional Francais et sa Jurisprudence”, in Conac, G. (ed.), Les Corns Suprêmes en Afrique, Tome I, Organisation, Finalilés, Procedure, Paris, 1988, 38.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid. at. 39.

²⁷ See art. 15(4).

²⁸ See arts. 16(2) (a) and 21(2).

²⁹ See generally, F. Moderne, “Les jurisdictions constitutionelles en Afrique” in G. Conac (ed.). Tome II op. cit. 3–43.

³⁰ Ibid, at 27–37.

³¹ See generally, Brewer-Carias, op. cit. 251–260 and Gappetteti, M., Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, Indianapolis, 1971, 1–6.Google Scholar

³² See arts. 31 and 47(3).

³³ See arts. 25 and 27.

³⁴ See Cappelletti, op. cit.

³⁵ See by contrast the evolution of the French Constitutional Council in Brewer-Carias, op. cit., 259–260.

³⁶ For challenges in respect of the regularity of a referendum, see art. 48(3).

³⁷ See Spaeth, op. cit. 22.

³⁸ See art. 49.

³⁹ See Abraham, op. cit. 297.

⁴⁰ See Breton and Makoundzi-Wolo, op. cit. 93.

⁴¹ In Conac (ed.), Tome 1, op. cit. 34.

⁴² Cited by Abraham, op. cit. 297.

⁴³ See Pickles, William, The French Constitution, London, 1960, 30.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Abraham, op. cit. 299.

⁴⁵ See generally, Brewer-Carias, op. cit. 260.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ See generally Gerard Conac, “Le juge constitutionnel en Afrique censeur ou pedagogue”, in Conac (ed.), op. cit. Tome II.

⁴⁹ See Moderne in Conac (ed.), Ibid. 22–23.

⁵⁰ See Gyimah-Boadi, E., “Ghana's uncertain political opening”, (1994) 5 Journal of Democracy 80–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵¹ See the examples cited by Konlchou-Kuomegni, op. cit. 54–33.

⁵² Ibid, at 62–63.