No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
The most common consumer complaint in Ghana now is that prices of consumer goods are too dear. It is common knowledge that prices of basic goods change almost every month. Life in Ghana shows that price control has been one of the difficult problems that successive governments have faced since the termination of colonial rule.
The primary intention of this article is to present a descriptive account of price control legislation in Ghana, in the hope that it will interest as well as be informative to the reader.
1 No 25.
2 For a detailed historical account see Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960 (Oxford, 1970) pp. 60–67Google Scholar.
3 Date-Bah, S. K. “Legislative Control of Freedom ofContract” in Essays in Ghanaian Law p. 118, at p. 122Google Scholar. See also Boahen, Adu, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London, Longman, 1975), Chapter 3, passimGoogle Scholar.
4 The rationale behind this policy was that the import elasticity of marginal increases in the income of Ghana was rising. “Thus, for instance, between 1954 and 1961, the volume of imports rose by 88 per cent or by over 8½ per cent per annum as against the average growth rate of the economy at 5–5½ per cent per annum”. Ghana, , Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963/64 to 1969/1970 (Ministry of Information) p. 219Google Scholar.
5 See 45 Economic Quarterly for Ghana and Nigeria, 08 1964, p. 6Google Scholar. In his Christmas broadcast to the nation on 24 December, 1964, the late Dr. Nkrumah accounted for the shortages of consumer goods thus: “First period in industrialisation is always marked by shortages of consumer goods because a greater proportion of our financial resources are being used to set up the factories which will produce the consumer goods to be used at a later time.” However, although the factories were established, the nation has, since then no-where near met her consumer requirements.
6 Parliamentary Debates (First Series), Vol. 26 ( 12th 02. 1962) Column 300–301Google Scholar.
7 No. 113.
8 S.2(1)(a).
9 S.2(1)(b).
10 S. 7(2)(b).
11 S. 7(2)(d).
12 S. 3(2)(a)–(c).
13 The Report noted that “The voluntary price inspectors are possibly the more dishonest breed. … Some price inspectors are themselves in the habit of buying from sellers at controlled prices and reselling presumably at a profit to others. … The corruption of price inspectors has naturally imparted an upward spiral to consumer prices, for the traders who are bent on profiteering simply pass on to the consumer overheads represented by payments to the price inspectors …” (Emphasis added). See paragraphs 323 to 327 of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malpractices in Ghana, 1965Google Scholar.
14 Daily Graphic, 5 01, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.
15 Ibid.
16 Daily Graphic, 6 01, 1965.Google ScholarPubMed
17 Daily Graphic, 15 01, 1965Google ScholarPubMed.
18 No. 298.
19 S. 4A(5).
20 S. 4A(6).
21 N.L.C.D. 95.
22 Daily Graphic, 12 and 30 03, 1966Google ScholarPubMed.
23
Source: External Trade: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969.
24 This figure was given in a broadcast to the nation by the then Prime Minister, DrBusia, , on 27 12, 1971Google Scholar.
25 Daily Graphic, 30 01, 1972Google ScholarPubMed.
26 The debts that were the subject of these settlements had been contracted under the Nkrumah regime in respect of contractor-financed projects which were generally believed to have been inflated in cost through corrupt deals for the projects. See Damachi, , (ed). Development Paths in Africa and China (International Institute of Labour Studies, Genera 1976) p. 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Indeed, Government issued a statement on 5 April. 1972, to that effect. See Daily Graphic, 6 04, 1972Google ScholarPubMed.
28 Daily Graphic issues of 2, 5 and 29 02, 1972Google ScholarPubMed.
29 N.R.C.D. 17.
30 See s. 11(1) and (2)(a)–(d)(i)–(ii).
31 For instance, on 14 Feburary, 1972, a Ho Magistrate Court imposed a total fine of ¢ 300·00 or in default two months imprisonment on a man who sold a cutlass at 85 pesewas instead of 65 pesewas. On the same day, the Court imposed a fine of ¢ 50 or in default 6 month's imprisonment on a woman trader who sold a tin of similac for ¢ 1·10 instead of 86 pesewas. A trader who sold 2 tins of milk for 48 pesewas instead of 44 pesewas was fined ¢ 15·00 or in default 1 month imprinsonment. On 15 Feburary, 1972, a trader was fined ¢ 40·00 or three months imprisonment in default by a Tamale Magistrate Court for selling a medium size of Omo for 27 pesewas instead of 23 pesewas. Daily Graphic, 16 02, 1972Google ScholarPubMed.
32 Daily Graphic, 8 04, 1972Google ScholarPubMed.
33 By the Price Control (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D., 39)Google Scholar. The Decree also contained other economic offences such as stealing cocoa, diamond, gold, motor vehicle, underground telephone cable, or any telephone wire attached to or connected with a telephone or telegraph pole, or any electricity cable or wire owned by the Government or a statutory corporation, and so on. Indeed, a large number of the specified offences were purely economic crimes as can be evinced by the provisions of section 1 of the Subversion Decree, 1972.
34 N.R.C.D. 119.
35 L.I. 805.
36 Reg. 1(2).
37 Date-Bah, op. cit., p. 125Google Scholar.
38 N.R.C.D. 305.
39 Section 3(1) and (2).
40 For a judicial decision on this question see Watara, v.The Republic (1974) 2 G.L.R. 24Google Scholar.
41 S.M.C.D. 17.
42 The goods included sugar, milk, mackerel, baby foods, dry cell batteries, key soap, Omo, tooth paste etc.
43 C/C 130/78.
44 C/C 192/78.
45 C/C 301/79.
46 See, Oguaye, Mike, Politics in Ghana 1972–1979 (Tornado Publications, 1980) chapter 1, passimGoogle Scholar.
47 One exception has been the passage of the Control of Prices (Display of Price List and Markings of Prices) (Amendment) Regulations, 1982 (L. I. 1268)Google Scholar.
48 Now known as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (C.D.R.).
49 See People's Daily Graphic, 29 March, 1983 and 22 07, 1983Google Scholar.
50 Such as those imposed by the Price Control Tribunals. For instance, for making an illegal profit of ¢ 80, a trader could be fined ¢ 50,000 or more.
51 It is thought that this relaxation is one of the conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund.