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A Legislative Proposal for Public Participation in Oil and Gas Decision-Making in Nigeria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2010

Abstract

Nigeria is on the verge of comprehensively reviewing its oil and gas laws. The review is aimed at, among other things, addressing the conflicts associated with the management of the resources and, especially, the affect on the people of the oil producing region of the country who have been vigorously protesting about their alienation from the resources. Drawing on the international law of public participation in natural resource management, this article seeks to develop a viable legislative framework for public participation in oil and gas decision-making that Nigeria can adopt. A viable legislative framework must take into account the various factors that shape the effectiveness of participation and the elements that promote the objectives of participation. It is premised on the ground that looking to international prescriptions might help to elucidate gaps in domestic laws, as well as alternatives to overcome them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 2010

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References

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13 Note that the term participation is often used interchangeably with other terms like “public consultation”, “local community involvement”, “indigenous peoples' consultation”, “multi-stakeholder participation”, etc. But the term most commonly used in international instruments and in the literature is “public participation”. All the terms are used interchangeably in this article. Although the term “consultation” has a more technical meaning than “participation”, no such meaning is intended here.

14 25 June 1998, UN doc ECE/CEP/43 (1998).

15 27 June 1989, 72 ILO Official Bulletin 59, 48 ILM 1389 (1989).

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33 Land Use Decree, sec 1.

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42 Omorogbe “The legal framework for public participation”, above at note 38 at 560.

43 See N Tattersall “Nigeria oil rebels reject Niger Delta summit” (17 June 2008) Reuters, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL17190258> (last accessed 27 July 2009); S Adebayo “N'Delta: FG tips Kofi Annan to chair summit” (20 April 2008) Punch, available at: <http://www.e-punch.com> (last accessed 20 April 2008); S Adebayo, “Niger Delta summit: Nigeria asks UN for Gambari” (26 April 2008) Punch, available at: <http://www.e-punch.com> (last accessed 26 April 2008).

44 GA res 37/7 (annex), UN GAOR, 37th sess, supp no 51 at 17, UN doc A/37/51 (1982), 22 ILM 455 (1983), arts 16 and 23.

45 25 February 1991, 30 ILM 800 (1991), arts 2(6) and 4(2).

46 13 June 1992: UN doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol 1) (1992), 13 ILM 874 (1992), principle 10.

47 5 June 1992: 1760 UNTS 79, 31 ILM 818 (1992).

48 See the preamble to chap 23 of Agenda 21, approved by the UN Conference on Environment and Development on 13 June 1992: UN doc A/CONF.151/26 (vols I–III) (1992).

49 C Campbell-Mohn “The human dimension in twenty-first century energy and natural resources development: The new law of ‘public rights’ in private development in the United States” in Zillman et al (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource Development, above at note 38, 233 at 233, noting that “[i]n the tapestry of laws that govern energy and natural resources in the United States, public participation is the warp – the string that supports and gives it its shape.”

50 Aarhus Convention, art 6(1)(a).

51 Id, art 6(1)(b). The term “proposed activity” is not defined in the convention; therefore parties have discretion to determine the relevant activity. However, they are bound by the rules and principles of international environmental law and, where relevant, European Community environmental law: Rodenhoff, VThe Aarhus Convention and its implications for the ‘institutions’ of the European Community” (2002) 11/3Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 343 at 347CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Aarhus Convention, art 7.

53 Id, art 8.

54 Comm filed by the Centre for Regional Development/Transparency International Armenia and Sakharov Armenia Botanical Society (all Armenian NGOs) against Armenia: comm ACCC/C/2004/08.

55 Comm filed by Ecopravo-Lviv against Ukraine: comm ACCC/C/2004/03.

56 ILO Convention 169, art 15(2). Under art 13(2), the concept of indigenous lands is deemed to cover “the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use”. In other words, “lands” includes territories.

57 Id, art 6(1)(a).

58 Report of the committee set up to examine the representation by the Central Unitary Workers' Union (CUT) alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (no 169), made under art 24 of the ILO Constitution: ILO doc GB.282/14/2 (21 November 2001) (Colombia Report). The report decried lack of consultation in three situations: the passage of a law governing consultation with indigenous peoples; the construction of a highway through indigenous lands; and the granting of permission for oil exploration in indigenous lands).

59 Report of the committee set up to examine the representation (by the Union of Workers of the Autonomous University of Mexico and the Independent Union of Workers of La Jornanda) alleging non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (no 169), made under art 24 of the ILO Constitution: ILO doc GB.289/17/3 (19 March 2004).

60 See Colombia Report, above at note 58, para 69.

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63 Rodenhoff “The Aarhus Convention and its implications”, above at note 51 at 344.

64 Aarhus Convention, art 2(5).

65 Ibid.

66 K Svitlana “New laws on public participation in the newly independent states” in Zillman et al (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource Development, above at note 38, 467 at 475. See also Rodenhoff “The Aarhus Convention and its implications”, above at note 51 at 345, where she notes that the distinctive definitions of “the public” and “the public concerned” are of particular relevance in that they determine who is entitled to the rights set out in the three pillars of the convention.

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70 Ibid, noting that such people invariably remain in contact with their communities of origin: “where they are more aware and educated (particularly in the case of people who have originated from rural towns and villages), they often contribute positively to community matters or function as spokespersons”.

