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Reforming the Purposes of Sentencing to Affirm African Values in Namibia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2019

Ndjodi Ndeunyema
Ndjodi Ndeunyema*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

This article considers the current sentencing purposes in Namibia. It discusses the legislator's failure to articulate these purposes, leaving this to the judiciary, and identifies the dangers that arise from this legislative lacuna. It establishes that current sentencing purposes are fundamentally premised upon a retributivist philosophy, transplanted into Namibia during the colonial period. The article thus advocates for sentencing reform, aimed at restoring a paradigm based on African values. It does so by analysing African indigenous justice systems, using Ubuntu as an Afrocentric value. The article establishes how Ubuntu is contemporarily mirrored by restorative notions of justice that prioritize victims, offenders and the community, thereby asserting sentencing purposes that promote reconciliation, reparation and offender re-integration. In juxtaposing this with other sentencing purposes, the article critiques comparable jurisdictions that have recently incorporated restorative justice and proposes a set of draft sentencing purposes in the appendix.

Keywords

Afrocentricityrestorative justiceretributionsentencingUbuntu
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of African Law , Volume 63 , Issue 3 , October 2019 , pp. 329 - 357
Copyright
Copyright © SOAS, University of London 2019 

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Footnotes

*

DPhil in law candidate, University of Oxford. This article is based on the author's dissertation submitted in the partial fulfilment of the requirements of the MSc in criminology and criminal justice at the University of Oxford. The dissertation was subsequently shortlisted in the top ten UK masters dissertations for the John Sunley Prize to celebrate impact and excellence in post-graduate research into penal issues in the UK. The author is grateful to Professor Liora Lazarus, who supervised the earlier dissertation and provided careful guidance, and Professor Julian Roberts for invaluable input to develop this article. The author also thanks Professor Sandra Fredman and members of the Oxford Human Rights Research Group for their feedback on earlier drafts.

References

1 The laws and academic commentary on the issue of sentencing (for example the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, Act No 51 of 1977) employ the terms “sentencing” and “punishment” interchangeably. While a distinction can be made, for the purposes of this article, sentencing and punishment are employed as synonyms.

2 Easton, S and Piper, C Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (3rd ed, 2012, Oxford University Press) at 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

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9 Roberts and Von Hirsch “Legislating the purposes”, above at note 7 at 50.

10 Ibid.

11 Mapaure, C, Ndeunyema, N, Masake, H, Weyulu, F and Shaparara, L The Law of Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure in Namibia (2014, University of Namibia Press) at 77–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 The Act, sec 343.

13 The Constitution, preamble and art 23.

14 Terblanche, S “Sentencing in Namibia: The main changes since independence” (2013) 26/1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 21 at 22Google Scholar.

15 The Stock Theft Amendment Act, 2004. See Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330 (HC); Kamahere v Namibia 2016 (4) NR 919 (SC); S v Gaingob 2018 (1) NR 211 (SC).

16 The Constitution, art 66.

17 For an extensive exposition of the Act's history, see Mapaure et al The Law of Pre-Trial, above at note 11 at 1–15.

18 This includes customary law, given customary law's recognition as being on a par with common law. See the Constitution, art 66.

19 Death sentences are unconstitutional: id, art 6.

20 Whipping was declared unconstitutional in Ex Parte Attorney-General: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 NR 178 (SC).

21 In respect of pre-constitutionalism, see: R v Swanepoel 1945 AD 444; S v Khumalo 1984 (3) SA 327 (A). In respect of post-constitutionalism, see: S v Tcoeib 1992 NR 198 (HC). See also Daniel, above at note 15; Kamahere, above at note 15.

22 S v Orina [2011] NAHC 137 (20 May 2011), para 2 (unreported decision of the Namibian High Court).

23 Ashworth, A and Roberts, J “Sentencing: Theory, principle, and practice” in Maguire, M, Morgan, R and Reiner, R (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (5th ed, 2012, Oxford University Press) 886 at 867Google Scholar.

24 Ibid.

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29 Prosecutor General v Daniel and Others (SA 15/2011) [2012] NASC (28 July 2017).

30 Roberts and Von Hirsch ”Legislating the purposes”, above at note 7 at 75. House arrest is, however, not in use in Namibia.

31 The Constitution, arts 6 and 8.

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37 Gaingob, above at note 15, para 80.

