^{page 8 note 2} Fanti Customary Law, p. 82.

^{page 8 note 3} Hill, The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, pp. 63 and 74–75.

^{page 8 note 4} Pogucki, , Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vol. 1, p. 54. Other writers on northern peoples do not mention it.Google Scholar

^{page 8 note 5} See especially Hill, op. cit., Chaps. V, VI and VII.

^{page 8 note 6} Ababio v. Darkwa (1956), 1 W.A.L.R. 124 (W.A.C.A.); Angmor v. Yiadom III, [1959] G.L.R. (C.A.). For a detailed consideration, see Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, Chap. 8.

^{page 9 note 1} Unreported judgment of VanLare, Ag.J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on 31 January, 1953.

^{page 9 note 2} Op. cit., pp. 122–123.

^{page 9 note 3} See also the passage from Akomea v. Biei (1958), reported Ollennu, op. cit., p. 186 (C.A.), cited in the next paragraph.

^{page 9 note 4} Ashanti, pp. 232–233.

^{page 9 note 5} Supra, note 3.

^{page 10 note 1} It has been held that the consents necessary for a mortgage of family land are the same as those necessary for a sale: Adjei v. Appiagyei (1958), 3 W.A.L.R. 401, at p. 404.

^{page 10 note 2} Sarbah, op. cit., pp. 82–84, described pledges as if the standard terms were rarely varied by agreement. An early example of contractual variations is the evidence in Ashon v. Barng (1891), Sar. F.C.L. 153.

^{page 10 note 3} Hill, op. cit., pp. 48–49.

^{page 10 note 4} Awuku v. Agbemakpettor, unreported judgment of Quashie-Idun, J., in the Land Court, Ada, delivered on 18 July, 1949, described below; Hill, op. cit., pp. 54–55 and 73.

^{page 10 note 5} Cases cited below, p. 20, nn. 2–5; Sarbah op. cit., p. 83; Hindle, Sarbah, op. cit., Appendix II, p. 279; Rattray, op. cit., p. 232 (“borrower” clearly being a mistake for “lender”); Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, p. 219; Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 95–97 Cf. Allott, Essays in African Law, pp. 275–282; Examples 2, 3 and 5 are cases of transactions where the creditor did not obtain possession, and perhaps would not be treated as pledges by the courts: see below. In Amonoo v. Abbakuma (1871), Sar. F.C.L. 157, the land was occupied by the pledgor and pledgee jointly. The pledgor may have been there by licence of the pledgee. The Ashanti Confederacy Council proposed that pledged farms should be in the joint possession of the pledgor and pledgee: Matson, Digest of Minutes of the Ashanti Confederacy Council, 1935–1949, pp. 19–21.

^{page 10 note 6} Gblonyo v. Gordor II, unreported judgment of Quashie-Idun, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on 25th July, 1949.

^{page 10 note 7} Amonoo v. Abbakuma; Ashon v. Barng (1891), Sar. F.C.L. 153 (but see below, p. 11, n. 1); Dapaah v. Poku (1950), reported Ollennu, op. cit., p. 173 (W.A.C.A.); Kumah v. Addai, unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on May 19, 1958; Sarbah, op. cit, p. 83; Hindle, op. cit., p. 279; Ollennu, op. cit., p. 99. In Gbevlo v. Awuku, unreported judgment of Quashie-Idun, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on July 1, 1947, an express agreement to the contrary was enforced.

^{page 11 note 1} Clarke v. Nkrumah, unreported judgment of Jackson, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on December 22, 1948 (holding that if the defendant had been pledgor, as he alleged, he would not have allowed oil palms to be felled without protesting); Langmako v. Ngwah, unreported judgment of Wilson, C. J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on July 7, 1949 (where the native court had given judgment for the plaintiff, who complained that the pledgee had felled palm trees and removed iron sheets from a house; the case was sent for re-trial to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to sue on behalf of his family); Ollennu, op. cit., p. 100. On this point Ashon v. Barng (1891), Sar. F.C.L. 153, seems no longer to be good authority.

