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³ Elections to the Constituent Assembly (CA) were held at the beginning of 1994. Actual debate and deliberations in the Assembly commenced in April of the same year. While the election and the debate are both interesting issues for examination, this article is concerned mainly with the process preceding these events. Although not specifically referenced, extensive reliance is placed on the Ugandan media output, which is prolific and fairly independent. This covers the period 1993 to 1994. The newspapers heavily relied upon include: The New Vision, The Monitor, Weekly Topic, Uganda Confidential, and Star.

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⁹ S. 1 of Act No. 12 stated: “The National Assembly may from time to time resolve itself into a Constituent Assembly with full power to enact such provisions for or in connection with the establishment of a new Constitution as it thinks fit”.

¹⁰ Art. 1 refers to the supremacy of the Constitution, Art. 3 to its alteration, and Art. 63 to the power to make law.

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¹² National Resistance Movement, The Ten-Point Programme of the National Resistance Movement, Kampala, 1986.

¹³ Salyaga, S., “RCs: a path for democracy?” (1987) 9, 2Forward 9;Google ScholarE., E. Ddungu and Wabwire, A., Electoral Mechanisms and the Democratic Process, CBR Working Paper No. 9, 1990;Google ScholarKiapi, A., “The Inspector General of Government: Uganda's ombudsman of all trades”, (1990) 9 The Ombudsman Journal 91;Google ScholarOloka-Onyango, J., “The dynamics of corruption control and human rights enforcement in Uganda”, (1993) 1, 1East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 23;Google ScholarBrett, E. A., “Rebuilding organization capacity in Uganda under the NRM”, (1994) 32 Journal of Modem African Studies 53. The major constitutional instrument of the NRM regime is Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (LN1/86), which formed the basis for the legitimization and subsequent exercise of state power by the government. Like its predecessors, LN1/86 suspended Art. 3 (alteration of the Constitution); Chapter IV (the Executive), save Arts. 24, 28, 34, 35 and 36; Chapter V (on Parliament) and Art. 63 (on the power to make laws for Uganda), of the 1967 Constitution. LN1/86 introduced several new concepts into the mode of governance such as the vetting of Presidential appointees (paras. 8 and 9), although in substance the exercise of this power has rarely been witnessed in Parliament.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²⁰ Justice Odoki responded by asserting that the UCC had visited and carried out seminars at the sub-county and district levels in all the disturbed areas. Furthermore, the areas which were excluded from the more extensive canvassing by the Commission would be represented in the Constituent Assembly at which time they would get the opportunity to fully air their views on the Constitution.

²¹ The issue of financial dependence on external funding surfaced in bold relief when a major financier of the Commission withheld further assistance on account of improprieties alleged to have taken place in the UCC's parent Ministry. See “DANTDA stops constitution aid”, New Vision, 9 January, 1993, 1.

²² The UCC focused on Resistance Councils and Committees (RCs), the NRM's grassroots structures that commence at the village level and extend upwards through to the county and district levels. The total number of memoranda received amounted to 15,693, broken down into the following categories: RCI 9,525, RCII 2,170, RCIII 575, RCIV 13, RCV 36, Individuals 2,539, and Groups 835 (Uganda Constitutional Commission).

²³ Translated literally from the Luganda, ebyqffe connotes “our things”. It refers to the overall cultural and material assets appropriated or abolished by the first Obote Government in the 1966 putsch against the monarchies.

²⁴ Mazrui, A. A., “Privilege and protest as integrative factors: the case of Buganda's status in Uganda”, in Mazrui, A. A. and Rotberg, R. I., Protest and Power in Black Africa, New York/Oxford, 1970.Google Scholar

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²⁶ Indeed, on more than one occasion, the principal architects of the restoration of the Kingdom asserted that they had no intention of crowning the King. Thus, for example, Africa Now (April 1986, 6) reported that Abu Mayanja, later to become the co-chairman of the Kabaka's coronation, told a gathering that those pushing for the restoration of the Kabakaship were members of FOBA (Force Obote Back Again). See further, “Mutebi already Kabaka”, New Vision, 2 April, 1993, in which the Bataka (Baganda Clan Heads) denied that Mutebi would be endironed as Kabaka.

²⁷ The three volumes of the final report comprise the Analysis and Recommendations of the various memoranda and seminars conducted, the Index of Sources of People's Views, and the draft Constitution.

²⁸ Tamale, S. R., “Law reform and women's rights in Uganda”, (1993) 1, 2East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 164;Google ScholarHarries, C., “Daughters of our peoples: international feminism meets Ugandan law and custom”, (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 493. See also draft Art. 14, which refers to the “unique status and natural maternal functions”: both of which continue to reflect the dominant perception of women as objects to be “protected” by their menfolk and emphasizing their traditional role as child-bearers and nurturers.Google Scholar

²⁹ For an examination of the evolution and operation of judicial power in Uganda, see Oloka-Onyango, J., Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda, CBR Working Paper No. 30, Kampala, 1993.Google Scholar

³⁰ Only injured individuals can move the Commission. Whilst Art. 77 of the draft provides for the Human Rights Commission to initiate investigations on its own motion, a much stronger provision would be necessary to give it the power of review of constitutionally offensive legislation upon enactment—a power that is not given to the judiciary (cf. draft Art. 156 on the power of the judiciary).

³¹ Indeed, Art. 97 is striking for its comprehensiveness, extending to the issue of the declaration of public assets and accountability, when there is only silence on the same issues in relation to the Movement.

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³³ This was not without considerable opposition from among members of the NRC comprising a rear-guard action led by former Attorney General George Kanyeihamba to abort the process (see, “Constitutional assembly bill blasted”, New Vision, 23 November, 1992, and “NRC can work as C. Assembly—Babu”, Weekly Topic, 15 January, 1993). The Bill was eventually passed after one of Museveni's closed session addresses to the NRC.

³⁴ It is nevertheless clear that the appointment was intended to act as a sop to the numerically significant Iteso, who had also suffered a long and debilitating period of military suppression under the NRA.

³⁵ The pre-election report of the African-American Institute stated that, for the very reason of the appointment, the Commissioner was under a special duty to be as objective as possible and open to public scrutiny (African-American Institute, below n. 37, 55). However, the new Commissioner soon ran into problems with journalists over what was perceived to be a lack of forthrightness and a tendency to patronize rather than listen.

³⁶ A “contentious matter” arises under the statute if the motion is supported by the votes of the majority of delegates voting, but does not obtain the support of two-thirds of the delegates voting (s. 17(3)(f)).

³⁷ African-American Institute, Uganda: Pre-Election Assessment, Washington D.C., 1993.Google Scholar

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