71 For a classical articulation of the doctrine, see the famous English case Wagon Mound No 1 (Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd) [1961] AC 388, 1 All ER 404. This case can be married with the earlier equally famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] All ER 1 where the English House of Lords, persuaded by the American case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co [1916] 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050, articulated the tortious principle of a general duty of care in what is popularly known as “the neighbour principle”: “The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour, and the lawyer's question: Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions that are called in question.”

72 Rio Declaration, above at note 46, principle 15.

73 European Environment Agency (EEA) “Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896–2000” Environmental Issue Report No 22 (2001, EEA) at preface.

74 Ibid.

75 Aarhus Convention, art 6(2)(a).

76 Id, (b)–(e).

77 Id, art 6(6)(a)–(f). This, however, is without prejudice to the right of parties to refuse to disclose certain information in accordance with arts 4(3) and (4), namely that: the public authority to which the request is addressed does not hold the information requested; or the request is manifestly unreasonable or formulated in too general a manner; or the disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for under national law, or adversely affect international relations, national defence or public security, etc: id, art 6(6).

78 See above at note 55.

79 Comm ACCC/C/2004/03, above at note 55, para 7.

80 Findings and recommendations with respect to compliance by specific parties (Ukraine (1)): ECE/MP.PP/C1/2005/2/Add.3 (14 March 2005).

81 Aarhus Convention, art 6(3).

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83 Id at 24.

84 Ibid.

85 Report of the committee set up to examine the representation (by CUT and the Colombian Medical Trade Union Association) alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (no 169), made under art 24 of the ILO Constitution: ILO doc GB.282/14/3 (14 November 2001).

86 Id, para 58.

87 ILO Convention 169, art 6(1)(c).

88 AR Lucas “Canadian participatory rights in mining and energy resource developments: The bridges to empowerment?” in Zillman et al (eds) Human Rights in Natural Resource Development, above at note 38, 305 at 322, reviewing a number of participant funding schemes developed and implemented by Canadian energy and related environmental impact assessment agencies.

89 Ibid.

90 ILO Convention 169, art 6(2).

91 Clavero, BThe indigenous rights of participation and international development agencies” (2005) 22/1Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41 at 46Google Scholar.

92 Ibid.

93 Report of the committee set up to examine the representation by the Confederación Ecuadoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (no 169), made under art 24 of the ILO Constitution, particularly para 38: ILO doc GB/282/14/2 (14 November 2001) (Ecuador Report).

94 The bidding process for the project was held on 26 June 1995 and the share agreement between the Ecuadorian government and Arco Oriente, Inc (the corporation executing the project) was signed on 27 April 1998. However, Ecuador ratified the convention on 15 May 1998 and it came into force in Ecuador on 15 May 1999, more than one year after the project was established: id, paras 2, 10 and 23.

95 Id, para 28, noting that some of the facts outlined in the complaint occurred after the convention came into force in Ecuador.

96 Id, para 24.

97 Id, para 25.

98 Clavero “The indigenous rights of participation”, above at note 91 at 47.

99 Ghanaian proverb, meaning that the rich man cannot know the poor man's problems unless he “gets off the donkey” and walks on the ground or unless he asks the poor man; see T Dogbe “The one who rides the donkey does not know the ground is hot: CEDEP's involvement in the Ghana PPA”, available at: <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G01655.pdf> (last accessed 28 May 2009).

100 ILO Convention 169, art 7(1) (emphasis added).

101 Ibid.

102 Id, art 7(3).

103 Chambers Challenging the Professions, above at note 69 at 10.

104 Aarhus Convention, art 6(7).

105 Id, art 6(3).

106 Id, art 6(8).

107 Id, art 6(9).

108 Id, art 6(1)(a).

109 Ecuador Report, above at note 93, paras 13–15.

110 Ibid.

111 Id, para 44.

112 Ibid.

113 Id, para 45(1)–(2).

114 It is for this reason that one finds in the literature “an amalgam of vague formulations and selective perceptions. Statements about the lack of an effective definition of community have appeared so frequently in the literature that it is clear we need to ask not only why has the term proved so problematic, but why it has maintained its popularity in the face of its acknowledged shortcomings”: Bryson, L and Mowbray, MCommunity: The spray-on solution” (1981) 16/4Australian Journal of Social Issues 255 at 256Google Scholar. In 1955, Hillery found in the literature 94 definitions of community and stated that the “94 definitions … [were] not all of the definitions of the community”: Hillery, G JrDefinitions of community: Areas of agreement” (1955) 20/2Rural Sociology 111 at 112Google Scholar.

115 UNDP Niger Delta Human Development Report, above at note 1 at 21.

116 Ibid.

117 Id at 113.

118 Id at 15.

119 Ibid.

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124 Switzer “Armed conflict and natural resources”, above at note 122 at 19.

125 Ross “Mineral wealth and equitable development”, above at note 82 at 28–29.

126 Id at 26.

127 Ibid. In Nigeria, it is arguably due to the government's self-consciousness about its lack of credibility among the oil bearing region that it is frantically seeking international support in its effort to mollify the people of the region.

128 The Commission on Global Governance Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995, Oxford University Press) at 22.

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