^{page 11 note 2} Dabla v. Ativor (1949), reported Ollennu, op. cit., p. 170, upheld on appeal in an unreported judgment of the West African Court of Appeal delivered on February 7, 1951.

^{page 11 note 3} Dzanku v. Kwadwo, [1960] G.L.R. 31. Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 99–100. suggests that improvements may be made, but his discussion of Dabla v. Ativor at pp. 100–101 seems contrary to this.

^{page 11 note 4} Ashon v. Barng (1891), Sar. F.C.L. 153; Sarbah, op. cit., p. 85; see also Hill, op. cit., pp. 53–54, stating that 100% was also common; and p. 77. The latter may however not refer to a transaction which would have been recognized by the courts as a pledge, because the creditor did not have possession: see below.

^{page 11 note 5} Nyako v. Atiadevie (1935), D.C. ‘31–‘37, 120, where the agreement stated that the pledgee was to enjoy the land in lieu of interest; Hindle, op. cit., p. 279; Danquah, op. cit., p. 219; Allott, op. cit., pp. 275–282, examples 3, 7 and 8, were pledges without interest, assuming (a) that they were pledges (see below) and (b) that the sums stated as having been lent were not in excess of those actually lent (cf. Awuku v. Agbemakpettor, p. 10, n. 4, ante); Hill, op. cit., p. 49, stating that interest in money, as distinct from cocoa, was rare.

^{page 11 note 6} Op. cit., pp. 82–83.

^{page 11 note 7} In Adobea v. Lassey (1956), 1 W.A.L.R. 181, the plaintiffs sued to recover possession of a house on the ground that it had been wrongfully pledged. It was held that the pledge was lawful, and that the plaintiffs must redeem it within three months or lose their right. Thus the result was an order for foreclosure. The decision seems surprising, since the plaintiffs do not appear to have asked to redeem, but it does indicate that a pledge may be ended by an order for foreclosure Ollennu, op. cit., p. 103, states that such an order may be made if the pledgor sues to redeem, In Kuma v. Anane, unreported judgment of Windsor-Aubrey, J., in the Land Court, Cape Coast, delivered on July 10, 1950, a pledgee had successfully sued for repayment of the debt. When the pledgor failed to satisfy the court's order for repayment the pledged farms were sold in execution. It was held that this procedure had been in effect a foreclosure action by customary law, and that when the pledgor failed to repay the debt the property had been lawfully sold. This last procedure for enforcing pledge debts was noted by Allott, Akan Law of Property (unpublished), pp. 429–430. See also: Norh v. Gbedemah (1929), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 395, where it was held that foreclosure had taken place; Rattray, op. cit., pp. 234–235.

^{page 12 note 1} Sei v. Ofori (1926), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 87 (holding that the creditor could not sell without recourse to the courts because the transaction was a mortgage, thus implying that if it had been a pledge he could have); Norh v. Gbedemah (1929), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 395; Nyako v. Atiadevie (1935), D.C. ‘31–‘37, 120; Dwumah v. Manu, unreported judgment of Quashie-Idun, J., in the Land Court, Kumasi, delivered on November 4, 1950 (which is authority for the same reason as Sei v. Ofori); Danquah, op. cit., p. 219, stating that there could be sale if payment was not made within “the appointed period”. Allott, Akan Law of Property (unpublished), p. 407, held that there was no right to sell or foreclose, but found, op. cit., p. 413, that a power of sale was in practice often exercised, even if it was not expressly granted. In each of the four cases just cited there was an express power. The statement by Ollennu, op. cit., p. 103, that an order of court is essential for a sale, seems to be unsupported by any other authority.

^{page 12 note 2} Clarke v. Nkrumah, p. 11, n. 1, ante (obiter); Buor v. Bekoe (1957), 3 W.A.L.R. 26 (not mentioning the need to give notice); Sarbah, op. cit., p. 83; Ollennu, op. cit., p. 107.