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40 Act No 9 of 2012.

41 Id, sec 3(c) provides: “The functions of the Correctional Service are … as far as practicable, to apply such rehabilitation programmes and other meaningful and constructive activities to sentenced offenders that contribute to their rehabilitation and successful reintegration into [sic] community as law abiding citizens.”

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47 Ibid.

48 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 “World prison brief: Namibia”, available at: <https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/namibia> (last accessed 17 September 2019).

52 Office of the Ombudsman Human Rights Baseline Study Report in Namibia (2013, University of Namibia) at 102.

53 Ibid. US Department of State Namibia 2014 Human Rights Report, available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/236600.pdf> (last accessed 29 August 2019).

54 Ashworth Sentencing, above at note 27 at 99.

55 Dror, Y “Values and the law” (1957) 17/4 Antioch Review 440CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Elias, T The Nature of African Customary Law (1954, Manchester University Press)Google Scholar.

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59 In re Corporal Punishment, above at note 20, para 2.

60 African Charter, art 17(3).

61 The Constitution, preamble.

62 Id, art 21(1)(c) provides for the right to the freedom to practise any religion and to manifest such practice.

63 Id, art 66(1).

64 Kuwali, D “Decoding Afrocentrism: Decolonizing legal theory” in Onazi, O (ed) African Legal Theory and Contemporary Problems (2014, Springer) 71 at 72Google Scholar.

65 The Constitution, art 140.

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69 Hoebe, E The Law of Primitive Man (1954, Harvard University Press)Google Scholar. Philosophers have long propelled this myth of Africa. George Hegel, for instance, is quoted as having held the view that: “Africa is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit … Egypt … does not belong to the African Spirit”: T Obenga “Egypt: Ancient history of African philosophy” in K Wiredu A Companion to African Philosophy (2004, Blackwell Publishing Ltd) 31 at 33.

70 Mapaure “Reinvigorating African values”, above at note 68 at 149.

71 Elias, O The Nature of African Customary Law (1956, Manchester University Press) at 260Google Scholar.

72 African Charter, art 5; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, art 1.

73 Ongyango, P African Customary Law (2013, Law Africa Publishers)Google Scholar.

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75 Id at 73.

76 Id at 75.

77 Ibid.

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85 Ongyango African Customary Law, above at note 73 at 153–57.

86 Mapaure “Reinvigorating African values”, above at note 68 at 152.

87 “Since time immemorial” is the formula used in the traditional context to ascertain legitimacy in an African traditional context: Hinz “Traditional governance”, above at note 80 at 59.

88 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 75; Kamwangamalu “Ubuntu in South Africa”, above at note 78 at 26.

89 Ibid.

90 DW Nabudere “Ubuntu philosophy: Memory and reconciliation” (2005) at 1, available at: <http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4521/3621.pdf?...1> (last accessed 29 August 2019). See also Gade, C “Restorative justice and the South African Truth and Reconciliation process” (2013) 32/1 South African Journal of Philosophy 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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92 Bennet, T “Ubuntu: An African equity” (2011) 14/4 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 30 at 35Google Scholar.

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94 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), para 308.

95 Id, para 224.

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98 Nabudere “Ubuntu philosophy”, above at note 90 at 2.

99 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 75.

100 Namibia is one of the 54 member states of the African Union, which was established in 2002 through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, thereby replacing its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, which had been established in 1963.

101 African Charter, preamble, arts 17 and 27. See also Viljoen, F International Human Rights Law in Africa (2nd ed, 2012, Oxford University Press)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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103 Id at 65.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Cited in Walgrave, L “Restorative justice: An alternative for responding to crime?” in Shoham, S, Beck, O and Kett, M The International Handbook of Penology and Criminal Justice (2008, CRC Press) 613 at 615Google Scholar.

107 Amadi, E Ethics in Nigerian Culture (1982, Heinemann) at 18Google Scholar; Braithwaite, J “Restorative justice: Assessing optimistic and pessimistic accounts” (1999) 25 Crime and Justice 1 at 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, it is notable that Daly disputes this as a “mythical, extraordinary claim”: Daly, K “Restorative justice: The real story” 2002 4/1 Punishment and Society 55 at 62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74.

109 Menkel-Meadow, C “Restorative justice: What is it and does it work?” (2007) 3 Annual Review Law Social Science 10 at 10.1–10.27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110 Walgrave “Restorative justice”, above at note 106 at 621.

