^{page 152 note 1} See, Report of the commission appointed to enquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them, presented to Parliament, July 1958; Odumosu, The Nigerian constitution, 1963, pp. 240–4.

^{page 152 note 2} Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, i960 (Second Schedule), hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”.

^{page 152 note 3} For a penetrating analysis of these conflicting philgsoghies as they relate to the task of judicial review, see Black, i960, The people anaihe court: judicial review in a democracy.

^{page 152 note 4} This phrase describes the apparent contradiction between the “restrained” position assumed by HOLMES, J., in cases where the United States Supreme Court was required to review governmental regulation of an economic nature, and his “active” oversight of governmental restrictions of the political and civil rights of the individual. See generally, Konefsky, 1956, The legacy of Holmes and Brandeis.

^{page 153 note 1} A full history of this doctrine, as seen from the point of view of its sharpest critic, is found in the concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Kovacs v. Cooper (1949). 336 U.S. 77, 93 L.Ed. 513.

^{page 153 note 2} Sections 18 (inhuman treatment), 19 (slavery and forced labour), and 30 (compulsory acquisition of property).

^{page 153 note 3} Sections 17 (deprivation of life), 20 (deprivation of personal liberty), 21 (determination of rights), and 27 (freedom from discrimination).

^{page 153 note 4} Section 21.

^{page 153 note 5} Sections 22 (private and family life), 23 (freedom of conscience), 24 (freedom of expression), 25 (peaceful assembly and association), 26 (freedom of movement), and 27 (freedom from discrimination).

^{page 153 note 6} Section 24.

^{page 154 note 1} Also within this category are cases arising out of legislation enacted to deal with a “period of emergency”, which restricts the rights guaranteed to the individual by sections 17, 20, 27, and 30. Under section 28 such restriction is permissible if it is “… reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period of emergency.”

^{page 154 note 2} [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 400 (High Court, Western Region).

^{page 154 note 3} Ibid., at p. 402.

^{page 155 note 1} [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 423 (High Court, Eastern Region).

^{page 155 note 2} Ibid., at p. 426.

^{page 155 note 3} But see Shempfe v. Commissioner of Police, [1962] N.N.L.R. 87 (High Court, Northern Region). There are factual differences between these cases which appear to make them distinguishable. No mention was made in Shempfe of the decision in Gokpa; undoubtedly the latter case had not yet been reported.

^{page 155 note 4} [1962] N.N.L.R. 29 (High Court, Northern Region).

^{page 156 note 1} The reported judgment of the court refers to this section. Under the Criminal Procedure Code Law, i960, N.R. Law No. 20 of i960, the appropriate section would appear to be section 191.

^{page 156 note 2} [1960] N.R.N.L.R. 42.

^{page 156 note 3} [1962] N.N.L.R., at p. 33.

^{page 156 note 4} Criminal Procedure Code Law, i960, N.R. Law No. 20 of i960, s. 382.

^{page 157 note 1} Cap. 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958 Revision).

^{page 157 note 2} See D.P.P. v. Obi, [1961] I All N.L.R. 182 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 157 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 157 note 4} Ibid. See Wallace-Johnson v. R. (1938), 5 W.A.C.A. 56, the case involving a similar ordinance in the Gold Coast in which this proposition was first announced.

^{page 157 note 5} [1961] I All N.L.R. 182 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 158 note 1} Ibid., at p. 196.

^{page 158 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 158 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 158 note 4} Ibid., at p. 197.

^{page 158 note 5} “In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit of their interference with legislative judgment can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their own way of thinking but for all, and that the majorityof the elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.” (1952), S.C.R. 597.

^{page 158 note 6} (1904), 194 U.S. 267, 48 L.Ed. 971.

^{page 159 note 1} [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 199 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 159 note 2} II Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, cap. 42 (1958).

^{page 159 note 3} [1961] 1 All N.L.R., at p. 203.

^{page 159 note 4} N.R. No. 28 of 1958, ss. 33–5.

^{page 159 note 5} [1960] N.R.N.L.R. 24 (High Court, Northern Region).

^{page 159 note 6} Ibid., at p. 26.

^{page 159 note 7} See p. 158, n. 5, ante.

^{page 160 note 1} [1960] N.R.N.L.R., at p. 28.

^{page 160 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 160 note 3} Basu, Commentary on the constitution of India (3rd. edn.), Vol. I.

^{page 160 note 4} [1960] N.R.N.L.R., at p. 29.

^{page 161 note 1} [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 269 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 161 note 2} Ibid., at p. 271.