^{page 12 note 3} Incroma v. Marmoon (1882), Sar. F.C.L. 157; Abeka v. Duker (1927), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 264; Kofi v. Kofi (1933), 1 W.A.C.A. 284; Dabla v. Ativor, p. 11, n. 2, ante; Kuma v. Kofi (1956), 1 W.A.L.R. 128; Kumah v. Addai, p. 10, n. 7, ante; Rattray, op. cit., pp. 233–234, Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 68 and 102–103. (Only some of these authorities negative the application of estoppel by acquiescence, others merely stating that long possession gives no title.)

^{page 13 note 1} (1933), 1 W.A.C.A. 284.

^{page 13 note 2} [1960] G.L.R. 31 (C.A.).

^{page 13 note 3} Op. cit., p. 100. Danquah, op. cit., pp. 219–220, stated that the mortgagor must pay the cost of improvements if he redeemed on an earlier date than would allow the creditor to realize full interest on the amount. Rattray, op. cit., p. 233, n. 1, stated that he used to impose such a rule when deciding cases. Allott found that the pledgee could take the improvements with him if they were severable, and he might be regarded as continuing to own them if they were not; Akan Law of Property (unpublished), p. 412.

^{page 13 note 4} Sarbah, op. cit., p. 85; there is no other authority for the one-year minimum period.

^{page 13 note 5} Examples of self-liquidating pledges: Gbevlo v. Awuku, p. 10, n. 7, ante; Darko v. Abore; Attoh, unreported judgment of the High Court, Accra, delivered on April 12 1961; Allott, Essays in African Law, pp. 275–281, Examples 2 and 9 (although 2 may not have been a pledge: see below); Hill, op. cit., pp. 50–53 and 76. Examples of minimum periods where the pledges were not self-liquidating: Opoku v. Botwe (1916), Danquah, Cases in Akan Law, p. 91; Sahoe v. Ahoe, unreported judgment of Martindale, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on August 22, 1946 (where a fishing creek was pledged for a fixed period of 15 years); Dapaah v. Poku, p. 10, n. 7, ante; Amusu v. Fenuku, unreported judgment of Jackson, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on June 3, 1952, described below; Hill, op. cit., pp. 76–77; Allott, op. cit., pp. 275–282, Example 7; Beckett, Akokoaso, p. 34; Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 103–105.

^{page 13 note 6} See e.g., Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd., v. Byrne, [1940] A.C. 613 (H.L., England).

^{page 14 note 1} Opoku v.Botwe, p. 13, n. 5, ante; Gbevlo v. Awuku, p. 10, n. 7, ante (obiter); Darko v. Abore; Attoh, p. 13, n. 5, ante.

^{page 14 note 2} P. 10, n. 7, ante.

^{page 14 note 3} See below.

^{page 14 note 4} Amonoo v. Abbakuma (1871), Sar. F.C.L. 157.

^{page 14 note 5} Clarke v. Nkrumah, p. 11, n. 1, ante; Darko v. Abore; Attoh, p. 13, n. 5, ante (upholding a sale in execution, and presumably overruling Mpeso v. Kontor; Peraa, unreported judgment of BUTLER in the Court of the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, Kumasi, delivered on June 6, 1941, which had upheld an interpleader by a pledgee in such a case); Sarbah, op. cit., p. 83; Ollennu, op. cit., p. 107.

^{page 14 note 6} Clarke v. Nkrumah; Sarbah, Ibid..

^{page 14 note 7} Abeka v. Duker (1927), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 264 (where the pledgor was prevented by sickness from giving notification); Kuma v. Kofi (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 128; Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 105–106.

^{page 14 note 8} Clarke v. Nkrumah, p. 11, n. 1, ante, (where this failure was one of the reasons for the decision that there was no pledge); Kuma v. Kofi; Ollennu, Ibid..

^{page 15 note 1} Cap. 175, 1951 edition of the Laws of the Gold Coast.

^{page 15 note 2} Cap. 176, Ibid..

^{page 15 note 3} Section 3 (3).

^{page 15 note 4} This enactment follows fairly closely the English Moneylenders Acts, 1900 and 1927, and the Nigerian Moneylenders Ordinance (cap. 124, 1958 edition of the Laws of Nigeria). It seems likely that English and Nigerian authorities can be used in its interpretation: see Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe, [1956] A.C. 539 (P.C., Nigeria). Beckett seems to have been unaware of the Loans Recovery Ordinance, as a result of which he was unduly pessimistic about the courts’ ability to check usury: op. cit., P. 37.