111 Above at note at 48.

112 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 75.

113 Ibid.

114 Id at 77.

115 Daly “Restorative justice”, above at note 107 at 62.

116 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 77.

117 Ibid.

118 Faris “African customary law”, above at note 83 at 181–82.

119 Elias The Nature, above at note 71 at 176–77.

120 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 79.

121 Id at 78.

122 Braithwaite, J Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989, Cambridge University Press) at 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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124 Id at 97.

125 Id at 178.

126 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 80.

127 Desmond Tutu rather simplistically dichotomizes African and western criminal justice by stating that “western justice is largely retributive. The African understanding is far more restorative - not so much to punish as to redress or restore a balance that has been knocked askew”: Clamp, K and Doak, J “More than words: Restorative justice concepts in transitional setting” (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 339 at 341CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, Daly and others extensively criticize this binary reductionism as mythical, arguing that proponents “seem to assume that an ideal justice system should be of one type only that it should be pure and not contaminated by or mixed with others”: Daly “Restorative justice”, above at note 107 at 62.

128 Elias The Nature, above at note 71 at 287.

129 Id at 262.

130 Braithwaite Crime, Shame, above at note 122 at 178.

131 Kuwali “Decoding Afrocentrism”, above at note 64 at 82.

132 Elias The Nature, above at note 71 at 262.

133 Walgrave “Restorative justice”, above at note 106 at 645.

134 Daly, K “Revisiting the relationship between retributive and restorative justice” in Strang, H and Braithwaite, J (eds) Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (2000, Ashgate) 33 at 40Google Scholar.

135 Ibid.

136 Cited in G Johnstone “Restorative justice: A form of punishment?” in Von Hirsch, Ashworth and Roberts Principled Sentencing, above at note 8, 198 at 209.

137 Ibid.

138 Elechi et al “Restoring justice”, above at note 74 at 80.

139 Ibid.

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141 Id at 491.

142 Lazarus Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights, above at note 42 at 3.

143 S Terblanche The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2016, Lexis-Nexis).

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147 Roberts, J “An analysis of the statutory statement of the purposes and principles of sentencing in New Zealand” (2003) 36/3 Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 254Google Scholar.

148 Id at 255.

149 Ibid.

150 Similar sentencing purposes exist under sec 7(1) of the Capital Territory Crimes (Sentencing) Act, 2005 (Australia).

151 Roberts “An analysis of the statutory statement”, above at note 147 at 267.

152 Id at 257. Sec 8 of the Sentencing Act also contains ten principles of sentencing.

153 On the application of restorative justice, see for example: R v Martin (2017) NZHC 1571 (7 July 2017), para 16; Solicitor-General v Heta [2018] NZHC 2453, para 19.

154 Sec 25.

155 Roberts “An analysis of the statutory statement”, above at note 147 at 257.

156 As amended by Sentencing Amendment Act, 2007, sec 7.

157 Young, W and King, A “Sentencing practice and guidance in New Zealand” (2010) 22/4 Federal Sentencing Reporter 256CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 See text to note 151 above.

159 Roberts “An analysis of the statutory statement”, above at note 147 at 249.

160 Roberts, J, Crutcher, N and Verbrugge, P “Public attitudes to sentencing in Canada: Exploring recent findings” (2007) 49/1 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 75 at 81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

161 Interestingly, sec 718(2)(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code introduces a “remedial provision designed to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing”. See R v Ipeelee [2012] 1 SCR 433; R v Gladue [1999] 1 SCR 688.

162 Roberts et al “Public attitudes to sentencing”, above at note 160 at 82.

163 Ibid.

164 Id at 97.

165 du Pisani, A, Kossler, R and Lindeke, W (eds) The Long Aftermath of War: Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia (2010, ArnoldBergstraesser-Institut)Google Scholar.

166 Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice, above at note 27 at 78.

167 In addition to New Zealand and Canada, the proposal borrows from sentencing reforms in England and Wales and Israel. Israeli reforms are reflected in the Penal Law (Amendment No 113) (2012) 2337 LSI 170, which is reproduced and translated into English in Roberts, J and Gazal-Ayal, O “Sentencing reform in Israel: An analysis of the statutory reforms of 2012” (2013) 46/3 Israel Law Review 479CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

168 Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice, above at note 27 at 78.