^{page 161 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 161 note 4} Ibid., at p. 273.

^{page 161 note 5} Dwarkadas v. Sholapwr Spinning Co. (1954), S.C.A. 132 and A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 119; Crouch v. The Commonwealth (1948), 77 C.L.R. 339.

^{page 161 note 6} (1923) 262 U.S. 447, 67 L.Ed. 1078.

^{page 161 note 7} (1947) 330 U.S. 75, 91 L.Ed. 754.

^{page 161 note 8} [1961] 1 All N.L.R., at p. 274.

^{page 162 note 1} (1962), F.S.C. 166/1962 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 162 note 2} ibid.

^{page 162 note 3} [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 371, [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 65 (High Court, Northern Region).

^{page 162 note 4} Ex-Native Office Holders (Mallam Mohammed Arzika, Ex- District Head of Arewa Gabas) Removal Order, i960 (N.R.L.N. 76/1960).

^{page 163 note 1} Cap. 48 (1948 ed.), s. 2(1).

^{page 163 note 2} [1961] 1 All N.L.R., at p. 382, [1961] N.R.N.L.R., at p. 67.

^{page 163 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 164 note 1} [1961] All N.L.R. 277 (Federal Supreme Court).

^{page 164 note 2} Ibid., at p. 280.

^{page 164 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 164 note 4} Compare the decision of the court in this case with that of the United States Supreme Court in Two-Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley (1961), 366 U.S. 582, 6 L.Ed.2d. 551.

^{page 165 note 1} (1938), 304 U.S. 144, 82 L.Ed. 1234.

^{page 165 note 2} Ibid., at pp. 152, 1241, n. 4.

^{page 165 note 3} Ibid., at pp. 153, 1242, n. 4.

^{page 165 note 4} E.g., West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 87 L.Ed. 1628.

^{page 165 note 5} (1945), 323 U.S. 624, 89 L.Ed. 430.

^{page 165 note 6} Ibid., at pp. 529, 440.

^{page 165 note 7} (1904), 194 U.S. 267, 48 L.Ed. 971.

^{page 166 note 1} Schenck v. U.S. (1919), 249 U.S. pp. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. pp. 470, 473–4.

^{page 166 note 2} (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 63 L.Ed. 1173.

^{page 166 note 3} Ibid., at pp. 630–1, 1180 (italics added).

^{page 167 note 1} Perhaps this criticism should be qualified. In the United States most judges are served by at least one law clerk who is a qualified lawyer and whose task it is to assist the judge in determining what the law is on any given matter. Thus the judge does not rely exclusively on counsel to present all the relevant authorities to him. Under the English approach the court must rely solely on the authorities cited to it by counsel. Therefore, if counsel for one party has inadequately researched his side of the case, a judge may render a decision and write a judgment in complete ignorance of relevant authority. If this approach accounts for the way in which foreign cases have been used, it is an indictment, not of the judges, but of the system within which they operate.

^{page 167 note 2} de Smith, “Fundamental Rights in the Commonwealth” (1961) 10 I.C. L.Q. 83, 215, at pp. 222–3.

^{page 167 note 3} Sections 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.

^{page 167 note 4} Section 28.

^{page 168 note 1} [1960] N.R.N.L.R. at p. 28.

^{page 168 note 2} Ibid., at p. 29.

^{page 168 note 3} (1962), F.S.C. 166/1962.

^{page 169 note 1} Brett, “The role of the judiciary in a federal constitution with particular reference to Nigeria.” Constitutional problems of federalism in Nigeria, 1960, p. 21.

^{page 169 note 2} But see Doherty v. Balewa (1961), F.S.C. 326/1961, in which the Federal Supreme Court held substantial parts of the Commissions and Tribunals of Inquiry Act, 1961, to be unconstitutional on the ground, inter alia, that some of its provisions encroached upon certain Fundamental Rights sections of the Constitution. (The judgment of the Privy Council on appeal from this decision is summarized at pp. 193–4, post.)

^{page 169 note 3} [1961] 1 All N.L.R., at p. 196.

^{page 170 note 1} Holland, “Human rights in Nigeria”, (1962) Current Legal Problems, pp. 145, 154.

^{page 170 note 2} [1961] I All N.L.R. at p. 196.

^{page 170 note 3} [1961] I All N.L.R. at p. 203.

^{page 170 note 4} Terminello v. Chicago (1949), 337 U.S. 1, 4, 93 L.Ed. 1131, 1134.

^{page 171 note 5} Jennings, The approach to self-government, 1958, 110.