^{page 15 note 5} Section 2. By s. 3 any person who lends money at interest or for repayment of a larger sum is to be presumed to be a moneylender until the contrary is proved.

^{page 15 note 6} Sections 12, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 26.

^{page 15 note 7} Sections 15, 16 and 17.

^{page 16 note 1} Sections 13 and 14.

^{page 16 note 2} P. 10, n. 4, ante. The case concerned the same transaction as Gbevlo v. Awuku, p. 10, n. 7, ante, where it was held to be a pledge, not a mortgage.

^{page 16 note 3} In the year in which they kept accounts, their gross return on the loan was £116, i.e., 23%.

^{page 16 note 4} P. 10, n. 7, ante.

^{page 17 note 1} P. 13, n. 5, ante.

^{page 17 note 2} The case is described by Ollennu, who was counsel for the plaintiffs, op. cit., p. 105, However, his description differs in a number of respects from that given above, which I have taken from the Judgment Book. He states that the use of the creek was to be as interest, until the last season's use, which was to constitute repayment of the loans: this seems to be inconsistent with the decision that some of the loans had already been extinguished. He stated that the defendant was ordered to account for his profits: this does not appear in the judgment. He says that the interest was fixed at 10½%, not 10% as in the Judgment Book.

^{page 17 note 3} P. 10, n. 7, ante.

^{page 17 note 4} Allott considered that there were cases of unfairness where pledgors were given inadequate relief: Akan Law of Property (unpublished), p. 411. He found that the Loans Recovery Ordinance was “more often ignored than enforced”: op. cit., p. 449.

^{page 17 note 5} Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe, [1956] A.C. 539 (P.C., interpreting the Nigerian Moneylenders Ordinance, with wording identical to s. 19 of the Ghanaian Ordinance); Attah v. Nkureh (1966), C.C. 132; Wale v. Wae (1966), C.C. 150.

^{page 18 note 1} Offi v.Appiah (1965), C.C. 193, giving effect to the proviso to s. 23 (1) of the Moneylenders Ordinance.

^{page 18 note 2} Donkor v. Dapaah, unreported judgment of JACKSON, J., in the Land Court, Kumasi, delivered on December 17, 1949.

^{page 18 note 3} Awuku v. Agbemakpettor, p. 10, n. 4, ante (described above); Dapaah v. Poku, p. 10, n. 7, ante (where this seems to have been the ratio decidendi, rather than the customary law rule that a pledge is always redeemable, as stated by Ollennu, op. cit., pp. 98–99); Amusu v. Fenuku, p. 13, n. 5, ante, (described above). The strongest case is Afram v. Akwasi, unreported judgment of Lingley, Ag. J., in the Divisional Court, Accra, delivered on October 17, 1947, which concerned a mortgage; it was held that at common law the restriction on the power of redemption would be reasonable, but that the Loans Recovery Ordinance nevertheless allowed the mortgagor to disregard it.

^{page 18 note 4} Unreported judgment of Doorly, J., in the Divisional Court, Kumasi, delivered on January 15, 1943.

^{page 18 note 5} See also Hill, op. cit., p. 68, quotation from an official memorandum expressing the same view.

^{page 19 note 1} See e.g., Hill, op. cit., passim. The properties pledged were often farms bought by migrant cocoa farmers in areas other than those where they were citizens. Thus they concerned business ventures, not land which had long been held by the families, nor land which had been used for the subsistence of the pledgors. So also Beckett found that pledges were generally of cocoa farms, not of household property: op. cit., p. 34.

^{page 19 note 2} See Holdsworth, , A History of English Law, Vol. III, 3rd edn., pp. 128–130, for the old law. The pledge was never quite the same as a mortuum vadium, because the pledgor's rights have never been extinguished by failure to repay. The principal distinction between the two modern systems is that in practice the pledgee exercises his right to possession, whereas the mortgagee very rarely does, even when he has such a right.Google Scholar

^{page 19 note 3} Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 (No. 4), s. 19, re-enacted several times, its final form being the Courts Ordinance (cap. 4, 1951 edition of the Laws of the Gold Coast), s. 87 (1); enactments for the inferior courts, e.g. the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance (cap. 98, Ibid.), s. 15; the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9) s. 66 (1), superseding the previous enactments, and now re-enacted in the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), para. 64 (1).

^{page 20 note 1} See the enactments cited in the preceding note.

^{page 20 note 2} F.C. ‘26–‘29, 87.

^{page 20 note 3} F.C. ‘26–‘29, 395.

^{page 20 note 4} I W.A.C.A. 63.

^{page 20 note 5} Nyako v. Atiadevie (1935), D.C. ‘31–‘37, 120 (creditor given possession: held to be pledge, but the written agreement in any case stated this explicitly); Gbevlo v. Awuku, p. 10, n. 7, ante (where possession by the creditor may have influenced the court in holding the transaction to be a pledge); Dapaah v. Poku, p. 10, n. 7, ante (per Blackall, P., implying that possession by the creditor indicated that it was a pledge); Dwumah v. Manu, p. 12, n. 1, ante (holding the transaction to be a mortgage because the creditor was not in possession); Cook v. Kutsoatsi, [1960] G.L.R. 96; Darko v. Abore; Attoh, p. 13, n. 5, ante (holding that possession by the creditor indicated a pledge).

^{page 20 note 6} Mpeso v. Kontor; Peraa, p. 14, n. 5, ante. Beckett, op. cit., p. 34, found that this could be done, although out of 45 pledges examined only one involved it.

^{page 20 note 7} See Allott, op. cit., pp. 275–282, Examples 2, 3 and 5; Hill, op. cit., p. 77. Allott considers that customary law developed its own forms of mortgages, where the creditor was not placed in possession, but agrees that these are not recognized by the courts: Akan Law of Property (unpublished), pp. 437–440. See also the discussion of Bossom v. Attonie (1897), reported Redwar, Comments on some ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony, p. 199, by Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana land law, pp. 377–379.

^{page 21 note 1} Swanzy v. Bordoh (1891), reported Redwar, op. cit., p. 197.

^{page 21 note 2} P. 10, n. 7, ante for the facts, see the description of Awuku v. Agbemakpettor, above, p. 10, n. 4, ante, given above.

^{page 21 note 3} Afram v. Akwasi, p. 18, n. 3, ante.

^{page 21 note 4} P. 10, n. 7, ante.

^{page 21 note 5} This view was followed in Darko v. Abore; Attoh, p. 13, n. 5, ante.

^{page 21 note 6} Swanzy v. Bordoh, supra; Norh v. Gbedemah (1929), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 395.

^{page 21 note 7} See e.g. Kwesi-Johnston v. Effie (1953), 14 W.A.C.A. 254.

^{page 21 note 8} See e.g. Ferguson v. Duncan (1953), 14 W.A.C.A. 316.

^{page 21 note 9} Swanzy v. Bordoh, supra.

^{page 21 note 10} Afram v. Akwasi, p. 18, n. 3, ante; Gura v. Agyei, unreported judgment of QUIST, J., in the Land Court, Cape Coast, delivered on October 26, 1948. There seem to be no cases concerning such an arrangement in English law.

^{page 22 note 1} In re Rumney and Smith, [1897] 2 Ch. 351 (C.A., England).

^{page 22 note 2} Sei v. Ofori (1926), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 87; Adjei v. Dabanka (1930), 1 W.A.C.A. 63; Dwumah v. Manu, p. 12, n. 1, ante (where there was an express provision for sale without an order of court).

^{page 22 note 3} Millett v. Davy (1862), 54 E.R. 1221.

^{page 22 note 4} The conditions for the operation of this doctrine are set out in Abbey v. Ollennu (1954), 14 W.A.C.A. 567, citing Willmott v. Barber (1880), 15 Ch.D. 96.

^{page 22 note 5} For the principle that a pledge can never be extinguished by acquiescence, see p. 12, n. 3, ante.

^{page 23 note 1} The present enactment is the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), which has replaced the Land Registry Ordinance (cap. 133, 1951 edition of the Laws of the Gold Coast). It is not possible to discuss adequately here the difficult problems raised by these enactments on priority between common law and customary law conveyances.

^{page 23 note 2} For the formalities of pledges, see above. It was once believed that a deposit of title deeds was essential to create an equitable mortgage: Bossom v. Attonie, p. 20, n. 7, ante. This was overruled in Sei v. Ofori (1926), F.C. ‘26–‘29, 87.

^{page 23 note 3} See p. 19, n. 3, ante.

^{page 23 note 4} See the enactments listed above, p. 19, n. 3. There was in theory one situation where a “mixed” loan agreement might have been possible. In a case in the Supreme Court between a “native” (a term defined in the Ordinance) and a “non-native”, customary law was to be applied: “where it may appear to the Court that substantial injustice would be done to either party by a strict adherence to the rules of [common law].” In the case put in the text, one party might be a “native” and the other a “nonnative”. If they had had a dispute which turned on the power to sell without recourse to the courts, it might have been held that, in view of the express agreement, substantial injustice would be done to the creditor by a strict adherence to common law. If they had had a dispute turning on any other point, there would have been no ground for applying customary law, and so common law would have applied. Such a case never arose in practice, and indeed cases on the “substantial injustice” clause were rare. Thus the argument had no practical significance.

^{page 24 note 1} Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), para. 64 (i), Rule 2, re-enacting the Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), s. 66 (1), Rule 2.

^{page 24 note 2} P. 13, n. 5, ante; described above.

^{page 24 note 3} See also Brown v. Nassar, unreported judgment of Quashie-Idun, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on September 5, 1949. In that case common law applied, and English authorities were followed, but the result was the same as in Amusu v. Fenuku. The plaintiff had executed a conveyance of a house to the defendants for £350; they had then leased her the house, and had agreed orally to re-sell it to her after five years. The house was worth £1, 658. The plaintiff, suing after the five years had elapsed, was granted a declaration that this was in fact a mortgage, and an order for redemption. In Kwaning v. Boateng, unreported judgment of Windsor-Aubrey, J., in the Land Court, Kumasi, delivered on January 21, 1952, there had been a series of transactions. In the first the defendant purported to convey a house to the plaintiff. Six months later the defendant acknowledged an advance for repairs to the house and again transferred it to the plaintiff. Later he acknowledged the receipt of another sum to save the house from attachment, and conveyed it to the plaintiff for a third time. Finally the plaintiff acknowledged the receipt of a sum “as part payment of an account in respect of” the house. It was held that none of the transactions had been a sale, and that they were merely mortgages. In Mojifa v. Magerty, unreported judgment of Jackson, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on June 9, 1952, the court held that there was no completed contract, because the parties had not agreed whether there was to be a pledge or a licence; the creditor was seeking an order for a grant of a licence, and failed. This decision may not have been entirely beneficial to the debtors, who were ordered to repay the debt. It would perhaps have been more satisfactory to grant a declaration, following the above cases, that there was an agreement for a pledge concealed as a licence, and to enforce the pledge.

^{page 25 note 1} Sarbah, op. cit., p. 73 (on land sold by a family); Rattray, op. cit., pp. 236–237, It is improbable that this right exists today.

^{page 25 note 2} (1958), 3 W.A.L.R. 540.

^{page 25 note 3} See also Khoury v. Addo, unreported judgment of Wilson, C.J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on September 10, 1949, where it was held that certain transactions seemed to be mortgages dressed up like sales with a right of repurchase. It was unnecessary to decide the point, because they were in either case ineffective for lack of the requisite consents.

^{page 25 note 4} Unreported judgment of COUSSEY, J., in the Land Court, Accra, delivered on March 2, 1945.

^{page 26 note 1} See also Aboagye v. Abokyi, unreported judgment of Dennison, J., in the Land Court, Cape Coast, delivered on February 4, 1952, where a sale followed later by a promise to re-sell was held to be a pledge.